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ABSTRACT
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea covering an area of approximately
3.5 million square kilometres and bordering China, Taiwan, and a number of other
Southeast Asian States. As one of the busiest international sea lanes linking North East
Asia with the rest of the world, securing maritime safety and the freedom of navigation
in the South China Sea is essential for global trade. The region is also important from a
military perspective. Military vessels and aircraft of regional and extra-regional
countries transit through this maritime region, from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian
Ocean and the Middle East. However, clashes between littoral States over territorial
sovereignty and associated maritime claims in the South China Sea have become
commonplace. So too have disputes over differing interpretations of international law
provisions relating to navigation and maritime safety in various maritime jurisdictional
zones. Indeed, these factors mean that the South China Sea ―ranks among the most
geographically and geopolitically complex ocean spaces in the world.‖1
All States surrounding the South China Sea (except Taiwan) are parties to the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). However, despite the LOSC
having entered into force in 1994, many regional disputes remain unresolved, making
the South China Sea ripe for potential conflicts. Apart from the LOSC, there are a
number of international conventions governing the safe passage of vessels and aircraft
on and over the sea. These include the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, and the
Convention on International Civil Aviation. Nevertheless, in an effort to protect their
interests and strengthen their maritime claims in the region, littoral and non-littoral
1

Clive Schofield, 'What's at stake in the South China Sea? Geographical and geopolitical considerations'
in Robert Beckman et al (eds), Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: Legal Frameworks
for the Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources (Edward Elgar, 2013) , 11.

v

States have strengthened the presence of their military and law enforcement vessels and
aircraft (sovereign immune vessels and aircraft). In doing so, multiple clashes have
occurred over the past 20 years, with such clashes showing no sign of abatement.
Sovereign immune vessels and aircraft operating at sea should act in accordance
with the international law of the sea and air. However, inconsistencies and ambiguities
exist in the navigational regimes of the LOSC, the practice of States, as well as in the
prevailing international law. Due to the geopolitical complexity of the South China Sea,
additional naval and law enforcement vessels including surface combatants, submarines,
and aircraft are likely to be operating in this region in the near future. With this
concentration of military and law enforcement assets, the potential for maritime
incidents involving sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea will
undoubtedly increase.
To address the problems arising from the passage of these types of vessels and
aircraft, a number of solutions have been devised. They include binding and nonbinding regional instruments, bilateral agreements, unilateral initiatives, as well as
guidelines proposed by regional governments and academic and policy forums.
However, these efforts have had very limited success.
This thesis provides an analysis of the international legal regime and geopolitical
issues surrounding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South
China Sea. International law principles, regional efforts, and the practice of South China
Sea littoral States regarding the passage of such vessels and aircraft in different
maritime zones of jurisdiction are critically analysed. Following on from this,
ambiguities and gaps in the current international legal framework and regional efforts
are identified. The thesis then provides potential options for clearer, more responsible
navigational regimes for sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea.
vi
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1

Introduction
Security tensions in the South China Sea caused by maritime disputes and

complex strategic relations have increased. One important aspect of maritime security in
the South China Sea is tensions generated by differences over the operation of vessels
and aircraft from navies and law enforcement services in waters under the jurisdiction,
or claimed jurisdiction, of littoral States. There have thus been numerous incidents in
the South China Sea involving these types of vessels and aircraft, and with rising
tensions and the proliferation of forces operating in the area, the potential for further
incidents is likely to grow. The risk of a major war in the South China Sea is low;
however, rising political temperatures mean that maritime conflicts might still occur.
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea surrounded by seven littoral States
and territories, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and
Indonesia.1 This region is not only a fertile fishing ground,2 but also rich in hydrocarbon
deposits.3 Apart from natural resources, the South China Sea is the world‘s second
busiest international sea lane, linking the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. However,
maritime disputes in the South China Sea are very complex and difficult to resolve.
These disputes concern territorial sovereignty and maritime boundary claims, and can
be bilateral, trilateral or multilateral in nature. In addition, disputes exist between littoral

1

Thailand and Cambodia are not considered South China Sea littoral States as the Gulf of Thailand does
not form part of the South China Sea. Singapore is not considered a State bordering the South China Sea,
as for the purpose of this thesis, the limits of the South China Sea are based on the 4 th draft of the
International Hydrographic Organization Publication S-23 (see Chapter two for more details).
2
UNEP, 'Procedure for Establishing a Regional System of Fisheries Refugia in the South China Sea and
Gulf of Thailand in the context of the UNEP/GEF project titled ―Reserving Environmental Degradation
Trends in the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand" in South China Sea Knowledge Document (UNEP,
2007) , 1. It is also worth noting that the South China Sea‘s fisheries have been severely over-exploited
and the depletion of fish stocks in this area due to overfishing and pollution is a really big concern, see
Sumaila, Rashid and William Cheung, ‗Boom or Bust: the Future of Fish in the South China Sea‘ (2015)
<http://www.admcf.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/FishSCSea03_11-FINAL-FINAL.pdf>.
3
U.S. Energy Information Administration, 'South China Sea' (7 February 2013).

1

States and extra-regional powers over the freedom of navigation and overflight in
various maritime zones.
In order to strengthen their territorial sovereignty and maritime claims, the
States concerned have employed different approaches. These approaches include the
construction of artificial islands- on disputed offshore features, deploying naval and
maritime law enforcement personnel to assert their claims, applying restrictive views on
the freedoms of navigation and overflight in various maritime jurisdiction zones, as well
as using coercive power to further advance their claims.
The international law of the sea has played a vital role in promoting global peace
and preventing air and sea incidents. However, the law of the sea cannot help to solve
sovereignty disputes over land features. Moreover, as international treaties are
invariably the product of compromise, there are always gaps and ambiguities in their
provisions. As a result, States have adopted conflicting interpretations of international
law provisions – interpretations which suit their own vested interests. Due to existing
gaps and ambiguities in the international legal regime, and the geopolitical complexity
of the South China Sea, there have been many incidents involving the passage of naval
and law enforcement vessels and aircraft in this region.
Apart from international law, there have been a number of regional initiatives to
address safe navigation and overflight at sea, including bilateral and multilateral
agreements advocated by regional institutions, as well as guidelines and principles
proposed by regional academic and policy forums. However, these initiatives have had
limited success.
As territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea are unlikely to be
resolved in the near future, concerned States have responded by modernising their
maritime forces, including naval, coastguard and other types of civilian law
2

enforcement assets. The increasing presence of naval and maritime law enforcement
vessels and aircraft (sovereign immune vessels and aircraft) from littoral states, and the
presence of vessels and aircraft of extra-regional powers in this confined and congested
region, will continue to create high tensions and the potential for maritime incidents in
the South China Sea.
This thesis uses the term ―sovereign immune vessels and aircraft‖ to refer to all
vessels and aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on
government non-commercial service.4 These types of vessels and aircraft include, but
are not limited to, vessels and aircraft of navies, coast guards, fisheries agencies and
border protection agencies. This thesis aims to analyse this problem and identify ways
to reduce the likelihood of future potential incidents by providing a number of
recommendations based on the existing international law and the geopolitical contexts
of the South China Sea.
1.2

International law and regional initiatives to address the passage of sovereign
immune vessels and aircraft at sea
There are a number of international conventions addressing the passage of

sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea. These include the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC);5 the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs);6 the International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea (SOLAS);7 and the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago

4

See Chapter Four for a detailed definition of ―sovereign immune vessels and aircraft.‖
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982 (entered into
force 16 November 1994), [hereafter LOSC].
6
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, adopted 20 October 1972 (entered into force
15 July 1977) [hereafter COLREGs], rule 1.
7
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, adopted 1 November 1974 (entered into force 25
May 1980) [hereafter SOLAS].
5

3

Convention).8 However, due to existing gaps and ambiguities in these conventions, the
passage of these types of vessels and aircraft is not clearly addressed. In the South
China Sea, state practice regarding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft
is also divergent. As a result, there have been frequent incidents in the region involving
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft of littoral States and extra-regional players.
In an effort to fill the gaps and ambiguities in the existing international law, a
number of regional initiatives addressing the passage of sovereign immune vessels and
aircraft in the South China Sea have been devised. These include: (i) the Declaration on
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea signed by ASEAN member states and China
in 2002; (ii) the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea adopted by the Western Pacific
Naval Symposium in 2014; (iii) the Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the
Exclusive Economic Zone, as well as its revision initiated by a group of academic and
policy experts and titled Principles for Building Confidence and Security in the
Exclusive Economic Zone of the Asia-Pacific; (iv) policy recommendations proposed
by the South China Sea Workshop Process initiated by Indonesia in 1989 and the
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) established in 1993; and
(v) other maritime cooperative and confidence building measures between littoral States
of the South China Sea.9 There have been a number of bilateral agreements for
managing incidents at sea in other contexts which could also be applied to the South
China Sea region. The Incidents at Sea Agreement signed by the United States and the
former Soviet Union in 1972 (INCSEA 1972),10 and the Incidents at Sea Agreement

8

Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed 7 December 1944 (entered into force 4 April 1947),
art 3.
9
See Chapter 7 of the thesis for a detailed discussion.
10
Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed 25
May 1972 (entered into force 25 May 1972).

4

between Indonesia and Malaysia (MALINDO) signed in 2001, are examples of bilateral
agreements for managing incidents at sea.11 In 1979 the United States launched the U.S.
Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program to oppose excessive maritime claims through ―a
peaceful exercise of the rights and freedoms of navigation and overflight recognized
under international law.‖12 Indeed, a number of operational assertions have been
conducted under the FON Program to challenge the excessive maritime claims of South
China Sea littoral States.13 However, these efforts have had little success in preventing
contentious incidents involving the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in
the region.
1.3

Unresolved maritime disputes in the South China Sea
Maritime disputes in the South China Sea have resisted easy resolution. These

disputes concern territorial sovereignty and associated maritime claims, access to
resources, the legal status of islands under the LOSC, as well as navigational regimes in
the LOSC, particularly the innocent passage of foreign warships and the freedoms of
navigation and overflight in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of coastal States.
There are more than 250 small offshore features located in the middle of the
South China Sea, including islands, rocks, reefs, shoals, and atolls.14 The exact number
of these features is not available as most of them are submerged at high tide, and only

11

MALINDO Prevention of Sea Incident Cooperative Guidelines (Jakarta 18 January 2001).
Department of State, Limits of the Seas: United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (United
States Department of State, 1992), 6.
13
DoD Annual Freedom of Navigation (FON) Reports (15 February 2016) U.S. Department of Defense <
http://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/FON>; see also Marcus Weisgerber, Annual DoD Report
Claims Steady Chinese Military Expansion (6 May 2013) Defense News
<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130506/DEFREG02/305060008/>.
14
Sonika Gupta, 'Emerging Security Architecture in Southeast & East Asia: Growing Tensions in the
South China Sea' (2013) 213 ISPS Issue Brief 1, 2.
12

5

some of them may be classified as islands under the LOSC.15 Sovereignty claims over
these offshore features by States surrounding the South China Sea are overlapping and
difficult to resolve. Indeed, there are five offshore groups of features in the South China
Sea which are claimed by more than one State. These include the Pratas Islands, the
Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Macclesfield Bank, and the Spratly Islands. The
Pratas Islands are located in the north-eastern part of the South China Sea and cover an
ocean space of approximately 45 square kilometres. Although currently occupied by
Taiwan, the Pratas Islands have also been claimed by China.16 The Paracel Islands are
located in the north-western part of the South China Sea and cover an ocean surface
area of more than 16,000 square kilometres. These islands are subject to overlapping
territorial claims by China, Taiwan and Vietnam, but are currently under Chinese
control.17 Scarborough Shoal is located approximately 124 nautical miles from
Zambales Province in the Philippines and within the Philippines‘ claimed EEZ. 18 This
feature is claimed by China, Taiwan and the Philippines, but since the maritime standoff
between the two States in 2012, China appears to have taken effective control of the
Shoal.19 Macclesfield Bank consists of a group of entirely submerged shoals and reefs
located in the centre of the South China Sea, between the Paracel Islands and
Scarborough Shoal.20 This Bank is claimed by China and Taiwan; however, as this

15

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982 (entered
into force 16 November 1994), Art 121. Article 121 of the LOSC defines an island as ―a naturally formed
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide‖.
16
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, 'South China Sea and the Gulf of Thailand' in Sailing
Direction (National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, 13th ed, 2011) , 4.
17
Hong Thao Nguyen, 'Vietnam‘s Position on the Sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratlys: Its
Maritime Claims' (2012) 1 Journal of East Asia and International Law 165, 167.
18
Robert Beckman, 'Scarborough Shoal: Flashpoint for Confrontation or Opportunity for Cooperation?'
(2012) (7/2012) RSIS Commentaries 1, 2.
19
M. Taylor Fravel, China's Island Strategy: "Redefine the Status Quo." (1 November 2012) The
Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-the-status-quo/>.
20
Ronald O'Rourke, 'Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving
China: Issues for Congress' (Congressional Research Service, 5 August 2014), 3.
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feature is totally submerged, no State can effectively occupy it. The Spratly Islands are
located in the south-eastern part of the South China Sea and cover an ocean surface area
of approximately 240,000 square kilometres.21 China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the
whole archipelago, while Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei claim certain parts of it.
All claimants, with the exception of Brunei, have military or maritime forces present in
the archipelago. Over the past few years, China has conducted an extensive artificial
island-building program on a number of its occupied features in the Spratlys, ignoring
protests from other claimant States and concerned countries.22
Under the LOSC, an island may have its own territorial sea, contiguous zone,
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. However, ―rocks which cannot sustain
human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone
or continental shelf.‖23 To date, only China has claimed that the Spratly Islands are
entitled to a territorial sea, an EEZ and a continental shelf.24 Other claimants have not
officially stated whether they share China‘s view with regard to the Spratly Islands, or
whether these islands should all be regarded as ―rocks‖ under Article 121 of the LOSC.
On 12 July 2016, an arbitral tribunal established as a result of a case brought by the
Philippines under Annex VII of the LOSC issued an award in the South China Sea
dispute between China and the Philippines. The arbitral tribunal ruled that none of the

21

Clive H Schofield, 'Island disputes and the "oil factor" in the South China Sea disputes' (2012) 4
Current Intelligence 3, 3.
22
See Greg Torode, China to project power from artificial islands in South China Sea (19 February 2015)
Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/19/us-southchinasea-reefs-chinaidUSKBN0LN0J820150219>; see also Senators McCain, Reed, Corker, and Menendez Send Letter on
Chinese Maritime Strategy (19 March 2015 ) United States Senate Committee on Armed Services
<http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/senators-mccain-reed-corker-and-menendez-sendletter-on-chinese-maritime-strategy>.
23
LOSC, art 121.
24
See Communication dated 14 April 2011 on the CLCS
<https://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm>.
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features in the Spratly Islands are capable of generating an EEZ or a continental shelf.25
Although the arbitral tribunal‘s award is legally binding on all the parties to the
arbitration, it is unenforceable. In fact, China has rejected the arbitral tribunal‘s ruling
outright.
In addition to territorial sovereignty disputes and associated maritime claims
over offshore features in the South China Sea, China and Taiwan‘s ambiguous ninedash line claim which covers almost the whole South China Sea area has created
confusion and tension among littoral States and extra-regional players.26 Vietnam,
Indonesia and the United States have rejected China‘s nine-dash line claim as having no
international legal basis, while the Philippines took the step of referring the matter to
arbitration, requesting an award to the effect that China‘s claim is contrary to the
LOSC.27 Many commentators have disputed the legal and technical basis for the ninedash line, and it continues to prove a major obstacle to dispute resolution in the South
China Sea.28 In its final award, the arbitral tribunal ruled that the nine-dash line claimed
by China has no legal basis. This is indeed a landmark ruling, but enforcing the decision
and establishing its validity under customary international law will be challenging, not
the least because China has rejected the ruling and will thus continue to assert the claim.
25

South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v People's Republic of China) (Case No. 2013-19)
(Award) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 12 July 2016) [646].
26
China introduced the so-called nine dash-line in 2009 in response to joint submissions by Vietnam and
Malaysia on their extended continental shelves to the CLCS. See Notes Verbal CML/18/2009 (7 May
2009) < http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/chn_2009re_vnm.pdf>.
27
See United States Department of State Limits in the Seas: China's Maritime Claims in the South China
Sea (5 December 2014); Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, Notification and
Statement of Claim, Manila 22 January 2013; See Vietnam Notes <
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/vnm_chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.p
df>; Indonesia Notes <
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf>.
28
Melek has commented that the nine dash-line map ―has little or no legal value for China to establish its
sovereignty or historic right claim.‖ See Melda Malek, 'A Legal Assessment of China's historic claims in
the South China Sea' (2013) 5(1) Australian Journal of Maritime and Oceans Affairs 28, 34; Florian
Dupuy and Pierre Marie Dupuy, 'A Legal Analysis of China's Historic Rights Claim in the South China
Sea' (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 124, 131-36; see also Francois Xavier Bonnet,
'Geopolitics of Scarborough Shoal' 2012 14 Irasec's Discussion Papers 1, 23.
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1.4

Incidents to date and the potential for future incidents
There have been two prominent incidents between sovereign immune vessels

and aircraft in the South China Sea in recent times. The first took place in 2001 and
involved a collision between a Chinese F-8II fighter and a U.S. EP-3 maritime
reconnaissance aircraft. The second incident occurred in 2009 and involved a U.S.
ocean surveillance ship, the USNS Impeccable, and a group of five Chinese law
enforcement and fishing vessels.29 In both cases, the United States argued that military
surveying, hydrographic surveying and intelligence collection by military vessels and
aircraft in a foreign State‘s EEZ are part of the normal high seas freedoms of navigation
and overflight granted under the LOSC. Meanwhile, China argued that unauthorised
military data collection in its EEZ violates the principle of the peaceful use of the sea set
out in the LOSC.30 In June 2009, a Chinese navy submarine hit the sonar array towed by
the destroyer USS John McCain near Subic Bay, approximately 144 miles off the coast
of the Philippines.31 On 5 December 2013, a Chinese amphibious ship encountered the
USS Cowpens in the South China Sea at a distance of less than 500 yards, forcing the
Cowpens to take evasive action to avoid a collision.32 On 19 August 2014, a Chinese
Shenyang J-11B fighter intercepted a U.S. Navy P-8 marine patrol and surveillance
aircraft in international airspace over the South China Sea. The incident occurred
approximately 135 miles east of China‘s Hainan Island and within China‘s claimed

29

See Chapter seven of this thesis for details.
Shirley A Kan, 'China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy
Implications' (Congressional Research Service, October 2001), 20.
31
David Carter and Erik Slavin, USS McCain arrives at Sasebo after suffering damage to sonar array (17
June 2009) Stars and Stripes <http://www.stripes.com/news/uss-mccain-arrives-at-sasebo-after-sufferingdamage-to-sonar-array-1.92521>.
32
See Chapter seven of the thesis for further details.
30
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EEZ.33 According to Pentagon spokesman Rear Admiral John Kirby, the interception
was ―very close, very dangerous... pretty aggressive and very unprofessional.‖34 As
China and the United States have conflicting views over what types of military activities
can be conducted in the EEZ of coastal States, further incidents involving the navigation
of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea are likely to occur in
the future.
Incidents involving law enforcement vessels of South China Sea littoral States
have also increased in recent years. In June 2010, a standoff occurred when the
Indonesian navy seized a Chinese fishing vessel operating in the waters north of Natuna
Island in Indonesia‘s claimed EEZ. A Chinese maritime surveillance vessel arrived on
the scene and pointed its large-calibre machine gun at the Indonesian naval vessel and
threatened to fire if the Indonesian vessel did not release the Chinese fishing boat.35 On
2 March 2011, two Chinese patrol boats manoeuvred close to and threatened to ram the
MV Veritas Voyager, a Philippine survey vessel operating in the Reed Bank area off
Palawan Island in the Philippines. The actions of the Chinese patrol boats ultimately
forced the MV Veritas Voyager to leave the area.36 On 26 May 2011, a Chinese
maritime surveillance vessel intentionally cut the cable towed by the Binh Minh 02, a
vessel operated by PetroVietnam well within Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ.37 In 2012, China
and the Philippines were involved in a two month standoff at Scarborough Shoal – a
feature over which both countries claim sovereignty. The standoff was sparked by two
33

Christopher P. Cavas, Chinese Fighter Buzzes US Patrol Aircraft (22 August 2014) Defense News
<http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140822/DEFREG02/308220025/Chinese-Fighter-Buzzes-USPatrol-Aircraft>.
34
Quoted in ibid.
35
Kelly Currie, Why is China Picking Fights with Indonesia? (6 August 2010) Weekly Standard
<http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/why-china-picking-fights-indonesia>.
36
Philippines halts tests after China patrol challenge (8 March 2011) Bristish Broastcasting Corporation
(BBC) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12672889>.
37
James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, International Maritime Security Law (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2013),
323.
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Chinese marine surveillance vessels preventing a Philippine warship, the BRP Gregorio
del Pilar, from arresting eight Chinese fishing vessels engaged in alleged illegal fishing
in the Shoal.38 On 9 May 2013, a Taiwanese fisherman was shot dead by a Philippine
patrol craft in an area where the EEZs claimed by Taiwan and the Philippines overlap.39
In 2014, tensions escalated in the South China Sea when China placed the Haiyang
Shiyou 981 (HYSY 981) oil rig in Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ and deployed approximately
80 escort vessels, including seven military ships and a number of military aircraft, to
protect the oil rig.40 In response, Vietnam dispatched a number of law enforcement
vessels to the area in order to issue warnings to the Chinese vessels and demand that the
rig be removed from Vietnam‘s EEZ and continental shelf.41 During this maritime
standoff, Vietnam accused Chinese Coast Guard ships of aggressively firing highpowered water cannons at, and intentionally ramming, Vietnam‘s maritime law
enforcement ships while Chinese aircraft circled above them.42 It is important to note
that Chinese Coast Guard ships deliberately used the high-powered water cannons not

38

Renato Cruz De Castro, 'China‘s Realpolitik Approach in the South China Sea Dispute: The Case of the
2012 Scarborough Shoal Standoff' (Paper presented at the Conference for the Managing Tensions in the
South China Sea, CSIS 5-6 June 2013), 5.
39
Shih Hsiu-chuan and Jake Chung, Fisherman killed in disputed waters (10 May 2013) Taipei Times
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/05/10/2003561896>.
40
Ernest Z Bower and Gregory B Poling, China-Vietnam Tensions High over Drilling Rig in Disputed
Waters (7 May 2014) Center for Strategic & International Studies <http://csis.org/publication/criticalquestions-china-vietnam-tensions-high-over-drilling-rig-disputed-waters>; see also Position paper of Viet
Nam on China‟s illegal placement of Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig in the Exclusive Economic Zone and
Continental Shelf of Viet Nam, Position paper of Viet Nam on China‟s illegal placement of Haiyang
Shiyou 981 oil rig in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf of Viet Nam (7 July 2014)
Consulate of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in New York, The United States of America
<http://vietnamconsulate-ny.org/news/2014/07/position-paper-viet-nam-chinas-illegal-placementhaiyang-shiyou-981-oil-rig-exclusive>.
41
See Bower and Poling, above n 147; see also Tomotaka Shoji, Vietnam and China over the South
China Sea: The confrontation proceeds towards a new phase (2 July 2014) World Affairs
<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/content/vietnam-and-china-over-south-china-sea-confrontationproceeds-towards-new-phase>.
42
Chinese aircraft intimidate Vietnam‟s law enforcement vessels (21 June 2014) Vietnamnet
<http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/105605/chinese-aircraft-intimidate-vietnam-s-lawenforcement-vessels.html>; see also Chinese ships ram Vietnamese vessels in latest oil rig row: officials
(7 May 2014) Thanhnien News <http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/chinese-ships-ram-vietnamesevessels-in-latest-oil-rig-row-officials-26069.html>.

11

only to damage communication systems of Vietnamese vessels but also cause injuries to
the crew on board these vessels.43
The Chinese navy‘s South Sea Fleet and the fleets of other navies operating in
the South China Sea currently comprise approximately 40 submarines, 85 principal
surface combatants and 390 patrol and coastal combatants, while the vessels belonging
to the law enforcement agencies of these States comprise roughly 1150 patrol vessels.44
Moreover, these numbers are expected to increase in the coming years. Due to the
overlapping maritime claims, and the increasing presence of naval and law enforcement
vessels and aircraft, incidents involving sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the
region are unlikely to reduce in frequency.
1.5

Scope, objectives and significance of the thesis
This thesis focuses on the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in

the South China Sea. The geographic scope of the South China Sea which this thesis
will use is the area designated in the draft 4th edition of the International Hydrographic
Organization (IHO) Publication S-23, which was submitted to the IHO in 200245. The
reason for selecting this particular geographic scope for the South China Sea is
explained in Chapter two of the thesis.
The research seeks to analyse international law, regional efforts and political
issues surrounding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South
China Sea. Based on these analyses, the existing gaps and ambiguities in the
43

Chinese vessels keep firing water at Vietnamese ships in Vietnam's seas (13 March 2014 ) Tuoitrenews
<http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/19615/chinese-vessels-continue-to-fire-water-at-vietnamese-ships-in-itswaters>.
44
'Chapter Six: Asia' (2013) 113(1) Military Balance 245, 245-352; 'Chapter Six: Asia' (2016) 116 (1)
Military Balance 211, 211-306. The number of vessels stated above has been adapted by the author from
data provided in this document.
45
The draft 4th edition of S-23 has not yet been approved. However, as the limits of the South China Sea
defined in the 1953 special publication ‗Limits of Ocean and Seas‘(also known as IHO S-23) include the
Strait of Taiwan, the Gulf of Tonkin and the Natuna Sea, the author does not consider these limits to be
appropriate. See Chapter Two of this thesis for additional details.
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international legal regime and regional efforts will be identified and critically evaluated.
Moreover, by examining the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the South
China Sea, the thesis will identify key challenges in addressing these gaps and
ambiguities with the objective of preventing maritime incidents in the South China Sea
involving sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. Finally, the thesis highlights
implications for the future security, safety and freedom of navigation and overflight in
the South China Sea, and provides a number of legal and policy recommendations for
addressing these challenges.
There have been a number of legal studies focusing on South China Sea issues.
However, most of this research has concentrated on areas such as territorial sovereignty
claims and associated maritime disputes;46 conflict management;47 maritime confidence
building measures;48 joint development;49 and foreign military activities in the exclusive

46

Leszek Buszynski and Christopher B Robert (eds), The South China Sea Maritime Disputes: Political,
Legal and Regional Perspectives (Routledge, 2015); Dong Manh Nguyen, 'Settlement of Disputes under
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: The Case of the South China Sea Disputes'
(2006) 25(1) University of Queensland Law Journal 145; Robert Beckman, 'The UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea' (2013) 107 American Journal of
International Law 142; Robert Beckman, 'The South China Sea: the evolving dispute between China and
her maritime neighbours' (2013) 21(3) Geomatics World 17; Nick A Owen and Clive H Schofield,
'Disputed South China Sea hydrocarbons in perspective' (2012) 36(3) Maritime Policy 809; Gregory B
Poling, 'The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute' (CSIS Report, July
2013); Robert C. Beckman and Clive H. Schofield, 'Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: A Potential South
China Sea Change' (2014) 29(2) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 193.
47
Munmun Majumdar, 'The ASEAN Way of Conflict Management in the South China Sea' (2015) 39(1)
Strategic Analysis 73; Hasjim Djalal, 'Conflict Management Experiences in Southeast Asia: Lessons and
Implications for the South China Sea Disputes' (2011) 3(4) Asian Politics and Policy 627; Sheldon W
Simon, 'Conflict and Diplomacy in the South China Sea: The View from Washington' (2012) 52(2) Asian
Survey 995; Gupta, above n 14.
48
Sam Bateman, 'Confidence-Building Measures for the South China Sea' in Euan Graham and Henrick
Z. Tsjeng (eds), Navigating the Indo-Pacific Arc (Nanyang Technological University, 2014) ; Christopher
C Joyner, 'The Spratly Islands Disputes: Legal Issues and Prospect for Diplomatic Accommodation' in
Baker John C and Wiencek David G (eds), Cooperative Monitoring in the South China Sea: Satellite
Imagery, Confidence Building Measures, and the Spratly Islands Disputes (Greenwood Press, 2002) ;
Justin Jones, 'Background paper: A naval perspective of maritime confidence building measures' (ASPI
Special Report, September 2013); Sam Bateman, 'Background paper: Existing and previous maritime
cooperative arrangements in the South China Sea' (Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 11-13 August
2013 2013);
49
Robert Beckman et al (eds), Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea : Legal Frameworks
for the Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources (Edward Elgar, 2013); Leszek Buszynski, 'The
South China Sea: Avenues Towards a Resolution of the Issue' in Tran Thuy Truong (ed), The South
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economic zone.50 There have been multiple incidents in the South China Sea involving
vessels and aircraft of navies, coast guards and civilian law enforcement agencies of
littoral States and extra-regional players. However, to date, there have been no
comprehensive studies focusing on the international legal regime governing the passage
of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. Nor have there been any regional studies
evaluating the relevant international law or grass-roots initiatives regulating the passage
of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea. This thesis provides a
comprehensive study on the international legal regime and geopolitical issues
surrounding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China
Sea. Accordingly, it seeks to contribute an understanding of the range of measures
aimed at minimising maritime incidents in the South China Sea while strengthening the
peace, security and freedom of navigation and overflight in the maritime region.
1.6

Research Questions
The research focuses on the following key questions:
First, what are the current geopolitical considerations in the South China Sea?

Understanding the geographical and geopolitical situation in the South China Sea is an
essential preliminary step. Key factors to be addressed include territorial sovereignty
disputes and associated maritime claims between littoral States; disputes over access to
resources; differing interpretations of navigational regimes under the LOSC by littoral

China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Development (Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam,
2010) .
50
Raul Pedrozo, 'Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The Right to Conduct Military Activities
in China‘s Exclusive Economic Zone' (2010) 9(1) Chinese Journal of International Law 9; Yu Zhirong,
'Jurisprudential Analysis of the U.S. Navy‘s Military Surveys in the Exclusive Economic Zones of
Coastal Countries' in Peter Dutton (ed), Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security
and International Law in the Maritime Commons (U.S. Naval War College, 2010) vol 7, ; Andrew S
Williams, 'Aerial Reconnaissance by Military Aircraft in the Exclusive Economic Zone' in Peter Dutton
(ed), Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue on Security and International Law in the
Maritime Commons (U.S. Naval War College, 2010) ; Jon M. Van Dyke, 'Military ships and planes
operating in the exclusive economic zone of another country' (2004) 28 Marine Policy 29.
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States (and between littoral States and external players); the strategic and economic
significance of the South China Sea region; and the burgeoning growth of naval powers
and maritime law enforcement capabilities, as well as the increased potential for
maritime incidents in the region.
Second, what is the strategic context of the South China Sea? To address this
question, the interests and strategies of littoral States and external players in the South
China Sea will be explored. In addition, the strategic implications of the recent arbitral
award in the Philippines-China case will be critically analysed.
Third, what are the relevant international legal principles applicable to the
passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in different maritime zones of
jurisdiction? The LOSC is popularly considered the ―Constitution for the Oceans‖, and
its success lies in the fact that it ―establishes a legal framework to govern all uses of the
oceans.‖51 Apart from the regime of deep seabed mining and the protection and
preservation of the marine environment and marine scientific research, most of the
provisions of the LOSC directly or indirectly address the issue of freedom of navigation
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to navigation.52 Apart from the
LOSC, there are other international treaties containing provisions related to the
navigation of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea. These include COLREGs,
the SOLAS Convention and the Chicago Convention. However, as international treaties
are the product of compromise, there are bound to be gaps and ambiguities in their
provisions. These gaps and ambiguities can be intentional or unintentional, and arise

51

Beckman, above n 49, 142.
Thomas A Mensah, 'Foreward' in Donald R Rothwell and Sam Bateman (eds), Navigational Rights and
Freedoms and the New Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff, 2000) , Viii.
52
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due to a lack of agreement between State parties.53 It is therefore necessary to analyse
the international legal regimes governing navigation and overflight at sea.
Fourth, what do the national legislation and practices of littoral States of the
South China Sea indicate about the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in
different maritime zones of jurisdiction? As international law is not free from
ambiguities, States have interpreted and implemented the provisions of the LOSC and
other relevant instruments differently to suit their own national and strategic interests.
All South China Sea littoral States are parties to the above-mentioned international
treaties; however, they have interpreted the provisions of these conventions in different
ways. For this reason, it is necessary to examine their domestic legislation and practices
to gain a better understanding of how the relevant international legal provisions have
been implemented with regard to the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft.
Fifth, what role are regional efforts playing in promoting the safety of
navigation and overflight of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China
Sea? A number of regional initiatives have been devised to address the passage of
sovereign immune vessel and aircraft in the South China Sea. These include binding
and non-binding regional instruments, bilateral agreements, unilateral initiatives, as well
as guidelines proposed by academic and policy forums. It is critically important to
examine current regional initiatives to determine their effectiveness in promoting the
safety of navigation and overflight of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the
region.
Sixth, what are the remaining challenges in addressing the passage of sovereign
immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea? To answer this question, the

53

See Dennis Mandsager, 'The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program: Policy, Procedure, and Future' in
Michael N. Schmitt (ed), The Law of Military Operations (Naval War College Press, 1998) , 124.
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remaining uncertainties in the international legal regime will be explored. The shortfalls
that exist in relation to regional efforts will also be evaluated, as will the unresolved
maritime disputes and the political and strategic mistrust that exists between States.
Seventh, what are the possible options for implementing more responsible
navigation behaviours for sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China
Sea? Based on the critical analyses conducted in the previous chapters of the thesis, a
number of legal and policy recommendations will be made with the objective of
minimising maritime incidents involving sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the
South China Sea. Provided these recommendations are adopted by a majority of States,
the result should be the promotion of peace, security, and the freedom of navigation and
overflight in the region.
1.7

Methodology
The methodology used in this thesis is a combination of systematic

identification, collection and analysis of related documents, as well as the personal
experience of the author. The documents used in the preparation of this thesis include
primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include international legal
materials such as binding and non-binding regional agreements and related instruments,
the national legislation and subordinate legislation of States, as well as the practice of
individual States (as evidenced by governmental policy documents). The secondary
sources include books, journal articles, academic presentations, conference papers,
informal interviews conducted by the author, relevant textbooks, and other online data.
With reference to the above sources, the gaps and ambiguities which exist in
international law, and the adequacy of regional efforts in addressing the passage of
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea (as well as political issues
17

surrounding the passage of vessels and aircraft of this type) will be critically evaluated.
Incidents involving the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft of South
China Sea littoral States will also be examined. The remaining challenges will then be
identified and recommendations made.
The author has been a member of the Vietnamese navy since 1992. As a
navigation officer, the author has spent several years on board Vietnamese naval vessels
and has been actively involved in various types of training and practical activities at sea,
including combined maritime patrols, hydrographic surveying, as well as maritime
search and rescue activities.54 The author‘s professional experiences and academic
knowledge are reflected in this thesis.
1.8

Thesis structure
The thesis is structured in ten chapters, as follows:
Chapter One is the introductory chapter.
Chapter Two discusses geopolitical considerations related to the South China

Sea. It examines unresolved disputes over territorial sovereignty and associated
maritime claims, evaluates the strategic and economic significance of the South China
Sea, as well as the potential for maritime incidents and accidents involving the passage
of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft.
Chapter Three considers the strategic context of the South China Sea. This
chapter critically analyses the interests and strategies of littoral States and extra-regional
players in the South China Sea. Moreover, with the arbitral tribunal recently issuing its

54

The author joined the Vietnamese Navy in 1992, obtained a Master‘s Degree in Maritime Policy from
the University of Wollongong in 2003, completed a hydrographic survey course at the RAN
Hydrographic School in 2006, graduated from the Australian Command and Staff College in 2010 and
completed a Maritime Search and Rescue course in the United States in 2012. Currently, the author is a
lecturer in the Faculty of Navigation at the Vietnamese Naval Academy.
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landmark award in the Philippines-China arbitration, this chapter highlights the strategic
implications of this award for the South China Sea area.
Chapter Four discusses relevant international legal principles applicable to the
passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in various maritime zones of
jurisdiction. It examines the navigational regimes of the LOSC, with a particular focus
on innocent passage in the territorial sea and the freedom of navigation and overflight in
the EEZ. In addition, supplementary international treaties governing the safety of air
and maritime encounters are critically analysed.
Chapter Five examines the current domestic legislation and practices of South
China Sea littoral States in implementing the LOSC innocent passage regime. It also
highlights political, security and strategic factors that have influenced trends in State
practice.
Chapter Six examines the current national legislation and practices of South
China Sea littoral States in implementing the LOSC EEZ regime. This chapter focuses
on controversial issues arising from foreign military activities in the EEZs of coastal
States, particularly hydrographic surveying, military surveying, as well as maritime
surveillance conducted by military vessels and aircraft. In addition, the chapter
highlights uncertain EEZ boundaries in the South China Sea that impact the
implementation of the EEZ regime in the region.
Chapter Seven examines specific incidents involving the passage of sovereign
immune vessels and aircraft in various maritime jurisdictional zones in the South China
Sea. The incidents under investigation fall into broad main categories: (i) incidents
which have occurred due to differing interpretations by States of the innocent passage
and EEZ regimes under the LOSC; (ii) disputes over access to resources; and (iii)
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incidents arising from the unsafe or unprofessional conduct of vessels and aircraft of
States.
Chapter Eight evaluates regional efforts aimed at addressing the passage of
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea. Efforts initiated by
regional institutions, academic and policy forums, as well as bilateral agreements and
unilateral initiatives are critically examined and evaluated.
Chapter Nine identifies the remaining challenges and key drivers behind the
State practices. It highlights implications for the future security, safety and freedom of
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, canvassing a number of legal and
policy recommendations to minimise potential incidents involving the passage of
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the region.
Chapter Ten is the concluding chapter. It reiterates the key findings of the thesis
and then recommends a number of areas that require further research in order to
advance maritime safety and the freedoms of navigation and overflight, not only in the
South China Sea region but in all ocean spaces.
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2 GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
2.1

Introduction
The South China Sea is not only rich in living and non-living resources, but also

connects to important Straits, particularly the Malacca and Singapore Straits. Indeed,
more than half of the world‘s oil tankers and total cargo tonnage passes through these
two Straits each year, making the South China Sea a critical international sea line of
communication.1 In addition to commercial shipping, military vessels and aircraft of
littoral and extra-regional States transit through and conduct military operations in this
particular region. Therefore, maintaining stable security and freedom of navigation and
overflight in and over the South China Sea is critical to the interests of many States.
However, as a semi-enclosed sea which contains hundreds of small islands, rocks and
submerged features (many of which are subject to sovereignty disputes between littoral
States), coupled with unresolved, overlapping and legally questionable maritime claims
by a number of littoral States, the South China Sea is ―among the most geographically
and geopolitically complex ocean spaces in the world.‖2 Unfortunately, these
longstanding maritime and territorial disputes, as well as conflicting interpretations of
international law by certain States, have made the South China Sea vulnerable to
maritime conflicts.
This chapter will outline geopolitical considerations affecting the South China
Sea. Particular attention will be given to: (i) the geographical limits of the South China

1

David Rosenberg, 'Governing the South China Sea: from Freedom of the Seas to Ocean Enclosure
Movements' (2010) XII(3&4) Harvard Asia Quarterly 4, 7; see also Nong Hong, 'Maritime Trade
Development in Asia: A Need for Regional Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea' in Wu
Shicun and Zou Keyuan (eds), Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and
International Cooperation (Ashgate, 2009) 42.
2
Clive Schofield, 'What's at stake in the South China Sea? Geographical and geopolitical considerations'
in Robert Beckman et al (eds), Beyond Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: legal Frameworks for
the Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources (Edward Elgar, 2013) 11.
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Sea; (ii) the economic and strategic significance of the region, (iii) unresolved territorial
disputes and associated maritime claims, including disputes over access to resources;
and (iv) the different interpretations of international law regarding navigation and
overflight by certain States. Moreover, the chapter will highlight the burgeoning growth
of naval powers and maritime law enforcement capabilities, as well as the concomitant
increase in the potential for maritime incidents.
2.2
2.2.1

Geographical limits and the significance of the South China Sea
Geographical limits of the South China Sea
The South China Sea is a semi-enclosed sea3 surrounded by China, Taiwan and

a number of Southeast Asian States. Located in the centre of East Asia, it is a vital sea
lane that links much of East Asia to the rest of the world. The limits of the South China
Sea are not well defined, being contested even today.4 The International Hydrographic
Organization (IHO), in its 1953 special publication titled Limits of Ocean and Seas (also
known as IHO S-23), defined the South China Sea as including the Strait of Taiwan, the
Gulf of Tonkin and the Natuna Sea5 (see, for example, figure 2.1 for the limits of the
South China Sea, cited in the U.S Energy Information Administration).
The third and latest edition of IHO S-23 was published in 1953. Unsurprisingly,
there have been many changes to areas indicated in the document since that time, as
well as name changes to water bodies and their adjacent land features. Indeed, these
changes have rendered the third edition somewhat antiquated. The draft 4th edition of
IHO S-23 was submitted to the IHO in 2002, but is yet to be approved. As IHO S-23 is
3

Article 122 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (hereafter LOSC) defines
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas as ―a gulf, basin or sea surrounded by two or more States and connected
to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or consisting entirely or primarily of the territorial seas and
exclusive economic zones of two or more coastal States.‖
4
Chris Rahman and Martin Tsamenyi, 'A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the South
China Sea' (2010) 41(4) Ocean Development & International Law 315, 316.
5
International Hydrographic Organization, Limits of Oceans and Seas (IHO, 3rd ed, 1953) 30-31.

22

a purely technical publication, it cannot be used for legal purposes in any sovereignty
dispute or in support of any maritime claim. In fact, the sensitivity of the subject is the
major obstacle to the draft 4th edition being approved.6
For the purposes of this research, the limits of the South China Sea are those
designated in the draft 4th edition of IHO S-23. As a result, the South China Sea is a
semi-enclosed sea covering an area of almost three million square kilometres and
surrounded by seven States and territories, China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia,
Brunei, Indonesia and Vietnam7 (Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.1 Limits of the South China Sea

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration
6

IHO Working Group, 'Final Report of S-23 Working Group to Member States' (June 2012).
Rahman and Tsamenyi, above n 4, 316. For the geographic limitation of the research area, the new limts
of the South China Sea as designated in the 4th edition of IHO S-23 will be used; hence, Singapore is not
included as a South China Sea littoral State.
7
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Figure 2.2 New Limits of the South China Sea (draft 4th edition of IHO
S23)

Source: extracted from IHO S-23 (draft 4th edition)
Figure 2.3 Bathymetric map of the South China Sea

Source: Wang, Pinxian and Li, Qianyu (eds), The South China Sea: Paleoceanography
and Sedimentology (Springer, 2009), 506
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Bathymetrically, the South China Sea can be divided into two portions: the deep
sea basin in the north-east and the broad continental shelves in the north-western and
southern sides. The deep sea basin covers approximately 52 per cent of the area,
exhibits a confused topography and has an average water depth of 4300m. The broad
continental shelves cover approximately 48 per cent of the area, and have a water depth
of less than 200m (Figure 2.3).8 The vast majority of these broad shelves lie within the
claimed exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of China, Vietnam, Malaysia, and the
Philippines.
There are more than 250 small offshore features located in the middle of the
South China Sea, including islands, rocks, reefs, shoals, and atolls.9 The total number of
features in the region is unavailable, as most are submerged at high tide and only some
are capable of being classified as islands under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (LOSC).10 The majority of these offshore features are located in five
groups: the Pratas Islands, the Scarborough Shoal, Macclesfield Bank, the Paracel
Islands, and the Spratly Islands. Claims to territorial sovereignty over these five groups
by States surrounding the South China Sea are overlapping and difficult to resolve.
Moreover, along the coastlines of littoral States, there are many small uncontested
islands which littoral States have used as basepoints to establish straight baselines, thus

8

Mark J Valencia, 'The South China Sea: Prospects for Marine Regionalism' (1978) 2(2) Maritime Policy
87, 87.
9
Sonika Gupta, 'Emerging Security Architecture in Southeast & East Asia: Growing Tensions in the
South China Sea' (2013) (213) ISPS Issue Brief 1, 2.
10
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982 (entered
into force 16 November 1994), art 121. Article 121 of the LOSC defines an island as ―a naturally formed
area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide‖. The status of these offshore
features is discussed in the following sections of this Chapter.
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extending their maritime claims. This practice has attracted international protests by a
number of States.11
The geographical complexity of the South China Sea, coupled with the
uncertainty in the international legal regime concerning islands, territorial sea baselines,
historic waters and historic rights, and the freedom of navigation, constitute the main
sources of tension and potential conflict between littoral States on the one hand, and
between littoral States and extra-regional players on the other.
2.2.2

The significance of the South China Sea

2.2.2.1 The economic significance of the South China Sea
The South China Sea provides approximately ten per cent of the world‘s
fisheries catch, with fisheries production being an important source of revenue for
littoral states.12 In 2010, China produced approximately 15.7 million tons of captured
fish, which accounted for 32 per cent of the total catch production for the Asia Pacific
region that year. To put that figure into perspective, the combined capture production of
all Southeast Asian countries in 2010 was 17.3 million tons.13 More than 1.77 million
fishing vessels operate in the South China Sea, with 3.73 million people being
employed in the fisheries sector in the region.14 In 2010, the marine and brackish fish
production of Southeast Asian countries reached a reported value of USD$11.8 billion,
while China‘s aquaculture production reached 48 million tons, worth USD$63 billion
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Clive Schofield, 'Adrift on complex waters: Geographical, geopolitical and legal dimensions to the
South China Sea disputes' in Leszek Buszynski and Christopher B Roberts (eds), The South China Sea
Maritime Disputes: Political, Legal and Regional Perspectives (Routledge, 2015) 26.
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2007) 1.
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(of which marine and brackish aquaculture accounted for USD$19 billion).15 According
to the Agricultural Outlook 2013-2022 prepared by the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO), China‘s capture and aquaculture fisheries production
is expected to reach 69 million tons by 2022.16 As all the littoral states of the South
China Sea are developing countries, fishing and aquaculture industries remain an
important revenue source for their national economies.
Besides living resources, the South China Sea is believed to be rich in
hydrocarbon deposits, even though there is no precise evidence to support this claim. It
is difficult to quantify the amount of oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea due to
territorial disputes and technological limitations. Even so, the U.S. Energy Information
Administration has estimated the amount of oil and natural gas reserves in the South
China Sea to be approximately 11 billion barrels and 190 trillion cubic feet
respectively.17 However, in 2010 the United States Geological Survey estimated that the
South China Sea may contain between 5 and 22 billion barrels of oil and between 70
and 290 trillion cubic feet of gas in undiscovered resources. 18 The estimates proposed
by the China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) in November 2012 exceed
those of the two U.S. organisations, with the CNOOC proffering estimates of 125
billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in undiscovered
resources.19 There is, of course, a difference between recoverable reserves and
resources. The term resources refers to the total amount of hydrocarbons deposited in
the region, while the recoverable reserves represent only a fraction of the resources that
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Ibid 110-115.
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 'Feeding China: Prospects and challenges in the next
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are capable of being economically recovered using current technologies. 20 Even though
the amount of hydrocarbon reserves in the South China Sea is difficult to determine, the
general consensus is that such reserves are significant.
Conventional hydrocarbon production is an important contributor to the
economies of littoral States. However, due to territorial disputes, geological challenges,
technical limitations, as well as unfavourable meteorological and hydrographical
conditions, the exploration of hydrocarbons in the South China Sea by littoral states has
thus far been limited. The table below shows the oil and natural gas produced by littoral
States in 2011 in the South China Sea.
Table 2.1 Estimated conventional hydrocarbon production in the South China Sea by
littoral States in 2011
Countries
Oil production
Natural gas production
(barrels/day)
(billion cubic feet)
Brunei
120,000
400
China

250,000

600

Indonesia

600,000

200

Malaysia

500,000

1,800

Philippines

25,000

100

Vietnam

300,000

300

Source: extracted from U.S. Energy Information Administration
Apart from its natural resources, the South China Sea is the world‘s second
busiest international sea lane, linking the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. The value
of seaborne trade passing through the South China Sea is approximately USD$5.3
trillion per year, of which the U.S. share is approximately USD$1.2 trillion.21 Of the top
ten container ports in the world, eight are located in countries bordering the South China
20
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21
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28

Sea.22 Indeed, more than 60 per cent of Japan‘s oil imports transit through the region‘s
waters,23 and nearly 15 per cent of South Korea‘s crude oil moves through the South
China Sea in order to reach its final destination.24 In 2010, China imported 51.3 per cent
of its oil consumption, with 77 per cent of this imported oil passing through the Strait of
Malacca and then the South China Sea.25 The South China Sea is also used for trade
between Southeast Asian countries, as well as for trade between Southeast Asian States
and the rest of the world.
In summary, as a semi-enclosed sea located in the centre of East Asia, the South
China Sea represents an important fishing ground, a rich repository of hydrocarbon
resources, and a vital sea lane that sustains regional and global trading relations.
2.2.2.2 The strategic significance of the South China Sea
The geographical location of the South China Sea also gives it special strategic
significance. As many countries in the Asia-Pacific region rely heavily on seaborne
trade, the security of South China Sea sea lines of communication (SLOC) is pivotal to
the economies of littoral states as well as other maritime countries. Any disruption to
seaborne trade would pose a significant threat to the region‘s economies. The South
China Sea is not only important for merchant shipping, but also for military transits and
operations. For many years, the United States Navy has utilised the South China Sea to
transit forces between the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Other
regional States also use the South China Sea for their naval transits and operations.26
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States in the region are interested in the security of South China Sea SLOC; however,
they have different perceptions of its significance. Maintaining the safety and freedom
of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea are key strategic interests for many
maritime powers, especially the United States, Japan, Australia and India. China, on the
other hand, is not only concerned about the security of its seaborne trade through the
South China Sea, but also its military defence strategy. China can potentially assert its
dominance in the region, as well as effectively support its strategy of ―offshore water
defence‖ and ―open seas protection‖27, by controlling the South China Sea. Indeed, once
China gains such control, it will be perfectly placed to use this maritime region as a
secure operating environment for its submarines based at Hainan Island.28
There are a number of offshore island groups, particularly the Paracel Islands,
the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal, which are subject to sovereignty disputes
between littoral States of the South China Sea. These tiny features are mainly
uninhabited and difficult to defend; however, according to James Holmes, they could
provide a ―sea-denial option vis-à vis passing merchant or naval traffic.‖29 China has
strengthened its maritime forces, including naval and law enforcement vessels and
aircraft, as well as civilian fishing vessels, in an effort to bolster its expansive maritime
claims in the South China Sea. Other South China Sea littoral States have also increased
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their defence spending, focusing on naval and coast guard assets in order to protect their
maritime claims in the region.
Due to the geostrategic complexity of the South China Sea, it seems that States
are unlikely to reach a compromise with regard to their maritime claims. Indeed, the
increase in the number of naval and law enforcement vessels and aircraft operating in
the South China Sea is evidence of the desire of these States to strengthen their
territorial sovereignty and associated maritime claims. However, the willingness of
regional States to protect their interests has resulted in a number of maritime incidents.
Unfortunately, no effective measures have been devised to address these issues. As
Robert Kaplan has opined, the South China Sea is at the ―throat of global sea routes‖
but has ―increasingly become an armed camp.‖30
2.3
2.3.1

Maritime disputes in the South China Sea
Disputes over offshore territorial claims in the South China Sea
Disputes over offshore territorial claims in the South China Sea are longstanding

and complex. There are five major offshore features in the South China Sea. The
designated groups of features are mostly composed of small islands, islets, rocks, cays,
shoals and reefs, which make human habitation quite difficult (figure 2.4). However,
their locations, combined with the maritime zones which they are potentially capable of
generating, give them special economic and strategic importance.
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Figure 2.4 Islands in the South China Sea

Source: Arbitral Tribunal, Case Nº 2013-19
2.3.1.1 The Pratas Islands
The Pratas Islands are located in the northern part of the South China Sea. This
group of features includes Pratas Island and two submerged coral reefs: North Vereker
Bank and South Vereker Bank. The diameter of this ring-shaped reef is approximately
32

13 miles.31 Taiwan occupied Pratas Island in 1946, and thus claims sovereignty over the
entire group of features. Although China has never occupied any of these features, this
has not prevented it from laying claim to the group. Pratas Island is located 240 nautical
miles southwest of the Taiwanese coastline and 170 nautical miles southeast of Hong
Kong. It is the largest offshore island in the South China Sea covering an area of
approximately 2.4 square kilometres.32 Located at the gateway to the Strait of Taiwan
and the Luzon Strait, Pratas Island is strategically located for the monitoring and
controlling of shipping routes from the South China Sea to the East China Sea. For
many years, Pratas Island has been used as a military outpost for the Taiwanese navy in
the South China Sea. A runway and a small airport have also been built on this island.
However, in January 2000, Taiwan replaced naval personnel stationed on Pratas Island
with coast guard personnel.33 In 2007, Taiwan designated Pratas Island as a national
park, establishing an administrative office on the island in July 2010.34
The dispute over the Pratas Islands involves only China and Taiwan. As China
claims Taiwan as part of its territory, and Taiwan‘s sovereignty claims in the South
China Sea are almost identical to those made by China, this overlapping claim is
unlikely to result in conflict, at least for the time being.35
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2.3.1.2 The Paracel Islands
The Paracel Islands are located in the north-western part of the South China Sea,
covering an ocean surface area of more than 16,000 square kilometres. 36 The Paracels
consist of two main groups of islands: the western group (Amphitrite group) and the
eastern group (Crescent group). From the 1950s, the Republic of Vietnam (South
Vietnam) occupied and exercised control over the western group, while China
controlled the eastern group.37 However, in 1974 China forcibly seized the western
group from South Vietnam, and has controlled all of the Paracels since that time.38
Moreover, China has unilaterally applied straight baselines around the archipelago.39
These straight baselines are totally inconsistent with international law, as under the
LOSC only mid oceanic archipelagic States that fulfil specific criteria on land to water
ratios can draw straight baselines (known as archipelagic baselines) around their
islands.40
There are approximately 35 features in this archipelago, including islands,
islets, reefs and cays.41 The largest island is Woody Island, which covers an area
slightly larger than 2 square kilometres.42 China, Taiwan and Vietnam all claim
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sovereignty over the Paracel Islands.43 Vietnam endorses the one-China policy, and thus
does not recognise Taiwan as a State. For this reason, no formal diplomatic relations
exist between Vietnam and Taiwan.44 Accordingly, Vietnam views the dispute over the
Paracels as a bilateral dispute between Vietnam and China. Since its occupation, China
has set about constructing and gradually upgrading its infrastructure on Woody Island,
which includes a military airstrip over 2,500 metres in length to accommodate fighter
aircraft operations.45 An artificial harbour which is capable of accommodating Chinese
warships, including frigates and destroyers, has also been built on Woody Island. 46 In
2016, China deployed HQ-9 surface-to-air missiles and J-11 fighter jets to Woody
Island, thereby allowing the State to ―bolster its strategic foothold in the Paracel
Islands.‖47 This move was strongly protested by Vietnam. Indeed, Vietnam‘s Foreign
Ministry spokesman, Le Hai Binh, branded China‘s actions as ―serious infringements of
Vietnam's sovereignty over the Paracels, threatening peace and stability in the region as
well as security, safety and freedom of navigation and flight.‖48
2.3.1.3 Macclesfield Bank
Macclesfield Bank consists of a group of submerged shoals and reefs located in
the centre of the South China Sea, between the Paracel Islands and Scarborough
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Shoal.49 As this feature is totally submerged, it cannot form the subject of any
sovereignty claim under international law.50 Both China and Taiwan have claimed this
bank, even though no country can effectively occupy it. Taiwan is neither a member of
the United Nations nor a party to the LOSC. As such, Taiwan has not been invited to
any official regional security forum, or formed part of any official regional effort to
address maritime issues in the South China Sea. For this reason, it is difficult for
Taiwan to assert any maritime claim in the region.51 Adding to this difficulty is China‘s
claim that Taiwan has always formed part of its territory. However, in the context of the
wider South China Sea disputes, the clash over Macclesfield Bank is unlikely to result
in an escalation of tensions.
2.3.1.4 Scarborough Shoal
Scarborough Shoal is a large atoll surrounded by a reef and with an inner lagoon
stretching 150 square kilometres.52 The largest rock located on this shoal is South Rock,
which is 1.8 metres above water at high tide.53 Scarborough Shoal is located within the
mainland EEZ claimed by the Philippines, approximately 124 nautical miles from
Zambales Province in the Philippines and 472 nautical miles from the Chinese coast.54
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There are five rocks in this area that are visible above the water at high tide. 55 With
regard to sovereignty, the Shoal has been claimed by China, Taiwan and the
Philippines. The Philippines maintains that it has exercised jurisdiction over
Scarborough Shoal since 1946, with such jurisdiction being confirmed by the
construction of a lighthouse by the Philippine government in 1965.56 For China and
Taiwan, Scarborough Shoal and Macclesfield Bank are parts of Zhongsha Qundao, even
though these two groups of features are located more than 170 nautical miles apart from
one another. Of all the features of Zhongsha Qundao, including Macclesfield Bank,
Scarborough Shoal, Truro Shoal, Saint Esprit Shoal and Dreyer Shoal, only
Scarborough Shoal is visible above water at high tide, and therefore this shoal is
critically important to China‘s sovereignty claim over Zhongsha Qundao.57
The waters around Scarborough Shoal, as well as those within the lagoon, are
rich in marine living resources and constitute traditional fishing grounds for Chinese
and Filipino fishermen. Besides these resources, Scarborough Shoal occupies a strategic
location, as it sits in the vicinity of South China Sea SLOC. The dispute over
Scarborough Shoal rose to prominence in 1997 when three Chinese fishing vessels were
prevented from approaching the shoal by the Philippine Navy. In 2012, similar incidents
between Chinese and Philippine vessels around the shoal intensified and persisted for
several months. The shoal is currently controlled by China. On 23 January 2013, the
Philippines requested that China bringing their dispute over the maritime jurisdiction in
the South China Sea to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) for
arbitration in accordance with the dispute settlement provisions of the LOSC. China,
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however, rejected this proposal.58 In October 2015, an arbitral tribunal established in
accordance with Annex VII of the LOSC, decided that it possessed the necessary
jurisdiction to hear the matter without China needing to participate.59 However, it is
important to note that the arbitral tribunal could only rule on maritime zones that are
generated from disputed features; it could not resolve sovereignty disputes over the
features themselves. On 12 July 2016, in its final decision, the arbitral tribunal declared
that Scarborough Shoal is a ―rock‖ for the purpose of Article 121(3) of the LOSC. 60 It
follows from this decision, that this feature is only capable of generating a territorial sea
and not an exclusive economic zone.
2.3.1.5 The Spratly Islands
The Spratly Islands are located in the south-eastern part of the South China Sea.
This group of islands consists of more than 150 features, including islands, islets, rocks,
reefs, and shoals; however, only 36 of them are above water at high tide.61 The total
land area of this group of features is less than 8 square kilometres, with Itu Aba Island,
the largest island in the group, covering an area of only half a square kilometre.62
Although the total land area of the group is unremarkable, the ocean surface area of the
entire archipelago is almost 240,000 square kilometres.63 So although the islands
themselves are very small and unable to sustain human habitation, the maritime zones
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that may potentially be generated from these islands are huge, making the Spratly
Islands highly significant for littoral States. Located close to major sea lanes used for
both commercial and military purposes, the Spratly archipelago holds a special strategic
location in this particular maritime domain. During the Second World War, the
Japanese effectively used Itu Aba Island as a submarine base and military outpost for
monitoring and intercepting allied vessels passing through the South China Sea.
After the Second World War, and particularly after the San Francisco Treaty of
Peace was signed in 1951, Japan renounced its sovereignty over a number of islands in
the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, including the Spratly Islands.64 Indeed,
post-World War II, China, Vietnam and the Philippines all claimed sovereignty over
some or all of the Spratly islands. However, the San Francisco Treaty of Peace did not
designate the Spratly Islands as belonging to any of these claimant States.65
Currently, China, Taiwan and Vietnam claim the whole archipelago, while
Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei claim certain parts of it. The legal bases for
China‘s, Taiwan‘s and Vietnam‘s sovereignty claims over the Spratly Islands are based
on historical evidence, while the Philippine claim is based on its discovery of certain
islands within the Spratlys. Malaysia and Brunei have justified their claims based on the
continental shelf provisions set out in the LOSC.66 With the exception of Brunei, which
only claims Louisa Reef, all the claimant States have a military presence in the
archipelago. Vietnam occupies a total of 21 islands, reefs and cays, China occupies
eight reefs and rocks, Taiwan occupies Itu Aba Island, the Philippines occupies nine
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islands, and Malaysia occupies three islands.67 Of these six claimant States, China is the
only country that has asserted its control through the use of military force. In 1988,
China attacked Vietnamese naval dispositions stationed on certain features of the
Spratlys, killing 70 Vietnamese sailors and, for the first time, seizing control of these
features.68 China recently carried out an extensive building program on its occupied
features in the Spratly Islands – one which included the construction of artificial islands
and airstrips. In doing so, China ignored the protests and warnings of several regional
States.69 Moreover, in a Note Verbale to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on
14 April 2011, China stated that ―China‘s Nansha Islands (Spratly Islands) is fully
entitled to Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf.‖70
Other claimant States have not provided any official statement regarding maritime
zones which might be generated from the Spratly Islands. It is worth noting that on 12
July 2016, in its South China Sea Arbitration Award, the arbitral tribunal declared that
none of the features of the Spratly Islands are capable of sustaining human habitation or
economic life of their own, and therefore such features are not entitled to an exclusive
economic zone or continental shelf.71 China, however, rejected the arbitral tribunal‘s
award, with the State‘s Foreign Minister Wang Yi propounding that ―the award is null
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and void and has no binding force.‖72
The unresolved sovereignty disputes over these offshore features, together with
clashes over natural resources and overlapping maritime zones, constitute the main
flashpoints for potential maritime conflict between the relevant States.
2.3.2

Disputes over maritime boundaries
In addition to their disputes over insular and other features in the South China

Sea, most countries surrounding the South China Sea have overlapping maritime claims
to offshore maritime zones.
In the southern part of the South China Sea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia and
Brunei have overlapping EEZs and continental shelf claims. The majority of the
overlapping continental shelves between Malaysia and Indonesia have been delimited.73
Although the overlapping continental shelf claimed by Vietnam and Malaysia in the
South China Sea has not yet been delimited, in 2009 the two countries made a joint
submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
(CLCS) for the overlapping section.74 This joint submission was protested by China,
Taiwan and the Philippines. In addition to its joint submission with Malaysia, Vietnam
submitted its own extended continental shelf claim in the northern part of the South
China Sea.75 China and the Philippines submitted Note Verbales to the CLCS in protest

72

Quoted in Prangthong Jitcharoenkul, Beijing rejects UN court's ruling (13 July 2016) Bangkok Post
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asean/1034269/beijing-rejects-un-courts-ruling>.
73
Gregory B Poling, 'The South China Sea in Focus: Clarifying the Limits of Maritime Dispute' (CSIS
Report, July 2013), 8.
74
Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to Article 76,
paragraph 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 in respect of the southern part
of the South China Sea (6 May 2009) United Nations
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/mys_vnm2009excutivesummar
y.pdf>.
75
Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to Article 76, paragraph
8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, Partial Submission in Respect of
Vietnam's Extended Continental Shelf: North Area (VNM-N) (7 May 2009) United Nations

41

of Vietnam‘s claim, while Taiwan, as a non-party to the LOSC, made a statement
reiterating its territorial and maritime claims in the South China Sea. 76 China and
Taiwan argue that this area is within the infamous ―nine-dash line‖ claimed by China
and Taiwan as ―historic waters‖, while the Philippines maintains that this area is in
dispute and overlaps with the Philippine claim.77 The continental shelf boundary
between Vietnam and Indonesia has already been delimited in an agreement signed by
the two countries on 26 June 2003 (and which entered into force on 29 May 2007).78 In
2009, Malaysia and Brunei reached an agreement in the form of an exchange of letters
regarding maritime boundary delimitation.79 It is interesting to note that, even though
Malaysia and Brunei have already agreed on their EEZ boundary, the joint submission
on the extended continental shelf between Vietnam and Malaysia covers the extended
continental shelf claim of Brunei.80
In the south-eastern part of the South China Sea, the maritime boundaries
between Malaysia and the Philippines have not yet been delimited. For many years the
Philippines maintained its maritime claims based on the Treaty of Paris, which is not
consistent with the LOSC. As a result, maritime boundaries between the Philippines and
other States could not be resolved. However, in 2009 the Philippines passed its baseline
law, declaring that its territorial sea and EEZ extend to 12 nautical miles and 200
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nautical miles respectively from the straight baselines established by that law. 81 By
virtue of this enactment, the Philippines maritime claims in the South China Sea will
likely have a sounder legal basis under international law, paving the way for maritime
boundary agreements between the Philippines and its neighbours, particularly Malaysia
and Taiwan.
In the north part of the South China Sea, only one maritime boundary agreement
has been reached. This agreement was signed between China and Vietnam in 2000, and
focuses on the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin.82 Perhaps the main obstacle to
other maritime boundaries being delimited in the region are the unresolved disputes
between China and Vietnam over the Paracel Islands, as well as those between China,
Taiwan and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal as previously discussed.
If States were prepared to ignore small offshore features when making maritime
claims, and if littoral States agreed to delimit their maritime boundaries using the
equidistance method, then maritime boundary delimitation would likely be a much
simpler task. Indeed, if this were the case, there would be an area in the middle of the
South China Sea that could be classified as high seas under the LOSC (see figure 2.5).
Of course, it is highly unlikely that claimant States would be willing to relinquish their
territorial claims over these small but strategically located offshore features. The
situation would be further complicated if these small offshore features were treated as
islands capable of generating their own territorial seas and EEZs. If so, all the waters of
the South China Sea would be under the jurisdiction of littoral states, and there would
be no high seas.
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Figure 2.5 Maritime boundaries in the South China Sea

Source: Andi Arsana and Clive Schofield, Australian National Centre for Ocean
Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, Australia

In addition to the above problems, China has complicated boundary delimitation
in the South China Sea by introducing the so-called ―nine-dash line‖ - an area which
covers almost the whole South China Sea area and over which China claims
jurisdiction. The nine-dash line claim was officially made by China in 2009 in response
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to a joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia on their extended continental shelves.83
Vietnam responded to China‘s claim by stating that the map ―has no legal, historical or
factual basis, [and] therefore is null and void.‖84 Indonesia issued a statement saying
that China‘s nine-dash line map ―clearly lacks international legal basis and is
tantamount to upset the UNCLOS 1982.‖85 Meanwhile, the Philippines requested the
arbitral tribunal established under Annex VII of the LOSC to issue an award to the
effect that ―China‘s maritime claims in the SCS based on its so-called nine-dash line are
contrary to UNCLOS and invalid.‖86 The original dashed line map contained 11 dashes
and was published in 1947 by the Republic of China (Taiwan) under the title ―Map of
South China Sea Islands.‖ However, two dashes within the Gulf of Tonkin were later
removed from the map, hence its current name.87 It is important to note that China has
never published the geographical coordinates of the dashes, nor has it provided any
official explanation as to the implications or the nature of the nine dash-line map. Many
analysts have disputed the legal and technical basis for the nine-dash line, and it
continues to prove a major obstacle to dispute resolution in the South China Sea. 88 On
12 July 2016, in its South China Sea Arbitration Award, the arbitral tribunal declared
that China has no legal basis to claim historic rights to resources within the nine-dash
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line.89 The decision of the arbitral tribunal is legally binding90; however, as the tribunal
does not have enforcement powers, it is unlikely that China will respect the ruling.
In summary, the strategic locations and maritime zones that may potentially be
generated from offshore features, as well as the excessive maritime claims of littoral
states (particularly China and Taiwan), represent the main impediments to maritime
boundary agreements being struck in the South China Sea.
2.3.3

Disputes over access to resources
The South China Sea is not only a productive fishing ground but also an area of

abundant hydrocarbon resources. As the majority of maritime boundaries in this region
are yet to be delimited, disputes between littoral States over access to resources are
commonplace.
In the southern part of the South China Sea, joint developments for the
exploration of hydrocarbon resources by certain States have been achieved, and thus
disputes over resources in this area are not as prevalent. However, in the northern and
centre parts of the South China Sea, and particularly in those areas surrounding offshore
features, consensus over boundary delimitation is unlikely. Disputes over access to
resources in these overlapping maritime zones have created strained relations and flash
points for potential maritime conflicts. In particular, with an increase in the number of
incidents between Chinese law enforcement vessels and vessels of other littoral States,
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China appears to be adopting a more aggressive stance when seeking to assert its
control over such resources.91
Since 1999, China has unilaterally instituted an annual fishing ban in the northwestern part the South China Sea for several months, even though this area
encompasses some marine areas under claimed Vietnamese jurisdiction.92 China has
claimed that the purpose of this ban is to conserve marine stocks. 93 However, it could
also be viewed as a strategic action by China to support its claims over these waters.
The Vietnamese government has always regarded the Chinese unilateral fishing ban in
the South China Sea as ―null and void‖,94 with the vast majority of Vietnamese
fishermen ignoring the ban altogether.95 As a result, many Vietnamese fishing vessels
have been arrested by Chinese patrol vessels. Indeed, between 2005 and 2012, more
than 60 Vietnamese fishing boats were seized by Chinese law enforcement authorities
in the South China Sea.96 In 2012, China and the Philippines became embroiled in a
two-month maritime standoff in the waters surrounding Scarborough Shoal due to a
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dispute over access to resources in this area.97 Even though tensions were diffused by
both sides engaging in diplomatic talks,98 the risk of further confrontations remain, as
the root causes of the disputes remain in place. Most recently, in March 2016 an
Indonesian law enforcement vessel captured a Chinese fishing boat operating illegally
in Indonesia‘s claimed EEZ within the South China Sea. A Chinese Coast Guard vessel
arrived on the scene thereafter and rammed the fishing boat to free it from Indonesian
authorities.99 Indonesia lodged a formal protest with China‘s Embassy in Jakarta, but
China responded by saying that the area where the incident took place was ―traditional
Chinese fishing grounds.‖100 Under international law Indonesia has sovereign rights
over both living and non-living resources in its claimed EEZ, while China‘s claim of
―traditional Chinese fishing grounds‖ in the South China Sea is legally questionable.
Nevertheless, disputes over access to living resources in the South China Sea represent
an emerging issue – one fraught with risk and which has already resulted in violent
clashes between the States concerned.
Access to oil and gas reserves is another aspect of the South China Sea disputes.
Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines are currently developing oil and gas fields in
their EEZs and on their continental shelves, but these fields also lie within the so-called
―nine-dash line‖ area claimed by China. Recently, disputes over access to oil and gas
resources have led to increased tensions between China and other littoral States. Since
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2007, China has warned foreign oil and gas companies to cease their joint exploration
activities with Vietnam or face adverse consequences in their business relations with
China.101 On 26 May 2011, three Chinese patrol vessels harassed a Vietnamese seismic
survey ship, the Binh Minh 02, with one of the Chinese vessels intentionally cutting a
submerged cable being towed by the Binh Minh 02 in an area called Block 148,
approximately 80 nautical miles from Vietnam‘s south-central coast and well within the
State‘s claimed EEZ.102 On 9 June 2011, a Chinese fishing vessel backed by two
Chinese patrol vessels rammed the survey cable of the Viking II, another Vietnamese
seismic survey ship, 60 nautical miles off the south coast of Vietnam and more than 500
nautical miles from China‘s Hainan Island.103 Vietnam asserted that the above actions
seriously violated Vietnam‘s sovereign rights over its EEZ and continental shelf, as well
as contravening the LOSC and the spirit of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in
the South China Sea (DOC) signed by China and ASEAN in 2002.104 Chinese vessels
have also harassed Philippine oil survey ships in the Reed Bank area, approximately 60
miles west of Palawan and well within the Philippines claimed EEZ.105 In May 2014,
China placed a large oil rig within the EEZ and on the continental shelf claimed by
Vietnam, approximately 130-150 nautical miles off the Vietnamese coast.106 During this
maritime standoff, Vietnam accused China Coast Guard ships of aggressively firing
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high-powered water cannons at, and intentionally ramming, Vietnamese law
enforcement ships while Chinese aircraft circled above Vietnamese vessels.107 The 75
day maritime standoff between China and Vietnam ended on 16 July 2014 when China
decided to withdraw the drilling rig from the contested area.108
As the economies of littoral States rely heavily on the natural resources of the
South China Sea, disputes over access to resources will persist unless the countries
involved enter into compromise arrangements.
2.3.4

Foreign military activities in the maritime zones of coastal States
Disputes over foreign military activities in the maritime zones of coastal States

in the South China Sea mainly involve the United States and China. Indeed, these two
States hold contradictory views over foreign military activities in the EEZ and the
passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea of coastal States.
Under the LOSC, ―ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.‖109 China, however, applies a
restrictive view on the innocent passage regime of the LOSC. While the United States
and other maritime user States argue that foreign warships enjoy the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea of coastal States; China, on the other hand, requires
prior authorisation for such passage.110 Other littoral States of the South China Sea,
particularly Vietnam and Taiwan, require prior notification for the passage of foreign
warships through their territorial seas, while the current domestic laws of Indonesia,
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Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines do not address this issue.111 As the LOSC does not
contain any specific provision regarding the innocent passage of warships, States
continue to interpret the innocent passage regime of the LOSC in different ways and in
accordance with their own vested interests.
In addition to the innocent passage regime, the issue of foreign military activities
in the EEZ of coastal States represents another controversial issue. As military activities
in the EEZ are not clearly defined in the LOSC, China and the United States have
adopted very different positions on this topic. For the United States, military surveying,
hydrographic surveying, and the collection of intelligence by military vessels and
aircraft in a foreign state‘s EEZ are normal activities that fall within the high seas
freedoms of navigation and overflight granted by the LOSC.112 As Pentagon Press
Secretary Geoff Morrell has stated: ―Coastal States do not have a right under
international law to regulate foreign military activities in the EEZ.‖ 113 China, however,
argues that military data collection violates the principle of peaceful use of the sea set
out in the LOSC.114 In a statement concerning a joint naval exercise between the United
States and South Korea in 2010, China‘s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said:
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―We oppose any party to take any military acts in our exclusive economic zone without
permission.‖115 Prominent incidents such as a collision between a U.S. reconnaissance
aircraft and a Chinese fighter in 2001,116 an incident which occurred in 2009 involving
USNS Impeccable,117 and a recent incident between a Chinese amphibious dock ship
and USS Cowpens,118 will be discussed in Chapter Seven of the thesis.
These incidents demonstrate that military activities in the EEZ of foreign States
continue to be a controversial issue. Given that most waters in the South China Sea are
within EEZs claimed by coastal States, conflicts of interest between coastal States and
maritime powers over military activities in the EEZ represent potential flash points and
need to be managed carefully.
2.4
2.4.1

The growth of naval powers and maritime law enforcement capabilities
Rise of China‘s naval and maritime law enforcement capabilities in the South
China Sea
To strengthen their maritime claims and protect their national interests in the

South China Sea, all territorial claimants within the region have increased their defence
budgets, expanding and upgrading their naval capabilities. However, the power of the
Chinese Navy far exceeds the combined naval capability of all the other claimant States
in the South China Sea. The rise of China‘s naval capabilities coincides with the
modernisation of China‘s military – a process which started in the 1990s and was
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spurred by the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis.119 These increased naval capabilities have
allowed China to fiercely protect its interests in the South China Sea (among other
things). For the past decade, and due to its stable economic growth, China‘s military
spending has increased by double-digits. In 2012, China announced a defence budget of
$114 billion. However, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, China‘s defence
spending could well exceed the State‘s published figures, with a defence budget
between $135 billion and $215 billion being more likely. 120 With this defence budget,
China is the world‘s second largest defence spender after the United States. Moreover,
China‘s defence budget has continued to increase in recent years, with Defence News
reporting a defence budget of $146 billion in 2016.121 Apart from its weapons
acquisition program, which includes anti-ship ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise
missiles, manned and unmanned aircraft, submarines, as well as surface ships, China‘s
naval modernisation also has led to the improvement of other defence areas, such as
C4ISR (command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance), defence maintenance and logistics, military research projects,
education and training, and military exercises.122
According to a 2015 report by the U.S. Department of Defense on Military and
Security Developments Involving China, the Chinese Navy possesses more than 300
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vessels including surface ships, submarines, amphibious ships, and patrol vessels.123
The U.S. Department of Defense also revealed that China is fielding a medium-range
anti-ship ballistic missile, known as the DF-21D, which is capable of attacking aircraft
carriers and other naval ships operating in the Western Pacific. 124 Chinese naval
aviation has also been equipped with modern aircraft such as the Su-30MK2 fighter,
JH-7A fighter-bombers and the Y-8J airborne early warning aircraft.125 In 2015, China
signed a contract with Russia for the construction of 24 Su-35 fighters which are
scheduled for completion within the next three years.126 China has also expanded its
submarine fleet with both modern indigenous-built and foreign-built submarines.
China‘s navy has acquired various diesel-electric submarines, including 13 Type-039
Song-class, 13 Type-039A Yuan-class, and 12 Kilo-class, as well as different classes of
nuclear submarines, including five Han-class, four Type-094 Jin-class, and six Type093 Shang-class.127 Currently, the Chinese navy possesses 21 Destroyers, including six
Luyang II-class (Type-052C), and three Luyang III-class guided missile destroyers
(Type 052D), which are capable of launching multipurpose missiles.128 Most notably, in
2012 the Chinese navy commissioned into service a refurbished aircraft carrier
purchased from Ukraine in 1998. Although China requires more time to operate this
aircraft carrier effectively, the entry into service of this carrier has helped China
strengthen its image as a significant maritime power. Table 2.2 shows the number of
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Chinese navy ships from 2005 to 2015 based on the U.S. Congress Research Service.
The table does not indicate a large increase in total numbers of ships; however, many
old ships have been replaced with newer and far more combat capable vessels.129
Table 2.2 Number of Chinese Navy ships from 2005 to 2015
Year

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Nuclearpowered attack
submarine

6

5

5

5

6

6

5

5

5

5

5

Diesel attack
submarines

51

50

53

54

54

54

49

49

49

51

53

Aircraft carriers 0

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

Destroyers

21

25

25

29

27

25

26

26

23

24

21

Frigates

43

45

47

45

48

49

53

53

52

49

52

Corvettes

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

8

15

Missile-armed
coastal patrol
craft

51

45

41

45

70

85

86

86

85

85

86

Amphibious
ships: LSTs
and LPDs

20

25

25

26

27

27

27

28

29

29

29

Amphibious
ships: LSMs

23

25

25

28

28

28

28

23

26

28

28

Source: extracted by the author from Ronald O'Rourke, ‗China Naval Modernization:
Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress‘,
Congress Research Service, September, 2015
The South Sea Fleet, based in Zhanjiang, Guangdong, is now the most capable
of China‘s three fleets. Indeed, over the past few decades, most of China‘s modern ships
have been allocated to the South Sea Fleet, amid rising tensions in the South China Sea.
These include four Luyang-class destroyers fitted with vertical launch surface to air
missiles with a 100 km range, two Jiangkai-II class frigates equipped with surface to air
missiles capable of cold launch, as well as different classes of new attack submarines,
129
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among them four Kilo-class, two Shang-class, three Song-class, and one Yuan-class.130
The South Sea Fleet has also received 24 Su-30MK2 fighters, together with a regiment
of JH-7A fighter bombers based on Hainan Island. As a result, China‘s air power in the
South China Sea has improved.131 With its increasing expansion of naval bases on
Hainan Island, the construction of an airfield on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands,
the deployment of surface-to-air missiles to Woody Island, and many hardened and
concrete hangars capable of housing fighter and strategic bombers, as well as airrefuelling aircraft, which have been built on various artificial islands built by China in
the Spratly Islands, China‘s navy has strengthened its capability to pursue effective
control of the entire South China Sea region.132
Apart from naval modernisation, China‘s law enforcement capabilities have also
been strengthened. For many years, China maintained five maritime law enforcement
agencies, including the China Coast Guard under the Ministry of Public Security, the
Maritime Safety Administration under the Ministry of Transport, China Marine
Surveillance under the State Oceanic Administration, the Fisheries Law Enforcement
Command under the Ministry of Agriculture, and the State and General Administration
of Customs.133 These five law enforcement agencies, which were often referred to as the
―Five Dragons‖, employed almost 40,000 people and boasted a fleet of roughly 480
vessels, including 8 large cutters, 19 midsize cutters, 149 small cutters, and 304 small
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boats.134 Of these vessels, more than 130 were allocated to patrolling the South China
Sea, including 4 large cutters, 5 midsize cutters, 48 small cutters and 80 small boats.135
As these five agencies were under different commands and had overlapping
responsibilities, their performance was often criticised as being decentralised and
ineffective. Thus, in order to strengthen its maritime law enforcement capacities, China
established a unified coast guard in July 2013 – one which integrates the functions of
the existing coast guard, chiefly marine surveillance, fisheries law enforcement and
anti-smuggling.136 The new Coast Guard, which is administered under China‘s State
Oceanic Administration, part of the Ministry of Land and Resources, possesses 11
squadrons and more than 16,000 personnel, but retains the core mission of maintaining
China‘s national maritime rights and interests, including enforcing the State‘s sovereign
territorial claims.137
With its increasing number of naval ships and maritime law enforcement vessels
in the South China Sea, China will undoubtedly become more assertive over resources
and its maritime territorial claims in the future.
2.4.2

Responses from other littoral states
In response to China‘s rise as a maritime power, other littoral states in the South

China Sea have modernised their navies and strengthened their maritime law
enforcement capabilities.
According to the geographical limits of the South China Sea set out in this
thesis, Singapore is not a South China Sea littoral State. Nor has Singapore made a
134
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claim to any territory or features in the region. However, as an island country that is
heavily reliant on secure access to SLOCs, Singapore‘s national security interests in the
South China Sea are mainly SLOC protection, seaward defence, and international
security.138 Singapore‘s navy has undergone rapid development and modernisation over
the past decade. Indeed, the State currently has six Formidable-class guided missile
frigates with blue water combat capability, four Challenger-class conventional
submarines, two Archer-class diesel-electric submarines equipped with air-independent
propulsion, and four Endurance-class landing platform docks, each capable of carrying
350 troops, 18 tanks, four helicopters and four landing craft.139 Singapore‘s air force has
74 F-16s and 24 F-15SG fighters, nine air-to-air refuelling tanker aircraft, four
Gulfstream G550s airborne early warning aircraft, and 20 AH-64D Apache Longbow
attack helicopters. In the near future, a number of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters may be
joining the fleet.140 With support from the State‘s air force, the Singapore navy is
becoming a regional leader in terms of naval modernisation and three-dimensional
combat capabilities.
Malaysia has also enhanced its naval capabilities, acquiring two Lekiu-class
frigates in 1999, two Scorpene-class submarines in 2009, and six MEKO A100 offshore
patrol vessels.141 Malaysia‘s air force has also been expanded, with the addition of 18
Su-30MKM, eight F/A-18Ds, and 13 F-5E/Fs. Moreover, there are plans to acquire
another 18 fighter aircraft and four airborne early warning aircraft over the next few
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years.142 Malaysia established its coast guard in 2005 as the Maritime Enforcement
Agency (MMEA). The coast guard currently possesses two amphibious aircraft, 50
ships, and 76 fast boats ranging from 50 tons to 2000 tons.143 In 2015, Malaysia
announced that it was allocating RM$31.2 billion to be spent across the Malaysian
Armed Forces, the Royal Malaysian Police and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement
Agency.144
The Indonesian navy currently possesses two Type-209 submarines, four new
Sigma-class corvettes and four Makassar-class landing platform docks. The State also
plans to buy three Type-209 Chang Bogo submarines from South Korea to replace its
existing Type-209s.145 The Indonesian air force has acquired ten Sukhois and plans to
buy up to 40 of them over the next few years. In 2010, Indonesia negotiated an
agreement with the United States for the supply of 24 F-16C/D combat aircraft.146 The
Indonesian navy announced its plans for a ‗Green-Water Navy‘ in 2005, setting a goal
of achieving a 274-ship force structure by 2024. This Green Water Navy will be
composed of 110 strike ships, 66 patrolling ships, and 98 supporting ships.147
Indonesia‘s defence budget has increased by 0.8 per cent annually over the last ten
years, from US$2.4 billion in 2004 to US$8.3 billion in 2013.148 Currently, Indonesia‘s
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maritime law enforcement capabilities are considered weak and insufficient.149 Indeed,
according to Law No. 17/2008 on shipping, Indonesia should have an independent sea
and coast guard. However, for many years the responsibility for maritime security and
law enforcement in Indonesian waters has fallen to different ministries and
institutions.150 In December 2014, Indonesian President Joko Widodo declared that an
Indonesian Maritime Security Agency would be established to act as a coast guard for
Indonesia.151 In 2015, the Indonesian government announced that it would increase
military spending from 0.8 per cent to 1.5 per cent of GDP, bringing the State‘s total
military expenditure to $15 billion by 2020.152
Vietnam has enhanced its naval and maritime capabilities, especially over the
past five years. The State‘s defence budget has steadily increased from US$2.67 billion
in 2011 to US$3.33 billion in 2012, reaching US$5.73 billion in 2014.153 The
Vietnamese navy has received two Gepard-class guided missile frigates from Russia,
and is anticipating the arrival of another two in a few years. Between 2010 and 2012, 20
Su-30MK2V combat aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, and two batteries of
the K-300P Bastion coastal defence missile system, were delivered by Russia.154 In
2008, Vietnam ordered six Kilo-class submarines from Russia, with the first one having
been delivered to the Vietnamese navy in January 2014. To date, the Vietnamese navy
has four Kilo-class submarines as part of its fleet. In 2009, Vietnam established its naval
air arm directly under Vietnamese naval command, with a number of aircraft transferred
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from the air force and additional maritime surveillance aircraft acquired from various
foreign countries. Vietnam has also engaged in on-going talks with the United States
and European countries for the purchase of combat and maritime patrol aircraft.155
Closer to home, Vietnam plans to buy the BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missile from
India, which is capable of being fired from ships and aircraft.156 The combined effect of
these new and incoming assets is that Vietnam has increased its self-reliance in terms of
defence capabilities. The Vietnamese Marine Police Force, which was established in
1998, was restructured in 2013 to form the Vietnamese Coast Guard, with the objective
of improving capabilities as well as expanding cooperation with regional counterparts.
With a number of offshore patrol vessels capable of carrying helicopters and three new
C212-400 maritime patrol aircraft, the Vietnamese Coast Guard has enhanced its
maritime law enforcement capabilities in the South China Sea. In April 2014, Vietnam
officially established its Fisheries Surveillance Force (VFSF) under the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Development. The construction of 32 patrol vessels and four
large fisheries surveillance vessels capable of carrying helicopters was also approved by
the Vietnamese Government in 2014.157 Vietnam‘s total expenditure on new coast guard
vessels and associated equipment in 2014 was US$540 million.158 The government also
allocated a further $US200 million to build four more large fisheries surveillance
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vessels to work alongside the coast guard and counter China's increasing aggression in
the South China Sea.159
Unlike Vietnam, the naval capability of the Philippines is very limited. Indeed,
the State‘s main surface combatants include three Jacino-class corvettes and one Rajah
Humabon destroyer escort without any cruise missiles.160 Recently, the Philippine navy
acquired two renovated Hamilton-class cutters and 12 FA-50 light attack planes from
South Korea. In July 2012, Philippine President Benigno Aquino announced that his
government would allocate US$2.3 billion over five years to modernise the State‘s
Armed Forces.161 With this level of defence spending, it is quite likely that the
Philippine navy will acquire further major surface combatants in the coming years. The
Philippine Coast Guard fleet has greatly expanded over the last five years, and there are
plans for the service to acquire ten multi-role response vessels, one offshore patrol
vessel, 24 fast patrol boats, and seven Bell helicopters in the near future.162
The Brunei navy is the smallest navy among the littoral states in the region.
With only 1000 personnel, four landing craft and 11 patrol and coastal combatants, its
ability to resist an outside aggressor is very limited.163
China‘s naval modernisation has had a great impact on Taiwan. Taiwan is a
South China Sea claimant but since the majority of States recognise the ―one China‖
policy, developing a naval force with asymmetric capabilities which can successfully
defend the island from a seaward invasion has been difficult to achieve, despite the fact
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that this is critical to Taiwanese national security. Taiwan has increased its defence
budget from US$9.6 billion in 2009 to US$10.3 billion in 2015.164 A total of 31 fast
attack boats equipped with anti-ship missiles have been provided to the Navy since
2010. In addition, several Jinn Chiang-class patrol boats have been upgraded with
super-sonic anti-ship missiles since 2011, and a new domestic submarine program is
being considered for the Taiwanese navy.165 Taiwan has upgraded its E-2K Hawkeye
early warning aircraft, acquired P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, and hopes to buy
several F-16s from the United States.166 The Taiwan Coast Guard (CCG) has also been
expanded in terms of assets and capabilities. In 2004, it requested US$2.4 billion for the
acquisition of fixed-wing aircraft and large ships capable of carrying helicopters for the
next 15 years.167 In 2013, one 2,000-ton cutter and one 1,000-ton patrol boat were
delivered to the CCG as part of a 37 ship building program.168
2.4.3

Potential maritime incidents in the South China Sea
As previously discussed, there are many different types of surface vessels,

aircraft and submarines operating in the South China Sea. Moreover, with States
increasing their defence budgets, it is highly likely that additional vessels and aircraft
will be added to existing fleets in the coming years. The Air Force and Naval Aviation
commands in China‘s Guangzhou Military Region operate an impressive 322 aircraft of
different types. Indeed, by comparison, the number of aircraft operated by other States
in the region is meagre. Vietnam operates 101 aircraft, Malaysia operates 61 aircraft,
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while the Philippines operates just 12 new FA-50 light attack planes.169 The South Sea
Fleet of China‘s navy and the navies of all other littoral states surrounding the South
China Sea currently comprise 38 submarines, 83 principal surface combatants and 381
patrol and coastal combatants. Meanwhile, the law enforcement agencies of these States
have roughly 1134 patrol vessels between them.170 The sheer number of State vessels
operating in the South China Sea, together with various types of commercial vessels and
the 1.77 million fishing vessels competing for space, make this maritime region
crowded and vulnerable to maritime incidents. With multiple sovereign immune vessels
including submarines, commercial vessels and fishing vessels operating in these
confined and disputed waters, maritime incidents will be difficult to avoid altogether.
Indeed, there have been a number of incidents in the South China Sea between various
types of vessels, including: (i) military vessels and fishing vessels; (ii) military vessels
and law enforcement vessels; (iii) law enforcement vessels and fishing vessels; and (iv)
submarines and surface vessels.171 These incidents will be detailed in Chapter Seven.
Since 2013, China has built artificial islands and airstrips capable of accommodating
military aircraft on a number of disputed features in the Spratly Islands. In 2016, China
deployed surface-to-air missiles to Woody Island in the Paracels. 172 In the near future, it
is expected that China could declare an Air Defence Identification Zone in the South
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China Sea.173 If this transpires, then it is likely that China will intensify its air patrol in
the region. As a result, incidents involving military and law enforcement aircraft over
the South China Sea will be a critical concern.
2.5

Conclusion
The South China Sea is not only a critical waterway for merchant shipping and

military transits and operations, but also contains rich fishing grounds and potential oil
and gas reserves. However, maritime disputes in this region are quite common and
highly complex. These disputes concern offshore sovereignty and maritime boundaries
claims; access to resources; military navigation and activities in different maritime
zones of coastal States, particularly the innocent passage of warships in the territorial
sea, as well as military surveying, hydrographic surveying and intelligence collection in
the EEZ. As the security concerns of coastal States in the South China Sea are
escalating, concerned States have responded by increasing and modernizing their
maritime forces. Indeed, increased naval and law enforcement surface vessels,
submarines, and aircraft are being added to the region each year. Unfortunately, this
means that the potential for maritime incidents between military and government
vessels and aircraft of interested States is also likely to increase. For this reason,
defining the international legal basis and geopolitical challenges associated with
navigating the shoals of the South China Sea for sovereign immune vessels and aircraft
is not only critical for individual States, but also for the security of the region as a
whole.
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3 STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
3.1

Introduction
As discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, the geopolitical interests in the South

China Sea make the region significant to littoral States and external powers. However,
the States concerned have different capacities and strategies to pursue their interests in
the region. While access to resources and maintaining peace and security are key
priorities for littoral States, external players are chiefly concerned with the freedom of
navigation and overflight, as well as the safe and secure passage of shipping which rulebased orders tend to promote. For China, resource security is a key strategic interest, but
so too is the projection of power and the extension of its sphere of influence. The South
China Sea policy of the United States centres on honouring commitments to regional
allies and cooperating with China for its national interests. However, for smaller South
China Sea claimant States, protecting territorial sovereignty and associated maritime
claims in the region while avoiding military conflict with China are prime
considerations. In light of the varying interests of the States concerned, the South China
Sea is of high strategic significance, shaping relationships between States in the region
and their interaction with extra-regional players. Moreover, on 12 July 2016, an arbitral
tribunal established under Annex VII of the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC)
delivered a ruling in the China-Philippines South China Sea dispute. As briefly
discussed in Chapter Two, this ruling has several strategic implications for the region,
and as a result certain States may need adjust their national policies accordingly.
This chapter provides the strategic context of the South China Sea. With this
objective, the interests and strategies of littoral States and external players in the South
China Sea will be explored, as well as the strategic implications of the arbitral tribunal‘s
award in the regional dispute between China and the Philippines.
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3.2
3.2.1

Interests and strategies of South China Sea littoral States
China‘s interests and strategies in the South China Sea

3.2.1.1 China‘s interests in the South China Sea
As the largest country in the world in terms of population, and the world‘s
largest energy consumer, resource security is a major challenge for the Chinese
government. Therefore, it is rather unsurprising that China has asserted its military
might to ensure maximum access to living and non-living resources in the South China
Sea. Besides access to food supplies to sustain its massive population, access to oil and
gas resources in the South China Sea may help China reduce its dependence on energy
supplies from Africa and the Persian Gulf - resources which must travel through the
Strait of Malacca. This has been described as the ―Malacca Dilemma‖ by Chinese
strategists.1 China claims almost all the waters of the South China Sea based on its
nationalistic view of ―historic rights‖, and has utilised both law enforcement and
military personnel to assert its claims. The concept of historic rights is not clearly
defined in international law, and the LOSC ―does not recognize historic rights as a basis
for claiming sovereignty over waters.‖2 However, China has been willing to use its
maritime forces to oppose any action which violates its claimed sovereignty or historic
rights in the South China Sea.
China is heavily dependent on imported energy, with nearly 80 per cent of the
State‘s imported crude oil passing through the South China Sea. 3 For this reason,
protecting sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the South China Sea is crucial for

1

Michael McDevitt, 'The South China Sea and U.S. Policy Options' (2013) 35(4) (August) American
Foreign Policy Interests 175, 181.
2
Florian Dupuy and Pierre Marie Dupuy, 'A Legal Analysis of China's Historic Rights Claim in the South
China Sea' (2013) 107 American Journal of International Law 124, 138.
3
Robert D Kaplan, Why the South China Sea is so crucial (20 February 2015) Business Insider
<http://www.businessinsider.com.au/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2>.
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China. If the region were to become blocked by an adversary due to a conflict, this
would have a significant negative impact on China‘s economy. Moreover, by
controlling the South China Sea, China would have the upper hand if it became
embroiled in a conflict with Taiwan or Japan, as approximately 60 per cent of these
States‘ energy supplies also pass through this region.4
As China is in the process of building a global maritime power, naval training
and exercises are of critical importance. However, even in peacetime and with strong,
well-trained U.S. naval forces stationed in Japan and South Korea, the East China Sea is
not conducive to China‘s navy conducting any type of covert training. Indeed, this
makes the South China Sea an ideal maritime area for Chinese aircraft carriers and
submarines to conduct training and exercises. Moreover, throughout China‘s modern
history, most of its military threats have come from the sea. The Science of Military
Strategy published by the Chinese Academy of Military Science in 2013 states that ―the
threat of war in the east is more serious than the threat of war in the west, the threat of
war from the sea exceeds that of the threat of war from the land.‖ 5 As a result, China
considers the South China Sea a security ―buffer zone‖ which can protect its mainland
from outside attacks.
Furthermore, as a rising power seeking to extend its sphere of influence
throughout the region, China has sought to push the United States away from the South
China Sea. This strategy is designed to give China a free hand in shaping regional
circumstances and dispositions. Indeed, an important part of the ―China Dream‖ is for
China to become a global maritime power6. However, in order to achieve this status,

4

Ibid.
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6
Ibid 4.
5
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China must first be a well-recognised regional maritime power. It is for this reason that
China so fiercely protects its maritime interests in the East and South China Seas. If one
compares the two seas, it is clear that establishing a stronghold in the South China Sea,
which is surrounded by small littoral States, is easier for China than achieving
dominance in the East China Sea. Thus, the South China Sea is a more favourable area
for China to gain increased status on its way towards becoming a global maritime
power.7
To further this goal, China has modernised its navy and expanded its naval bases
in the region. The expansion of the Yulin naval base on Hainan Island has allowed it to
house more submarines and surface vessels. Such expansion accomplishes three main
goals: it strengthens China‘s nuclear deterrent, enhances its counter intervention
strategy towards other maritime powers, and supports its law enforcement personnel
and military forces in the South China Sea.8
3.2.1.2 Chinese strategies in the South China Sea
With the goal of controlling the South China Sea when circumstances permit,
China has applied a variety of approaches and strategies to protect its interests in the
region.
Firstly, China has tried to integrate with the region to strengthen its regional
influence. Cooperating with regional States in both economic and political aspects is a

7

A comparative Analysis of the South and East China Seas, see Andy Yee, 'Maritime Territorial Disputes
in East Asia: A comparative Analysis of the South China Sea and the East China Sea' (2011) 2 Journal of
Current Chinese Affairs 165, 165-193.
8
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Thayer, 'The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea' (2010) 6(2) Security
Challenges 69, 73-74.
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vital strategy for China‘s ―Peaceful Rise.‖9 China has increased its economic relations
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) through trade and foreign
investment. Indeed, China became ASEAN‘s largest trading partner in 2009, with the
two-way trade reaching approximately USD$400 billion in 2014. Moreover, this figure
is expected to reach USD$1 trillion by 2020.10 The ASEAN-China Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA), which came into effect on 1 January 2010, covers the largest free
trade area in the world in terms of population (two billion people), and is the third
largest in terms of nominal GDP, just after the European Economic Area and the North
American Free Trade Area.11 China has also launched the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB), which all ASEAN States have joined, as well as advancing the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which also includes all
members of ASEAN, as well as Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand.
Due to the importance of economic relations between ASEAN and China, it is unlikely
that ASEAN States will take any action against China which would adversely affect
their economies.12 China became a full dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1996, and has
attempted to portray itself as the ultimate benefactor, thereby enhancing its influence in
the region.13 However, China‘s behaviour in the South China Sea in recent years has
deeply concerned many ASEAN States. China has also utilised ASEAN-driven forums
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to consolidate its position and minimise ASEAN‘s collective power – a power which
has the capacity to work against China‘s interests in the future, especially in the case of
the South China Sea.14 China has always insisted that maritime territorial disputes and
sovereignty claims in the South China Sea be resolved through bilateral approaches,
rejecting multilateral approaches or any efforts to internationalise the issues. However,
as the majority of disputes in the South China Sea involve more than two States,
bilateral approaches are unlikely to be effective. By employing this delaying tactic,
China gains more time to consolidate its claims and strengthen its control over disputed
maritime areas in the region.15 China has certainly succeeded in dividing ASEAN
members and weakening the consolidation of ASEAN.16 One such example was the
failure of ASEAN to issue a joint statement on South China Sea issues at the Foreign
Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in 2012, which was perceived by some
commentators as a Chinese proxy.17 A similar situation occurred in 2016, when ASEAN
retracted its agreed press statement over rising tensions in the South China Sea only a
few hours after it was released to the public. It was later suggested that China had
pressured Laos, the ASEAN chair in 2016, to withdraw the statement.18 It is important
to note that at the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting held in 2016 in Vientiane,
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Laos, ASEAN failed to reach a unified position on the South China Sea disputes, and
made no specific mention of the recent ruling of the arbitral tribunal on these disputes.
Cambodia was again alleged to have blocked any mention of the arbitral tribunal‘s
ruling against China.19 It is clear that China has been successful in using its economic
and military power to impose diplomatic pressure and even tacitly threaten States to
further its own national interests and divide ASEAN member States when it comes to
South China Sea issues.
Secondly, China exploits loopholes in international law to justify its actions in
the South China Sea. On the one hand, China claims almost all the South China Sea
based on what it calls ―historical rights‖, and is willing to use hard power to enforce its
claims in complete disregard of international law norms. As Isaac B Kardon has
commented, for China, ―history is a superior consideration to law and can be deployed,
loosely, to justify any claims and behaviours that appear to be prima facie illegal.‖20 On
the other hand, China interprets international law provisions in ways which suit its own
national interests. For many years, smaller littoral States have explored and exploited
natural resources within their maritime zones in the South China Sea without dispute or
disruption.21 However, by claiming almost all the waters of the South China Sea without
legal entitlement, and using its power to strengthen its maritime claims, China has
changed the status quo in the region, including increasing its maritime patrols. China
has also enacted domestic laws and regulations to support the operations of its law
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enforcement vessels in the South China Sea. Indeed, many Chinese law enforcement
vessels have been used to harass fishing vessels of smaller littoral States and to prevent
them from accessing waters claimed by China.22 It has also become apparent that China
is using many of its fishing vessels as maritime militia to advance China‘s maritime
claims and to support Chinese law enforcement agencies in disputed areas of the East
and South China Seas.23 Furthermore, China has adopted a restrictive view on LOSC
navigational regimes in order deter the United States from using the South China Sea.
For example, while the United States and other maritime user States are of the view that
the LOSC grants vessels and aircraft of foreign States the ability to conduct military
activities in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of coastal States, China does not allow
such activities in its own EEZ.24 With respect its historic water claim, it is not even
clear what China is actually claiming. Instead, China interprets international law
provisions narrowly to suit its own interests, and has evinced an intention to reject any
decision or award by an international arbitral tribunal. This can be seen in China‘s
response to the arbitral tribunal‘s recent ruling in the South China Sea dispute. Not only
did China refuse to participate in this arbitration, it also ignored the arbitral tribunal‘s
ultimate decision.25 To avoid being isolated from regional security fora, China is willing
to participate in regional confidence building measures. However, when it comes to

22

For example, Chinese law enforcement vessels have harassed and sunk a number of Vietnamese fishing
vessels around the Paracel Islands, and have blocked Philippine fishing vessels from accessing resources
in Scarborough Shoal. See Chapter seven of this thesis for a detailed discussion.
23
James Kraska and Michael Monti, 'The Law of Naval Warfare and China‘s Maritime Militia' (2015) 91
International Law studies 450, 452.
24
See Chapter six of this thesis for a detailed discussion.
25
See Full Text: China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes
Between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea (13 July 2016) Xinhuanet
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2016-07/13/c_135509153.htm>.

74

agreements, China always prefers non-legally binding arrangements.26 This strategy
gives China a certain flexibility to manoeuvre in accordance with its own interests.
Thirdly, as smaller littoral States are reliant on foreign companies and
governments to explore and exploit non-living resources, China uses diplomacy to
prevent the development of any resource-related activities. Many diplomatic objections
to hydrocarbon projects in the South China Sea have been made by China in order to
deter foreign companies from cooperating with other claimant States on resource
exploration.27 Moreover, China has increased oil and gas exploration and exploitation in
disputed areas of the South China Sea, using its military and maritime law enforcement
vessels and aircraft to threaten and harass vessels of other claimant States while
protecting its own areas of operation.28
Lastly, with its growing economic power, in addition to modernising its military
forces and maritime law enforcement agencies, China continues to expand its footprint
in the region. Since 2013, China has carried out an extensive artificial island-building
program on its occupied features in the Spratly Islands that can be used as forward
operating bases for its maritime forces. In 2016, China landed a number of civilian
aircraft on artificial islands in the Spratlys,29 and deployed surface-to-air missiles to
Woody Island in the Paracels.30 According to the Washington Times, many hardened
and concrete hangars capable of housing fighter and strategic bombers, as well as airrefuelling aircraft, have been built on various artificial islands built by China in the
26
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Spratlys.31
It is clear that China has adopted an assertive stance in extending its maritime
security buffer zones, claiming living and non-living resources, as well as projecting its
military footprint in the South China Sea. However, in order to avoid armed conflict,
China has thus far applied the tactic of low-level coercion, using its maritime law
enforcement and fishing vessels rather than military forces to assert its maritime
claims.32 According to James Kraska, ―[b]y using asymmetric maritime forces –
principally fishing vessels and coast guard ships – China is slowly but surely absorbing
the South China Sea and East China Sea into its domain.‖33
China‘s strategy in the South China Sea has been described as a ―salami slice‖
strategy, or as Ashley Townshend and Rory Medcalf have proposed, a ―passive
assertive approach to consolidate its strategic gains in ways that reduce military risk.‖34
On the one hand, China continues to assert its maritime claims in the South China Sea,
using the tactic of low-level coercion to avoid military confrontations with other
claimant States while gradually consolidating its claims and taking control of disputed
areas. On the other hand, China uses its economic leverage to dampen responses from
smaller South China Sea littoral States. Moreover, China understands the strategic and
economic importance of maintaining a stable relationship with the United States, and
has sought to restrain the U.S. response to its assertive behaviour in the region. With its
burgeoning economic and military power, China will reject any legal resolutions and
31
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prevent outside players, particularly the United States, India and Japan, from becoming
involved in South China Sea issues.35
3.2.2

Interests and strategies of smaller littoral States
For smaller littoral States, protecting their maritime claims, having access to

resources, as well as maintaining peace, stability and security in the South China Sea
are prime considerations. Of the six smaller littoral States in the region, Vietnam,
Indonesia and the Philippines are among the world's top ten seafood producers.36
Maintaining access to living resources in the South China Sea is not only critically
important to fishermen in Southeast Asia, but also a top policy priority for littoral
States. Access to oil and gas in the South China Sea is also crucial to smaller South
China Sea claimant States. As many of the oil and gas fields being developed by
Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines are located on their continental shelves but lie
within the so-called ―nine-dash line‖ claimed by China, securing access to these
resources in accordance with international law is of paramount importance for these
particular States. Ideally, preventing China from expanding its control over the area,
while maintaining regional peace and stability through rule-based orders, is a clearly
objective for all smaller littoral States. Moreover, for Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, the South China Sea represents a security buffer zone one which protects these States from an outside attack, particularly from China. For
Vietnam specifically, if China were to block the South China Sea, there would be no
alternative sea lane to sustain Vietnam‘s maritime trade, even with regional States. As a
35
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result, maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea, and avoiding military
confrontation with China, is critical to the Hanoi‘s security interests.37
With the exception of China and Taiwan, all other littoral States are members of
ASEAN, and therefore their security strategies have centred mainly on ASEAN
frameworks. In order to mitigate China‘s military and economic power in the South
China Sea disputes, Southeast Asian States have tried to engage China in a multilayered web of regional and international institutions, thereby incorporating China into
their own security commitments.38 The ASEAN Dialogue Partnerships, the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF), the ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asian Summit (EAS), and the
ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) are examples of multilateral
forums which bring together ASEAN countries, China, as well as other powers to
discuss regional security. All of these regional forums are centred on ASEAN, and thus
ASEAN can set agendas and further its objectives in accordance with international law
and universally acceptable norms. The signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of
Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) between China and ASEAN in 2002 is
considered one of ASEAN‘s successes as it directly engaged China in a regional
cooperative process.39 Even though the DOC is a non-binding document, it was
considered a significant achievement by ASEAN at the time.40 ASEAN countries have
also welcomed extra-regional powers into the region, including the United States,
Japan, India, Australia and South Korea. However, ASEAN members are not always
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united when dealing with China in the South China Sea. Vietnam and the Philippines
tend to be proactive in their dealings with China. Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and
Singapore have assumed a more abstemious attitude, while Cambodia, Laos, Thailand
and Myanmar invariably try to accommodate China.41 Cambodia‘s willingness to defer
to China was evident at the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in 2012.42 As
previously mentioned, this meeting, which was held under Cambodia‘s chairmanship,
failed to issue a joint communiqu for the first time in ASEAN‘s history due to
disagreements over South China Sea issues. The third ADMM – Plus meeting held in
Malaysia in 2015 also failed to issue a joint declaration due to a lack of consensus on
the South China Sea disputes.43
Littoral States within ASEAN have also tried to resolve their overlapping
maritime boundaries in the South China Sea in accordance with international law,
particularly the LOSC.44 The joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia to the UN
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf clearly indicated that both States
consider the disputed features in the Spratly Islands to be no more than ―rocks‖ under
article 121 of the LOSC.45 This implies that Vietnam and Malaysia share the same view
– that is, that none of the features in the Spratly Islands are entitled to an exclusive
economic zone. This view echoes the arbitral tribunal‘s recent ruling that none of the
high-tide features in the Spratly Islands ―generate entitlement to an exclusive economic
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zone or continental shelf.‖46 This ruling, if fully respected, could help narrow down the
disputed areas in the South China Sea. Some ASEAN States have even issued their own
laws and regulations regarding their claims in the South China Sea. The Philippine
Baseline Law 1999,47 and the Law of the Sea of Vietnam 2012,48 are examples of
efforts by littoral States to more closely align their domestic laws with the LOSC.
Apart from ASEAN, littoral States have enhanced their military and law
enforcement capabilities in order to protect their sovereignty and interests in the region.
Recognising that their military capabilities cannot match those of China, littoral States
have directed their spending on sea denial capabilities within the South China Sea.49
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Taiwan and Brunei all plan to buy new
military assets to enhance their military capabilities.50 Of the smaller claimant States,
Vietnam and the Philippines have both reacted firmly and unequivocally to China‘s
growing assertion. However, due to different political ideologies, foreign policies, as
well as military and maritime capabilities, their strategies in the South China Sea are
quite different.
To counter China‘s ambition to dominate the South China Sea, Vietnam has
pursued a number of strategies, including hard power and diplomatic approaches. On
the one hand, with its ―Three-nos‖ defence policy (no military alliances, no foreign
military bases on its territory, and no reliance on any country to fight against a third
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country)51, Vietnam has strengthened its maritime forces, including naval, coast guard
and fisheries surveillance forces.52 On the other hand, given that Vietnam‘s maritime
forces cannot match China‘s military prowess, Vietnam has actively sought to
internationalise the South China Sea disputes, garnering support from extra-regional
players while simultaneously maintaining an open dialogue with China through
different channels, including diplomatic, military and party-to-party channels.53
Vietnam is open to external players, particularly the United States, Japan, India and
Australia playing constructive roles in maintaining peace, security and freedom of
navigation in the South China Sea in accordance with international law. However,
Vietnam does try to avoid escalating tensions with China over the South China Sea
issues.54 It is important to note that while the South China disputes represent a critical
factor in the relationship between Vietnam and China, it is not the only factor. China is
Vietnam‘s largest trading partner and shares Vietnam‘s nominal political ideology. As
Carlyle Thayer has opined, Vietnam tries to manage its relationship with China - a
much larger neighbour - ―under conditions of mature asymmetry‖, with ―Vietnam and
China hav[ing] too much at stake to allow the present period of mature asymmetry to
revert back to hostile asymmetry due to territorial disputes in the South China Sea.‖55
As a result, balancing strategic re-alignment with China on the one hand, and other
outside players (particularly the United States) on the other hand, is important to
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Vietnam‘s foreign policy. Following the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig incident, there have
been no major maritime incidents between the vessels and aircraft of the two States in
the South China Sea. Indeed, it could be argued that Vietnam has been successful in
dissipating China‘s assertiveness in the region, and that China has shown signs of
diffusing tensions with Vietnam over the South China Sea disputes. In April 2015, the
General Secretary of Vietnam‘s Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, visited China,
and in November 2015 Chinese President Xi Jinping became the first Chinese president
in ten years to visit Vietnam.56 These diplomatic visits indicate that the two sides are
seeking to better manage their relations in the wake of the oil rig incident.
Unlike Vietnam, the Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States, and has
ramped up its defence cooperation with this powerful ally over disputes in the South
China Sea. On 12 January 2016, the Philippine Supreme Court upheld the Enhanced
Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) signed by the Philippines and the United
States in 2014 - an agreement which grants U.S. forces a presence in selected Philippine
military bases.57 The Philippines has also strengthened its defence relationship with
Japan and India. In February 2015, Japan and the Philippines signed an agreement on
defence equipment transfer.58 The signing of this agreement is a clear indication of the
increasing defence cooperation between the two States. Accordingly, the Philippines
expects to receive at least five TC-90s reconnaissance aircraft on loan from the Japanese
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Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF), which will enable it to increase maritime
patrols in the South China Sea.59 In 2015, Japan also provided the Philippines with a
low-interest loan of US$150 million to buy ten patrol vessels from Japan. These vessels
will be used to enhance the capability of the Philippine Coast Guard.60 The Philippines
has also improved its defence cooperation with India. At the third Meeting of the IndiaPhilippines Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation held in New Delhi in October
2015, the two States agreed ―to further strengthen defence and security cooperation in
the areas of maritime domain awareness.‖61
Moreover, as its military forces cannot match those of China, in 2013 the
Philippines sought a legal resolution to its maritime disputes with China in the South
China Sea as noted earlier. Although China refused to participate in the proceedings, the
arbitral tribunal proceeded without China‘s involvement. On 12 July 2016, the arbitral
tribunal issued its award in favour of the Philippines. In effect, the legal strategy
adopted by the Philippines has forced China to choose between its maritime ambitions
in the South China Sea and its reputation in the wider international community. The
award of the arbitral tribunal is certainly considered a landmark win for the Philippines,
but it remains to be seen how the award will affect China‘s dealings with other
claimants in the South China Sea disputes.62
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3.3

Interests and strategies of extra-regional powers
The geographical position of the South China Sea gives it strategic significance

not only for littoral States but also for extra-regional powers, including the United
States, Japan, India and Australia. However, each of these States has different interests
in the South China Sea, and as a result their strategies are also quite different.
3.3.1

The United States
Apart from the economic importance of the South China Sea (as discussed in

Chapter two of the thesis), this region has been used by the U.S. Navy and Air Force as
an operating area and as a transit point between its military bases in Asia and the Indian
Ocean and Persian Gulf. Therefore, maintaining peace, safety and freedom of
navigation and overflight in accordance with international law is of vital strategic
interest to the United States.63 At an ARF meeting in July 2010, U.S. Secretary of State,
Hillary Clinton, affirmed that:
…As a Pacific nation and resident power, the United States has a national interest in
freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international
law, and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea...64

Although the United States does not take sides regarding territorial disputes, it
does encourage claimants to resolve such disputes peacefully and in accordance with
international law.65 In addition, the United States has rejected China‘s ―nine-dash line‖
claim, and has publically urged China to stop its extensive artificial island-building

63

Patrick Ventrell, South China Sea Press Statement (3 August 2012) U.S. Department of State
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/08/196022.htm>; see also Jian Yang, 'Navigating the Volatile
South China Sea' (2011) 36(5) New Zealand International Review 2, 3.
64
Hillary Rodham Clinton, Remarks to the ASEAN Regional Forum (12 July 2012) U.S. Department of
State <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/07/194987.htm>.
65
Ibid.

84

program in the Spratlys.66
Honouring its commitment to regional allies is another U.S. priority. The United
States is a treaty ally of the Philippines under the 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty. Article
IV of this Treaty provides that:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties
would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet
the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes…67

Article V states that:
For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to
include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the
island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public
vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.68

There have been different interpretations of this Treaty regarding the response of
the United States in the event of an armed attack on one of the offshore islands claimed
by the Philippines in the South China Sea. To date, there has been no official
declaration by either side on the level of commitment which would be made if such an
attack were to occur. Even though the United States does not take sides in territorial
disputes, it is clear from the text of the treaty that if an armed attack were to take place
on the armed forces, public vessels or aircraft of the Philippines in the South China Sea,
then the United States would be obliged to become consult. The scope of the U.S.
involvement, however, would depend upon the diplomatic, political and security
environment at the time.
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Strengthening its regional influence in the region is another strategic interest of
the United States. Indeed, maintaining the presence and unhindered passage of U.S.
military vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea to sustain its power projection in the
region and around the globe is strategically important. With the increasing number of
incidents between vessels and aircraft of China and those of the United States in the
South China Sea, as well as the rapid modernisation of China‘s Navy, it appears that the
future of U.S. leadership in the Asia-Pacific region could be affected by China‘s rising
power.69 Ensuring a sustainable security environment in the South China Sea is
therefore crucial to the U.S. rebalancing strategy towards the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, this
will help the United States strengthen its political position in the region.
In an effort to maintain its influence in the region, the United States has
enhanced its diplomatic, economic and security relations with surrounding States. Since
2009, the Obama Administration has adopted an engagement policy towards the AsiaPacific region. In July 2009, the United States acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation,70 and in 2011, the U.S. President participated in the East Asia Summit
for the first time. In his 2011 speech before the Australian Parliament, President Barack
Obama stated that ―the United States will play a larger and long-term role in shaping
this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in close partnership with our
allies and friends.‖71 According to Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to President
Obama, the ultimate goal of the rebalancing policy toward the Asia-Pacific region is to
ensure that ―international law and norms are respected, that commerce and freedom of
69
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navigation are not impeded, that emerging powers build trust with their neighbours, and
that disagreements are resolved peacefully without threats or coercion.‖ 72 Under this
rebalancing policy, the United States has directed more resources toward the region,
including military, diplomatic, economic and strategic support.73
In relation to military resources, on 5 January 2012, President Obama announced
a new Defense Strategic Guidance policy titled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense. This policy reaffirmed that ―while the U.S. military
will continue to contribute to security globally, we will of necessity rebalance toward
the Asia-Pacific region.‖74 The Defense Strategic Guidance introduced a new ―Air-Sea
Battle‖ concept, proposed a service collaboration to address anti-access and area denial
challenges, and confirmed that ―the U.S. military will invest as required to ensure its
ability to operate effectively in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments.‖75 In
his remarks at the Asia Society New York on 11 March 2013, Donilon stated that:
[in] the coming years a higher proportion of our military assets will be in the Pacific.
Sixty percent of our naval fleet will be based in the Pacific by 2020. Our Air Force is
also shifting its weight to the Pacific over the next five years. We are adding capacity
from both the Army and the Marines. The Pentagon is working to prioritize the Pacific
Command for our most modern capabilities – including submarines, Fifth-Generation
Fighters such as F-22s and F-35s, and reconnaissance platforms.76

As an integral component of the U.S. Defence strategy, the ―Air-Sea Battle‖ concept
provides the opportunity for the United States to ―maintain freedom of action in the
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global commons, and secure operational access to enable concurrent or follow-on joint
operations.‖77 Notionally, the concept does not seek to directly target any particular
State. However, as Benjamin Schreer has observed, ―the US military‘s increased focus
on China has given the concept much prominence in the strategic community.‖ 78 In
April 2014, the United States and the Philippines signed the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), which allows U.S. forces to use Philippines military
bases on a rotational basis.79 According to Carlyle Thayer, this Agreement ―reflects the
desire of the Philippines and the U.S. for a more comprehensive agreement that covers
the full range of enhanced defense cooperation.‖80 In August 2014, the United States
and Australia signed the Force Posture Agreement, which increases the annual rotation
of U.S. Marine Corps members and U.S. airmen in Darwin, northern Australia.81
The United States has also strengthened its defence relations with Singapore. In
1990, the two States signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) Regarding United
States Use of Facilities in Singapore. This MoU allows U.S. air and naval forces to
expand their access to Singaporean facilities.82 In 2005, Singapore and the United States
signed a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) which seeks to ―expand the scope of
defense and security cooperation‖ while affirming that ―[c]ooperation between likeminded countries on defense and security issues is an essential part of effectively
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responding to threats to peace and stability.‖83 The United States has deployed a number
of Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) to Singapore as part of its commitment to strengthening
its military engagement in the Southeast Asia region. The first seven-month deployment
of LCS to Singapore has already been completed, with potentially another four
deployments to take place by the end of 2016.84 Although Singapore is not a formal
U.S. ally, Chris Rahman has commented that ―Singapore has become the most
important partner in the U.S. Pacific Command security network after the three main
formal allies – Japan, South Korea, and Australia.‖85 That LCS have already been
deployed to Singapore (and with further deployments to come), demonstrates that the
United States is keen to enhance its presence in the South China Sea.
As part of its military rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, the United States has also
strengthened its military presence in South Korea and Japan. Since 2009, the United
States and South Korea have broadened their defence alliance ―from its primary purpose
of defending against a North Korean attack to a regional and even global partnership.‖86
In April 2015, the United States and Japan revised an existing agreement known as the
Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation. Under these Guidelines, the Japanese
Self-Defense Forces and the United States Armed Forces ―will provide mutual
protection of each other‘s assets, as appropriate, if engaged in activities that contribute
to the defense of Japan in a cooperative manner.‖87 U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry
also confirmed that ―Washington's commitment to Japan's security remains ironclad and
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covers all territories under Japan's administration, including the Senkaku Islands.‖88
This clear statement by the United States is qualitatively different from the situation
with respect to disputed offshore features in the South China Sea (where the United
States does not take sides). The Guidelines also enhance cooperation between the
United States and Japan with regard to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in
the maritime domain without geographical limitation.89 This will hopefully contribute to
the protection of maritime security and the freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific
region.
The United States has also improved its relationship with Vietnam. The two
States established a Comprehensive Partnership in July 2013, and in 2014 the U.S.
removed part of its embargo on lethal weapon sales to Vietnam in order to help improve
Vietnam‘s maritime security.90 In June 2015, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and
Vietnamese Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh signed the Joint Vision Statement on
Defence Relations, with the two States committing to deepen their defence
relationship.91 Carter also announced that Washington would provide $18 million to
help Vietnam improve its maritime defence capabilities.92 In a meeting with U.S.
President Obama during his visit to the United States in July 2015, Vietnamese
Communist Party Leader Nguyen Phu Trong stated that ―we have been transformed
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from former enemies to become friends, partners, and comprehensive partners. And I‘m
convinced that our relationship will continue to grow in the future.‖93 In May 2016,
during his official visit to Vietnam, President Obama announced that the United States
would fully lift its embargo on lethal weapons sales to Vietnam in an effort to normalise
relation between the two States.94
In addition to sending military forces into the region and strengthening
diplomatic and security cooperation with regional allies and friends, the United States
has improved economic ties with regional States. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
Agreement - a proposed free trade agreement between the United States and 11 other
States including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Singapore,
Brunei, Malaysia, Japan and Vietnam, is one such example. Significantly, China has not
been included among the TPP States. Speaking at the Nike factory in Oregon on 8 May
2015, President Barack Obama stated that:
We have to make sure America writes the rules of the global economy and we should
do it today while our economy is in a position of global strength. If we don‘t write the
rules for trade around the world, guess what, China will. And they‘ll write those rules in
a way that gives Chinese workers and Chinese businessmen the upper hand.95

As the 12 TPP States collectively make up almost 40 per cent of global gross domestic
product (GDP), the TPP Agreement is ―a concrete manifestation of [the U.S.] strategy
of rebalancing toward Asia.‖96 Although all 12 States signed the agreement in October
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2015, it can only come into effect 60 days after all the original signatories have ratified
the agreement, or when at least six States which together account for at least 85 per cent
of the total GDP of the 12 original signatories ratify the agreement within two years
from the date of signing.97 As both Republican and Democratic 2016 presidential
candidates oppose the TPP Agreement, it is unlikely that the U.S. Senate will discuss
agreement‘s ratification until after the November 2016 election.98 That the ratification
process will be delayed in the United States, together with domestic protests over the
agreement in some States, particularly New Zealand and Australia, indicates a degree of
skepticism regarding the efficacy of the TPP.99 If the TPP cannot enter into force, the
strategy of rebalancing toward Asia as well as the U.S. leadership role in the region will
be compromised.
To reaffirm navigational rights in the South China Sea, Secretary Carter has
declared that ―[t]he United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law
allows, as we do around the world, and the South China Sea is not and will not be an
exception.‖100 The United States has conducted a number of operational assertions in
the South China Sea under the Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program to challenge
China‘s excessive maritime claims. Examples of this include: the USS Fort Worth
patrolling the maritime area near the Spratly Islands on 11 May 2015; a U.S. P8-A
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Poseidon surveillance aircraft conducting overflights over China‘s artificial islands in
the Spratly Islands on 20 May 2015; the USS Lassen conducting a patrol within 12
nautical miles of the artificial island built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands;
and the USS Curtis Wilbur exercising innocent passage within 12 nautical miles of
Triton Island.101 Even though FON operations cannot address the root causes of
tensions, they may help challenge China‘s excessive claims in the South China Sea.
The United States has also affirmed its ―respect and support for ASEAN
Centrality and ASEAN – led mechanisms in the evolving regional architecture of the
Asia-Pacific.‖102 The United States certainly encourages ASEAN States to support the
rule of law and the principle of freedom of navigation under international law. At the
Special U.S.-ASEAN Leaders Summit held in February 2016, the United States and
ASEAN declared their ―commitment to maintain peace, security and stability in the
region, ensuring maritime security and safety, including the rights of freedom of
navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the seas.‖103
In summary, the United States remains focused on maintaining the freedoms of
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, as well as preserving regional stability
through abiding respect for international law rules and norms. On the one hand, the
United States insists that all claimant States should resolve their disputes peacefully and
in accordance with international law. In this regard, the United States shows deference
to the central role of ASEAN in regional affairs. On the other hand, the United States
has affirmed its navigational rights in the South China Sea by conducting FON
operations. Although the United States tacitly challenges China‘s excessive maritime
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claims, it also seeks to avoid any direct conflict. A key component of the U.S. strategy
has been to strengthen its strategic and political relations with its regional allies and
friends, but it has also (and rather unexpectedly) tried to positively engage with China to
resolve regional and global problems. As the South China Sea is not only a central
strategic issue in the relationship between China and the United States, it is to be
expected that the United States will: (i) continue to assert the freedoms of navigation
and overflight in the South China Sea; (ii) strengthen its security relations with regional
States; and (iii) eschew any display of open aggression against China which would
escalate existing regional tensions and/or lead to direct conflict.
3.3.2

Japan
With more than 90 per cent of Japan‘s oil imports transiting through the South

China Sea, ensuring the freedom of navigation and the safety and security of SLOCs in
the region is a main priority for Japan. In light of China‘s increasing military presence
in the Paracel Islands, its extensive artificial island-building program in the Spratly
Islands and potential artificial-island building program in Scarborough Shoal, Japan‘s
fear of China one day controlling the South China Sea is well founded. If China did
exercise control over the region, this would undoubtedly have a significant strategic
impact on Japan.
China‘s increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea also has the
potential to weaken the rule of law at both the national and international level. If this
were to occur, Japan‘s position in its maritime disputes with China in the East China
Sea would be undermined.104 Therefore, maintaining stable security in the region and
adherence to international law rules and norms is in Japan‘s national interest. Moreover,

104

Ian Storey, 'Japan‘s Growing Angst over the South China Sea' (2013) 20 ISEAS Perspective 1, 2.

94

as Japan and the United States are treaty allies, if armed conflict involving the United
States were to break out in the South China Sea, Japan would be required to provide
logistical support to U.S. forces at the very least.
In light of the above concerns, Japan has tried to strengthen ASEAN solidarity,
calling for the implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC), as well as the negotiation of a Code of Conduct in the South China
Sea (COC).105 Not only has Japan supported the efforts of Vietnam and the Philippines
in strengthening their maritime law enforcement capabilities, it has also assisted the
United States in its rebalancing policy towards the Asia-Pacific.106 In 2015, Japan
provided six second-hand patrol ships to the Vietnamese Coast Guard as part of a US$4
million aid program, and there are plans for Japan to provide Vietnam with brand new
ships to help it strengthen its maritime security responses.107 Last year Japan provided
the Philippines with a low-cost interest loan of US$150 million to buy ten patrol vessels
from Japan to enhance the capability of the Philippine Coast Guard. 108 Japan has also
encouraged other maritime powers including the United States, India and Australia to
cooperate in safeguarding maritime interests and rule-based order in the region.109
Over the past few years, Japan‘s security policy has undergone major changes,
leading to improved engagement with regional security matters. In April 2014, Japan
lifted its ban on arms exports, paving the way for greater cooperation with its partners,
including ASEAN States, in weapons‘ procurement and development. In July 2014,
Japan revised its interpretation of Article 9 of its Constitution, with the result that the
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country‘s defence forces are now permitted to engage with other States and exercise the
right of collective self-defence without geographical limitation.110 Moreover, in
September 2015, Japan passed new security legislation explicitly setting out this revised
interpretation of Article 9. Under the new legislation, Japan may invoke the right to
collective self-defence when responding to an armed attack against itself or a foreign
country which threatens Japan‘s survival, or in circumstances where there exists no
other appropriate means to repel the attack.111 According to Yoji Koda, with the passage
of this new security legislation, ―the possibility of JSDF (Japan Self-Defence Force)
military operations in the South China Sea...will become greater than before.‖112 Japan
is involved in maritime disputes with China in the East China Sea, particularly over the
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. If a conflict transpired in this area, Japan has the right to
intervene without changing its defence policy and without having to reinterpret its
Constitution. The situation in the South China Sea, however, is another story altogether
insofar as Japan is concerned. Lionel P. Fatton has commented that ―[n]owhere are the
impacts of the revamp of the Japanese security architecture more evident than in the
South China Sea.‖113
In summary, Japan has a stake in the South China Sea, but not as a South China
Sea claimant State. To date, Japan has only played a modest role in pursuing stable
security in the region. However, if China continues to assert its maritime claims,
ramping up its militarisation in the South China Sea and ignoring international law rules
and norms, it is likely that Japan‘s involvement in the South China Sea will escalate.
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3.3.3

India
India‘s interests in the South China Sea centre on the State‘s burgeoning trade

and economic engagement with ASEAN and Northeast Asia, as well as its growing
strategic interests in the region.114 With the value of its trade with East Asia expected to
reach US$100 billion by 2016, India is strengthening its economic engagement with the
region. Indeed, this is one of the principal goals laid down in India‘s ―Look East‖
Policy.115 During the 2014 India-ASEAN Summit in Myanmar, Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi stated that his government had transformed the long standing ―Look
East‖ Policy into an ―Act East‖ policy. According to Subhash Kapila, while the ―Look
East‖ policy was driven by India‘s economic and political imperatives, the ―Act East‖
policy is propelled by its strategic significance in Southeast Asia.116 Approximately 25
per cent of India‘s sea borne trade passes through the South China Sea. Thus
maintaining security and freedom of navigation in the region is critical to India.117 On
12 July 2016, the day the arbitral tribunal issued its award in the South China Sea
arbitration, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs made a statement indicating that
―India supports freedom of navigation and over-flight, and unimpeded commerce, based
on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the UNCLOS.‖118 India‘s
oil and gas exploration in the South China Sea also contributes to the region‘s economic
prosperity and may assist to reduce India‘s energy deficit. Therefore, any maritime
conflict in the South China Sea would negatively impact India‘s economic and national
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interests. In October 2011, India signed an oil exploration agreement with Vietnam
despite objections from China. All these actions could be viewed as India supporting
not only the freedom of navigation but also access rights to natural resources in the
South China Sea in accordance with international law.119 In 2012, India‘s Union
Minister Ashwani Kumar expressed the view that the ―South China Sea is the property
of the world. Nobody has a unilateral control over it and India is capable enough of
safeguarding its interests.‖120 To balance China‘s growing ambitions in the South China
Sea, India has adopted a proactive approach to the region. Indeed, India has improved
its military and security relations with Southeast Asian States, particularly Vietnam,
Malaysia and the Philippines. This has been achieved by increasing its naval presence in
the region, and particularly by conducting naval visits to Southeast Asian States. India
has also engaged with the United States, Japan and Australia in a way which David
Lang has described as ―a coalition of like-minded democracies that stands for the
established regional order and against unilateral attempts to change the status quo by
force.‖121
It is clear that India has several interests in the South China Sea. However, due to
budgetary constraints, India has focused its resources on the Indian Ocean, where it has
vital strategic interests. Although India supports the freedoms of navigation and
overflight, it is important to note that it shares the same view as China regarding foreign
military activities in the EEZ of coastal States – a view which is inconsistent with the
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LOSC.122 Moreover, China is India‘s largest trading partner, and with bilateral trade
between the two States reaching US$70.25 billion in 2014,123 it is unlikely that India
and China will oppose each other‘s interests directly, particularly in the South China
Sea. Thus far, India‘s policy in the region could best be described as ―incremental
balancing‖, a term which David Scott has coined.124 However, as the South China Sea is
critical for India‘s trade ties with Southeast Asian States, as well as with Japan and
South Korea, if China‘s pattern of aggressive behaviour persists, it is possible that India
will join the United States, Japan and Australia in preserving the freedom of navigation
in the region.
3.3.4

Australia
As a heavily trade-dependent State, maritime security and the freedom of

navigation are vitally important to Australia‘s national interests. With approximately 54
per cent of its trade passing through the South China Sea, Australia has a definite stake
in this maritime region.125 China is Australia‘s largest trading partner, with a two-way
trade value of AUD$152.5 billion in 2014. ASEAN trade ranks second to China, with a
two-way trade value of AUD$101.6 billion in the same financial year.126 Although
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Australia avoids offending China, it actively supports ASEAN in advocating for a Code
of Conduct in the South China Sea. Therefore, it appears Australia has a keen desire to
keep ASEAN countries on side.127 In addition, Australia and the United States are treaty
allies by virtue of the ANZUS Treaty.128 As Chris Rahman has commented: ―The
ANZUS alliance is the unalterable cornerstone of Australia‘s defence and foreign
policies.‖129 Even though the United States professes not to take sides in sovereignty
disputes in the South China Sea, clashes over the freedom of navigation (especially
military activities in the South China Sea), together with its commitment to the
Philippines under the Security Treaty, could draw the United States into a conflict. If
the United States became involved in a maritime conflict in the South China Sea, it is
likely that Australia would follow through with its alliance obligations.130 Moreover,
Australia‘s security partnerships with Malaysia and Indonesia, and its participation in
the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) also involving Singapore, the United
Kingdom, Malaysia and New Zealand, would require Australia to provide diplomatic
support at the very least in the event of a conflict in the region involving one of its
FPDA partners.131
Moreover, like the United States, maintaining the freedoms of navigation and
overflight in the South China Sea is important to Australia. The Australia-United States
Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2015 Joint Statement ―emphasized the importance
of the rights, freedoms, and lawful uses of the sea enjoyed by all states to fly, sail, and
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operate in accordance with international law.‖132 The Australian Defence White Paper
2013 highlighted that:
Australia has interests in the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes
including in the South China Sea in accordance with international law, the prevention of
aggression within Southeast Asia, and freedom of navigation and maritime security in
the region‘s sea lanes.133

These sentiments were echoed in the Australian Defence White Paper 2016, which
stated that ―Australia has a strong interest in the maintenance of peace and stability,
respect for international law, unimpeded trade and freedom of navigation and
overflight.‖134
Lastly, as many regional States rely heavily on seafood, the collapse of marine
ecosystems in the South China Sea due to accelerated land reclamations and overfishing
could make Australian waters the new target for regional fishing fleets, negatively
impacting Australian fish stocks and the State‘s fisheries stakeholders.
While the United States ―will continue to be Australia‘s most important strategic
partner‖, Australia is also engaging China, though with an acknowledgment that the
strategic interests of the two States ―may differ in relation to some regional and global
security issues.‖135 Australia does not take sides in the South China Sea disputes,
although it ―opposes the use of artificial structures in the South China Sea for military
purposes‖136, supports international rule-based orders, and supports the ASEAN-led
regional security architecture.
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3.4

The Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling and strategic implications for the South
China Sea
One of the most important findings of the arbitral tribunal in the Philippines-

China arbitration is that China has no legal basis to claim historic rights to resources
within the nine-dash line.137 Indeed, despite being unenforceable, the arbitral tribunal‘s
ruling is legally binding on all parties involved in the proceedings.138 The second key
ruling of the arbitral tribunal is that none of the land features in the Spratly Islands,
individually or collectively, are entitled to claim an EEZ or a continental shelf. 139 These
two rulings, when taken together, clearly reduce the maritime zones which can be
claimed by South China Sea claimant States. Moreover, as none of the land features in
the Spratly Islands can generate an EEZ or continental shelf, it could be argued that
none of the land features in the Paracel Islands (which are remarkably similar to those in
the Spratly Islands), are capable of generating the relevant maritime zones. In addition,
by dangerously operating law enforcement vessels and creating a serious risk of
collision at sea, the arbitral tribunal ruled that China had violated the navigational safety
provisions of the LOSC and other treaty provisions on maritime safety, particularly the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs).140 As many
incidents in the South China Sea have involved Chinese law enforcement vessels, this
ruling represents a stern warning to China regarding its increasingly dangerous and
aggressive behaviour. The arbitral tribunal‘s ruling also has the effect of undermining
China‘s posture of strategic ambiguity in the South China Sea, with the decision
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unequivocally concluding that China can only claim maritime zones in accordance with
the LOSC, not ―relevant waters‖ based on so-called ―historic rights‖.
As a result of the arbitral tribunal‘s award, China must choose whether it will
respect the ruling and change its South China Sea policy, or whether it will continue to
assert its maritime claims in contravention of the ruling, thus risking damage to its
international reputation. On 13 July 2016, one day after the arbitral tribunal‘s award,
China released a White Paper titled China Adheres to the Position of Settling Through
Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South
China Sea. This document states that ―China‘s territorial sovereignty and maritime
rights and interests in the South China Sea shall under no circumstances be affected by
those awards. China does not accept or recognize those awards. China opposes and will
never accept any claim or action based on those awards.‖141 In light of these perfervid
comments, it is highly unlikely that China will show any respect for the arbitral
tribunal‘s decision. Clive Schofield has expressed the view that China may respond to
the award with ―an intensification of [its] island-building campaign in new locations
and an increase in enforcement actions within the nine-dash line.‖142 If this is the case,
then the number of maritime incidents in the South China Sea is likely to increase.
For ASEAN, the arbitral tribunal‘s decision has implications for the unity of the
organisation. ASEAN has always called for the resolution of South China Sea disputes
by peaceful means and in accordance with international law, particularly the LOSC.
This suggests that ASEAN should respect the arbitral tribunal‘s decision. However, as
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mentioned above, at this year‘s ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting in Laos, ASEAN
failed to refer to the South China Sea diplomatic and legal processes in its joint
statement due to an objection from Cambodia. Indeed, ASEAN‘s consensus policy
means that one member can block the decision of the whole organisation. For this
reason, ASEAN may need to reconsider its voting process or risk losing its credibility
when dealing with regional security issues.
The arbitral tribunal‘s ruling has also opened up opportunities for maritime user
States to intensify freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea. The United
States, Japan, India and Australia have all expressed their support for the ruling. 143 But
who has power to enforce this ruling? It is clear that the United States cannot enforce
the ruling, but an international coalition could play an important role in managing
China‘s behaviour. Now that the arbitral award has been handed down, it is quite
possible that more operational assertions will be conducted in the South China Sea by
like-minded States including the United States, Australia, India and Japan.144 Smaller
littoral States including Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines will
continue to strengthen their maritime capabilities while forging security and strategic
partnerships with major external players to challenge China‘s authority in the region.
With the nine-dash line being legally defunct, Indonesia is likely to be more assertive in
protecting its maritime resources within its EEZ, especially around Natuna Island.145
Meanwhile, Vietnam may consider mounting a legal challenge if China continues to
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violate its claimed EEZ in the South China Sea.146 So although the arbitral tribunal went
to considerable lengths to consider the arguments before issuing its landmark ruling, its
award will not necessarily assist in reducing tensions in the South China Sea.
3.5

Conclusion
Due to the long-standing maritime disputes, tensions continue to rise with no

signs of abatement. As the asymmetrical military balance between China and smaller
littoral States continues to grow, so too does the involvement of external players, adding
further complexity to the region‘s strategic context. If the arbitral tribunal‘s ruling in the
Philippines-China arbitration is respected, the number of disputed maritime areas in the
South China Sea would be reduced. However, to date, there have been no signs that
China is willing to enter into any sort of compromise arrangement with regard to its
maritime claims in the region. Accordingly, the risk of maritime incidents in the South
China Sea, especially between military and law enforcement vessels and aircraft of the
parties involved, will continue to grow. Unfortunately, the ultimate result of this
situation is that navigating the shoals of the South China Sea will become increasingly
precarious for sovereign immune vessels and aircraft.
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4 INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE PASSAGE
OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNE VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT
4.1

Introduction
Navigation rights and maritime safety have been key areas of discussion

throughout the development of the international law of the sea. While coastal States
have sought greater control of waters along their coastlines, the priority of maritime
States has been to maintain the status of water spaces within which the freedom of
navigation can be exercised. Since the 17th century, these conflicting interests have been
debated by many scholars, among them Hugo Grotius and John Selden. In April 1609,
Grotius published Mare Liberum and proclaimed the freedom of the seas doctrine,
thereby allowing the Dutch to utilise international sea lanes for trade in the East Indies.1
By that time, the freedom of the seas doctrine posed a threat to Great Britain, which
sought to control the seas around its territory. In 1635 the English author Selden wrote
Mare Clausum, rejecting Grotius‘s claim and asserting that the seas adjacent to the
British coasts were under British control.2 To balance the competing interests of coastal
States and maritime States, a number of international discussions took place during the
20th Century, the most significant being the three United Nations Conferences on the
Law of the Sea conducted in 1958, 1960 and 1973. As a result, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) was finally adopted in 1982 and entered into
force in 1994. The LOSC establishes a legal framework which governs all uses of the
oceans. In addition to the LOSC, several other international conventions governing
navigation and overflight at sea have been established. These include the Convention on
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972, the International
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Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974, as well as The Convention on
International Civil Aviation 1944. All of these conventions have provisions governing
the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft.
This chapter introduces the concept of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft
under international law. It also analyses international law principles applicable to the
passage of vessels and aircraft of this type in various maritime jurisdictional zones
designated by the LOSC.
4.2
4.2.1

The concept of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft under international
law
Principle of sovereign immunity
Sovereign immunity has long been accepted as a principle of customary

international law. In essence, the principle holds that one sovereign State cannot be
subject to the jurisdiction of another State. Under article 2(1) of the Charter of the
United Nations, all states enjoy sovereign equality.3 The principle of sovereign equality
recognises that the official representatives of one State should not be subject to the
jurisdiction of another State.4 Although sovereign immunity is an internationally
recognised doctrine, States have different views regarding the circumstances in which
such immunity can be invoked. Currently, there are two divergent approaches to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity: the absolute immunity doctrine and the restrictive
immunity doctrine. Under the absolutist approach, foreign States enjoy absolute
immunity from suit; by contrast, under the restrictive approach, foreign States are
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granted immunity for their governmental acts but not their commercial activities.5 In
2004, the United Nations enacted the Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States
and their Property, with an effort to provide a comprehensive approach to the issue of
sovereign immunity. However, the Convention has not yet entered into force due to a
lack of ratification.6 As a result, the doctrine of sovereign immunity continues to derive
from customary international law.
4.2.2

The concept of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft under international law
There is no particular treaty definition for sovereign immune vessels and

aircraft. However, international law has provisions regarding the passage of sovereign
immune vessels and aircraft in different maritime jurisdictional zones. These provisions
are chiefly found in the LOSC7 and The Convention on International Civil Aviation
(Chicago Convention).8
Article 29 of the LOSC defines a warship as:
...a ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external marks
distinguishing such ship of its nationality, under the command of an officer duly
commissioned by the government of the State and whose name appears in the
appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned by a crew which is under regular
armed forces discipline.9
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Article 32 states that ―…nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of
warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes.‖10 LOSC
articles 95 states that ―Warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the
jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State.‖11 Meanwhile, Article 96 makes it
clear that:
Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-commercial
service shall, on the high seas, have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any
State other than the flag State.12

Regarding environmental protection, LOSC article 236 states that:
The provisions of this Convention regarding the protection and preservation of the
marine environment do not apply to any warship, naval auxiliary, other vessels or
aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on government
non-commercial service.13

Article 3 of the 1944 Chicago Convention classifies aircraft used in military,
customs and police services as state aircraft and therefore not subject to the provisions
of the Convention.14
For the purpose of this research, sovereign immune vessels and aircraft are all
vessels and aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the time being, only on
government non-commercial service.
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4.3
4.3.1

International law principles applicable to the passage of sovereign immune
vessels and aircraft at sea
The Law of the Sea Convention
Throughout the development of the international law of the sea, navigational

issues have featured prominently in discussions. Apart from the new regime of deep
seabed mining and the protection and preservation of the marine environment, most of
the provisions of the LOSC directly or indirectly address the issue of freedom of
navigation and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to navigation.15.
Although the LOSC is widely regarded as the ―Constitution for the Oceans‖, the
passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft is not clearly addressed in the
document. Indeed, there have been divergent interpretations among State Parties to the
LOSC regarding the passage of these types of vessels and aircraft through different
areas of ocean space. The following section will analyse the provisions of the LOSC
applicable to the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in various maritime
jurisdictional zones.
4.3.1.1 Internal Waters
Internal waters are those waters which lie landward of the baseline from which
the territorial sea and other maritime zones are measured.16 There are two systems of
baseline - the normal baseline, which is the low-water line along the coast of the coastal
State, and the straight baseline, which is determined in accordance with articles 7, 9 and
10 of the LOSC.17 Coastal States enjoy sovereignty over their internal waters as well as
the airspace above and the seabed and subsoil below.18 It has long been internationally
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accepted that coastal States are, in principle, free to regulate activities in their internal
waters as they are with regard to activities on their land territory. 19 Internal waters,
therefore, have not been the subject of detailed regulation under international law.20
During the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
Indonesia and the Philippines claimed that all waters which fell within the limits of
archipelagic baselines were internal waters.21 Pursuant to these claims, which had no
precedent in international law, vast areas of waters would have become internal waters.
Indeed, this issue became the subject of a compromise arrangement during UNCLOS
III, with the recognition of a regime of archipelagic waters within the archipelagic
baselines of archipelagic States. Within their archipelagic waters, archipelagic States
(including Indonesia and the Philippines) may draw closing lines across river mouths,
bays and harbours on individual islands for the delimitation of internal waters in
accordance with the normal rules on baselines, particularly articles 9, 10 and 11 of the
LOSC.22
Geographically, there are two types of internal waters: internal waters bound by
the territorial sea of a coastal State, and internal waters bound by the archipelagic waters
of an archipelagic State. Generally, a state may exercise complete and absolute
sovereignty over its internal waters. However, there is one exception to this principle
under LOSC article 8. According to this article, where the establishment of a straight
baseline has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas not previously considered as
such, the right of innocent passage still exists in those waters.23 So, for the purposes of
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navigational regimes, there are two categories of internal waters. The first category is
internal waters in which the coastal State enjoys absolute sovereignty, and the second
category is internal waters in which foreign ships have the right of innocent passage to
the same extent as in the territorial sea.
By entering the internal waters of a coastal State, ships put themselves under the
territorial jurisdiction of that State.24 Therefore, foreign ships within the internal waters
of a coastal State are subject to the criminal and civil laws and regulations of that State.
However, warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
(hereafter sovereign immune vessels), enjoy sovereign immunity, and thus the laws of
the coastal State may not be directly enforced against these vessels when they are in the
internal waters of a particular coastal State.25 It is important to note, however, that as
sovereign immune vessels require permission from coastal States to enter their internal
waters, such vessels normally comply with the conditions imposed by the coastal State
granting admittance.26 If, however, sovereign immune vessels violate the law and
regulations of the coastal State resulting in loss or damage to the coastal state, the flag
States of those vessels will bear international responsibility.27
4.3.1.2 Territorial Sea
Under the LOSC, every coastal State has the right to establish its territorial sea
up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles measured from its baselines. 28 Coastal
States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea subject to the exercise of innocent
passage by foreign vessels. Article 17 of the LOSC states that: ―…ships of all States,
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whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea.‖29 Two key terms – ―passage‖ and ―innocent‖ – are fundamental to the
definition of innocent passage. Article 18 of the LOSC defines the regime of passage as:
1.

...navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of:
a. Traversing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead
or port facility outside internal waters; or
b. Proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such roadstead or port
facility.

2.

Passage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage includes

stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are incidental to ordinary
navigation or are rendered necessary by force majeure or distress or for the purpose of
rendering assistance to persons, ships or aircraft in danger or distress.30

Article 19(1) defines passage to be innocent ―... so long as it is not prejudicial to
the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in
conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law.‖31 Article
19(2) lists activities which, if engaged in by a vessel in the territorial sea, would be
considered non-innocent. These include:
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or
security of the coastal State;
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(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal
State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device;
(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the
customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other
facilities or installations of the coastal State;
(l) any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.32

Article 21 gives coastal States the right to enact laws and regulations relating to
innocent passage, provided such laws and regulations shall not apply to the design,
construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships ―unless they are giving effect to
generally accepted international rules or standards.‖33 Articles 24(1a) and 211(4) of the
LOSC prevent coastal States from adopting regulations that have the effect of denying
or impairing the innocent passage of foreign ships through the territorial sea. 34 For the
safety of navigation, coastal States may designate sea lanes and traffic separation
schemes for foreign ships engaging in innocent passage through their territorial sea.35
For reasons essential for the protection of their security, coastal States may suspend
temporarily the innocent passage of foreign vessels in specified areas of their territorial
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sea after duly publishing the suspension.36 Article 25 of the LOSC states that: ―The
coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which
is not innocent.‖37 However, if a foreign vessel does not comply with the coastal State‘s
laws and regulations during passage, it is unclear whether or not such passage
immediately becomes non-innocent, thus allowing the coastal State to invoke the
protective rights under article 25.38 It is also unclear how the coastal State may deal with
vessels exercising non-innocent passage in its territorial sea. In practice, issuing a verbal
warning, preventing vessels from proceeding, firing warning shots, boarding vessels or
―bumping off‖ are commonly used methods.39
The LOSC contains no specific provision regarding the innocent passage of
warships. With regard to modes of navigation, article 20 stipulates that ―submarine and
other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and show their
flags.‖40 Article 30 states that if a foreign warship passing through the territorial sea
does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State, then the coastal State
may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately. 41 There are no provisions in the
LOSC requiring foreign warships exercising the right of innocent passage in the
territorial sea to give prior notification to, or seek prior authorisation from, the coastal
state. Indeed, UNCLOS III attempted to settle these issues, with a particular focus on
whether warships enjoy the doctrine of innocent passage or require prior notification or
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authorisation from the coastal State.42 However, due to the disagreement between
coastal States and maritime powers at UNCLOS III, the final text of the LOSC does not
address this issue.43
Three different interpretations have emerged regarding the innocent passage of
warships. The first interpretation is that ―warships enjoy a right of innocent passage
which may be exercised in the same manner as merchant ships.‖ 44 This interpretation is
based on the text of LOSC article 17 which states that ―Ships of all States, whether
coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.‖45
Article 17, which appears under the heading ―Rules applicable to all ships‖, could be
read as implying that warships are entitled to exercise the right of innocent passage.
This interpretation is also supported by the decision of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in the Corfu Channel Case, which involved the passage of four British warships
through the Corfu Channel in 1946.46 In this case, the ICJ ruled that:
It is...generally recognized and in accordance with international custom that States in
time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international
navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a
coastal State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless otherwise prescribed in an
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international convention, there is no right for a coastal State to prohibit such passage
through straits in time of peace.47

Even though the Corfu Channel is a strait which overlaps with Albania‘s
territorial sea (rather than merely constituting territorial waters), and the case itself
precedes the LOSC, the ICJ decision provides support for the right of innocent passage
of warships.48 In 1989 the United States and the former Soviet Union – the two major
maritime powers at the time – reached an agreement titled Uniform Interpretation of
Norms of International Law Governing Innocent Passage. The Joint-Statement provides
that:
All ships, including warships, regardless of cargo, armament or means of propulsion,
enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea in accordance with
international law, for which neither prior notification nor authorization is required.49

This view is supported by other maritime powers including Germany, Italy and
the Netherlands.50 The U.S. Navy has also been exercising the right of innocent passage
of warships as part of its freedom of navigation program since 1979.51
The second interpretation is that in the light of the provisions of LOSC articles
19 and 25 (which concern the ―Meaning of Innocent Passage‖ and the ―Rights of
Protection of the Coastal State‖ respectively), coastal States have the right to take
measures to safeguard their security interests, including requiring foreign warships to
obtain prior authorisation when seeking to exercise the right of innocent passage
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through their territorial sea.52 Some authors support this view by differentiating the
terms used in the relevant articles of the LOSC. They suggest that in article 38 (Right of
Transit Passage) and article 53 (Right of Archipelagic Sea Lanes Passage), the term
used is ―all ships‖, while in article 17 (Right of Innocent Passage), the term used is
―ships‖.53 This has led Jin to assert that: ―If the former term is intended to cover ships of
all types, the latter can only mean vessels other than warships.‖54 According to some
scholars, there are at least 40 States which have made the passage of foreign warships in
their territorial seas contingent on certain requirements being met - such as the need for
prior authorisation or notification in accordance with their national laws and
regulations.55
The third interpretation is that since the LOSC has no provisions specifically
regarding the innocent passage of warships, the question should be governed by
customary law as affirmed in the Preamble to the LOSC. Indeed, the Preamble
explicitly states that ―...matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be
governed by the rules and principles of general international law.‖56 However, the
doctrine of innocent passage for warships has long been one of the most contentious and
controversial issues in international law. Not a single written agreement exists on the
issue, and there has been a lack of uniformity in State practice over the past 100 years.57
Of the 23 States involved in addressing this issue at the 1930 Hague Codification
Conference, four favoured the requirement of prior notification or authorisation, 15
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were prepared to allow the innocent passage of warships without special formalities,
and one State considered the issue to be controversial in light of existing international
law.58 Due to the different views expressed on this topic, the conference failed to
produce a convention on the territorial sea (among other issues). When the International
Law Commission of the United Nation (ILC) was asked to prepare a draft for the Law
of the Sea Convention by UN member States, Article 26 of its 1954 draft provided that:
―Save exceptional circumstances, warships shall have the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea without previous authorization or notification.‖59 However,
two years later, in its commentary on the articles concerning the Law of the Sea, the
ILC stated that:
The coastal State may make the passage of warships through the territorial sea subject
to previous authorization or notification. Normally it shall grant innocent passage
subject to the observance of the provisions of articles 17 and 18.60

This provision was not adopted at the first United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). Indeed, as States have adopted different positions on the
question of innocent passage of warships, their practices have been far from uniform.61
Moreover, the divergence of opinion between maritime powers and developing States
on this topic continued to UNCLOS III. Ultimately, however, the failure of states to
reach consensus on this issue led to the LOSC being silent on the innocent passage of
warships.
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More concerning, however, is that the divergence of state practice in the area,
coupled with a lack of judicial decisions, makes the formation of a universal customary
law rule on the innocent passage of warships extremely unlikely.
In summary, there exists three different interpretations of the regime of innocent
passage for warships. However, the second interpretation is rather weak because, in
general, the use of the term ―ships‖ instead of ―all ships‖ does not have the effect of
excluding warships. In addition, as the right of innocent passage was established with
the intention of balancing the interests of coastal States and maritime States, if the
coastal States restrict the innocent passage of warships through their territorial seas, the
notion of balancing competing interests becomes somewhat obsolete. The third
interpretation is quite neutral, and thus does little to resolve the issue. Moreover, this
interpretation could result in States implementing the right of innocent passage
differently – a consequence which militates against the very intention of the LOSC. The
first interpretation is widely supported by a majority of States and by the text of the
Convention itself. It is also worth noting that, at the final session of the meeting of
UNCLOS III in December 1982, Professor Tommy Koh, the president of UNCLOS III,
made the following pronouncement:
I think the convention is quite clear on this point. Warships do, like other ships, have a
right of innocent passage through the territorial sea, and there is no need for warships to
acquire the prior consent or even notification of the coastal State.62

Even so, this statement is hardly authoritative, being only the personal view of
the president of UNCLOS III at a discrete point in time.
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In summary, the territorial sea is subject to the sovereignty of coastal States.
Ships of other States have the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.
However, the passage of warships through the territorial sea of a coastal State has long
been a controversial issue - both in legal doctrine and as a matter of state practice. The
LOSC does not contain any provision expressly prohibiting or allowing warships the
right of innocent passage. In addition, State practice has failed to elucidate the issue,
with no uniform approach existing among States. This divergence of state practice,
combined with a lack of judicial decisions on the matter, makes the formation of
universal customary law rule on the innocent passage of warships very unlikely. What is
clear is that the right of innocent passage does not apply to foreign aircraft. Indeed, this
principle has international appeal, and is expressly recognised in the Chicago
Convention.
4.3.1.3 Straits used for International Navigation
The term ―strait‖ has never been defined in any international convention, including
the LOSC. The International Hydrographic Organization defines a ―strait‖ as ―a passage
connecting two larger bodies of water.‖63 The LOSC devotes considerable attention to
the legal regime of waters constituting a strait rather than the definition of a strait as
such.64 Under the LOSC, there are different legal regimes applying to each category of
strait. These include: (i) straits through which there is a high seas route or a route
through an EEZ of similar convenience with respect to navigational and hydrographical
characteristics;65 (ii) straits formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its
mainland where there exists seaward of the island a route of similar convenience with
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respect to its navigational and hydrographical characteristics;66 (iii) straits connecting a
part of the high seas or an EEZ with the territorial sea of a foreign State; 67 (iv) straits
governed by long-standing special conventions;68and (v) straits connecting one part of
the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ.69
In the case of a strait through which there is a high seas route or a route through an
EEZ of similar convenience with respect to its navigational and hydrographical
characteristics, the regime of innocent passage will apply to those parts of the strait
which lie within the territorial sea limits of States bordering the strait. Conversely, the
regime of freedom of navigation will apply on the high seas and in the EEZ to those
waters outside the territorial seas of bordering States.70 Theoretically, this type of strait
should be broader than 24 nautical miles. The Strait of Florida between the United
States and Cuba is one such example.71
Within straits formed by an island of a State bordering the strait and its mainland,
and where there exists seaward of the island a route of similar convenience with respect
to its navigational and hydrographical characteristics, ships of all States enjoy the right
of innocent passage without suspension and there is no right of innocent passage for
aircraft.72 The Strait of Messina (Italy), the Pemba Channel (Tanzania), and Hainan
Strait (China) are examples of these types of straits.73
In the case of those straits which connect a part of the high seas or an EEZ with the
territorial sea of a foreign State, the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage will
66
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apply.74 The Strait of Tiran which connects the Red Sea with the territorial sea of Jordan
and Israel is one such example.75
For those straits which are regulated in whole or in part by long–standing special
conventions referred to in LOSC article 35, the provisions of those conventions will
apply. For instance, passage through the Turkish Straits (which comprise the
Dardanelles connecting the Aegean Sea with the Sea of Marmara), as well as the
Bosphorus (which connects the Sea of Marmara with the Black Sea), would be
regulated by the Montreux Convention of 1936.76
The last category comprises those Straits connecting one part of the high seas or an
EEZ and another part of the high seas or an EEZ. Passage through this category of strait
is regulated by the LOSC, under the regime of ―Transit Passage.‖77 The LOSC states
that the transit passage regime applies to Straits which are used for international
navigation between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the high seas
or an EEZ.78
Article 38 of the LOSC states that ―all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit
passage…‖79 The LOSC also defines transit passage as:
...the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight
solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait between one part
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone…80
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During transit passage, ships and aircraft shall ―refrain from any threat or use of
force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of States
bordering the strait‖, ―refrain from any activities other than those incident to their
normal modes of continuous and expeditious transit‖, as well as comply with
international safety regulations, procedures and practices such as the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), the International Convention
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the Rules of the International Civil Aviation
Organization.81 The words ―normal modes‖ are significant for the transit of military
vessels and aircraft. In the view of the United States, this term means that ―submarines
may pass through straits submerged, naval task forces may conduct formation steaming,
aircraft carriers may engage in flight operations and military aircraft may transit
unannounced and unchallenged.‖82 This view, which is held by not only the United
States but also other naval powers, has not been controversial in the Asia - Pacific
region, and is consistent with the travaux prèparatoires of UNCLOS III.83
States bordering the strait may ―designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation
schemes‖, as well as adopt laws and regulations relating to the safety of navigation, the
prevention, reduction and control of pollution, the prevention of fishing, and other
measures related to customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary matters. 84 However, such
laws and regulations shall not have the practical effect of denying, hampering or
impairing the right of transit passage.85 While a coastal State may temporarily suspend
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innocent passage, transit passage cannot be suspended by the strait State. 86 Marine
scientific research and hydrographic survey activities during the transit passage of
foreign ships are subject to the prior authorisation of those States bordering the strait.87
According to LOSC article 38, warships and other sovereign immune vessels and
aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage.88 However, if a sovereign immune vessel or
aircraft violates laws and regulations of States bordering the strait, then the flag State of
the vessel or the State of registry of the aircraft shall bear international responsibility for
any loss or damage to States bordering the strait.89
4.3.1.4 Archipelagic Waters
The concept of archipelagic waters is relatively new in international law. The
LOSC defines an archipelagic State as ―a State constituted wholly by one or more
archipelagos and may include other islands.‖90 An archipelago is defined as:
A group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters and other natural
features which are so closely interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural
features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which historically
have been regarded as such.91

An archipelagic State may, in accordance with the provisions of the LOSC, draw
straight archipelagic baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and
drying reefs of the archipelago to proclaim the enclosed waters landward of these
baselines as archipelagic waters.92 The sovereignty of an archipelagic State over its
archipelagic waters extends to the air space above as well as the seabed and subsoil and
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the resources contained therein.93 It should be noted that only archipelagic States can
draw straight archipelagic baselines. Thus, archipelagic baselines cannot be drawn
around a group of islands belonging to a non-archipelagic coastal State.
Throughout archipelagic waters, ships of all States enjoy the right of innocent
passage similar to the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea.94 However, the
LOSC also provides a more liberal passage right within designated archipelagic sea
lanes in archipelagic waters. Article 53 of the LOSC defines archipelagic sea lanes
passage as:
...the exercise in accordance with this Convention of the right of navigation and overflight
in the normal mode solely for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed
transit between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of
the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.95

The phrase ―normal mode‖ can be interpreted as including all activities which are
incidental to the ordinary navigation of vessels and aircraft exercising the passage. For
instance, submarines are permitted to navigate underwater as their normal mode of
navigation, while aircraft carriers may be used to launch and recover aircraft. 96 Unlike
the regime of innocent passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage shall be continuous and
expeditious, excluding calling at a port of an archipelagic State. 97 This means that if a
vessel seeks to call at a port within the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State, then
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the innocent passage regime will apply to the passage of that vessel on its way to the
port.98
An archipelagic State may designate sea lanes within and air routes above these
archipelagic sea lanes. However, ―such sea lanes and air routes shall include all normal
passage routes used as routes for international navigation or overflight through or over
archipelagic waters.‖99 Where an archipelagic State does not designate sea lanes or air
routes, ships and aircraft may exercise the right of archipelagic passage through the
routes normally used for international navigation.100 Aircraft only enjoy the right of
archipelagic sea lane passage through the air routes above the sea lanes. 101 Within
archipelagic waters but outside the sea lanes, the innocent passage regime applies;
hence, there is no passage right for aircraft over other parts of archipelagic waters
without the consent of the archipelagic state. The new regime of archipelagic sea lanes
passage is significant mainly for military aircraft, as civil aircraft normally use routes
designated by the International Civil Aviation Organization rather than routes over
archipelagic sea lanes.
Under LOSC article 53(5) the width of a designated sea lane may not be more than
50 nautical miles, and ships and aircraft are not permitted to navigate closer to the coast
than ten per cent of the distance between the nearest points on islands bordering the sea
lanes.102 In addition to the designation of archipelagic sea lanes, the archipelagic State
may also prescribe traffic separation schemes for the safe passage of ships through
narrow channels in the sea lanes.103 An archipelagic State may adopt laws and
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regulations relating to the safety of navigation, the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution, the prevention of fishing, as well as other measures related to customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary matters. However, such laws and regulations shall not have the
practical effect of denying, hampering or impairing the right of archipelagic sea lanes
passage.104 Although these sea lanes can be substituted in consultation with the relevant
competent international organisation, the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage cannot
be suspended.105
All ships and aircraft, including sovereign immune vessels and aircraft, enjoy the
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.106 Article 54 of the LOSC makes it clear that
ships and aircraft exercising the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage are required to:
(i) refrain from any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of the archipelagic State; and (ii) comply with generally accepted
international regulations regarding safety at sea, marine environmental protection
provisions and the Rules of Air established by the International Civil Aviation
Organization. Maritime scientific research and hydrographic survey activities in the
archipelagic sea lanes may only be conducted with the consent of the archipelagic
State.107 The regimes of archipelagic sea lanes passage and transit passage demonstrate
similarities, as both represent continuous and expeditious forms of transit. However,
differences do exist between the two regimes. Firstly, in exercising the right of
archipelagic sea lanes passage, ships must stay within the designated sea lanes and not
deviate more than 25 nautical miles on either side of the axis line and observe the ten
per cent rule. By contrast, ships in transit passage are not required to stay within specific
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boundaries.108 Secondly, a ship in transit passage may visit ports along the strait and
still remain in transit passage. However, if a ship is seeking to call at a port of an
archipelagic State, then the innocent passage regime rather than the archipelagic sea
lanes passage regime will apply to the passage of that vessel on its way to port. In
addition, the text of the LOSC uses the term ―freedom of navigation‖ for the transit
passage regime, while the phrase ―right of navigation‖ is used in relation to the
archipelagic sea lanes passage regime. Hasjim Djalal, an Indonesian author, views the
different wording as a matter of principle. Indeed, Djalal has asserted that: ―We have no
difficulty in giving the right of navigation to people for traversing Indonesia sea lanes,
but we would not be able to recognize that right as freedom of navigation.‖109 Thus, the
regime of archipelagic sea lane passage is deemed to be more restrictive than the regime
of transit passage.110
In summary, archipelagic sea lanes passage is a relatively new navigational legal
regime introduced in the LOSC. It represents a compromise between the regime of
innocent passage advocated by the archipelagic States and the regime of freedom of
navigation advocated by maritime user States.111
4.3.1.5 Exclusive Economic Zone
Like the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage, the exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) is one of the newer concepts to be introduced into the LOSC. Until the LOSC
was adopted in 1982, all waters beyond the territorial seas of the coastal States were
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treated as high seas - an area where all States enjoyed the freedoms of navigation and
overflight. However, before the LOSC, States could not reach an agreement on the
breadth of the territorial sea. Some States claimed a breadth of 3 nautical miles (nm),
others claimed 12 nm, and some Latin American and African States claimed territorial
seas up to 200 nm.112 The concept of the EEZ was first proposed by Kenya to the AsianAfrican Legal Consultative Committee in 1971, and to the United Nations Seabed
Committee in 1972.113 This new concept of the EEZ was largely supported by most
developing States and reflected the desire of such States to gain greater control over
economic resources off their coasts.114 The concept of the EEZ also attracted the support
of major maritime States, as it was a jurisdictional zone in which the high seas freedoms
of navigation and overflight would be reserved (rather than being a sovereignty
zone).115 During negotiations at UNCLOS III, there was considerable debate between
developing States and maritime States over the legal regime of the EEZ. Developing
States considered the EEZ to be a simple extension of national jurisdiction within which
coastal States would enjoy sovereignty subject to certain limitations. Meanwhile, other
maritime States viewed the EEZ as part of the high seas – an area where coastal States
would have some rights over resources.116 The concept of the EEZ finally adopted at the
LOSC represented a compromise between the varying positions.117 The EEZ zone is
widely regarded as an innovation in the Law of the Sea. It is a separate functional zone
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of a sui generis character, with neither residual territorial sea characteristics nor residual
high seas characteristics.118
Article 55 of the LOSC states that:
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea,
subject to a specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the rights and
jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed
by the relevant provisions of this Convention.119

The LOSC gives coastal States sovereign rights over living and non-living
resources of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, as
well as over activities related to economic exploration and exploitation of the zone, such
as the production of energy from the water, current and wind.120 The term ―sovereign
rights‖ was used instead of ―sovereignty‖ in article 56 as the latter term could imply that
the coastal State‘s rights over the EEZ are exclusive, not preferential. 121 Article 56 also
makes it clear that coastal States have jurisdiction, as provided for in the relevant
provisions of the Convention, with regard to the establishment and use of artificial
islands, installations and structures, marine scientific research, as well as the protection
and preservation of the marine environment.122 This means that in the EEZ, the coastal
State‘s jurisdiction is limited to that ―provided for in the relevant provisions‖ of the
LOSC. In other respects, the regime of the high seas will apply. Moreover, in exercising
its rights and performing its duties in the EEZ, the coastal State ―shall have due regard
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to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner compatible with the
provisions of [the] Convention.‖123
Article 58 of the LOSC gives all ships and aircraft the freedoms of navigation
and overflight, as well as the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines referred to
in Article 87 and ―other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms,
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft [etc].‖124 However, in the
exercise of their rights, user States ―shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the
coastal State and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal
State in accordance with the provisions of [the] Convention and other rules of
international law.‖125
The requirement that coastal and maritime States respect each other‘s rights and
duties is encompassed in the term ―due regard‖ in Articles 56 and 58 of the LOSC.
However, no definition exists for the term ―due regard‖. The text of the LOSC makes it
clear that coastal States and maritime States shall have due regard to the rights and
duties of each other, but there is no obligation on such States to have due regard to each
other‘s interests.126 Therefore, other States are not expressly required to give due regard
to, for example, the security interests of coastal States in the EEZ.127
Article 59 provides a basis resolving conflicts regarding unattributed rights and
jurisdiction in the EEZ. The article provides that:
In cases where this Convention does not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal
State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a conflict arises
between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or States, the conflict
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should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the relevant
circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to
the parties as well as the international community as a whole.128

This means that, in cases where the LOSC does not explicitly grant rights to
coastal States or other States, there should be no presumption in favour of one over the
other.129 Article 59 also makes it clear that in determining each case of conflict, the
―relevant circumstances‖ have to be taken into account.
In its attempt to balance the divergent interests of littoral States and extraregional players in the EEZ, the LOSC is not free from ambiguity, especially with
regard to military activities in the EEZ. The LOSC does not expressly state which types
of military activities are permissible or prohibited in the EEZ of a foreign State. Coastal
States have not been granted any specific authority to regulate foreign military activities
in their EEZ, while no particular right has been granted to maritime user States
regarding military activities. Some States took the step of making declarations upon
their signature, ratification or accession to the LOSC requiring their consent regarding
foreign military activities in their EEZ. These States include Brazil, Bangladesh,
Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Cape Verde.130 Other maritime States made declarations
opposing these interpretations, among them the Netherlands, Germany and Italy. 131 The
LOSC allows States to make declarations or statements when signing, ratifying or
acceding to the Convention; nevertheless, it does not permit reservations.132 Currently,
this issue remains ambiguous and controversial with regard to state practice. Between
2002 and 2005, a group of second track participants from the Asia - Pacific region
128
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participated in a series of meetings sponsored by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation
(OPRF). These meetings focussed on the development of guidelines for navigation and
overflight in the EEZ. EEZ Group 21 agreed that the LOSC is unclear and ambiguous
regarding the regime of military activities in the EEZ. 133 In 2005, EEZ Group 21
proposed Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone,
which sought to ―assist in balancing and clarifying the rights and duties of both coastal
States and maritime user States, as well as certain terminology with regard to the
activities that might be undertaken in an EEZ by foreign ships and aircraft.‖134
However, The Guidelines were not widely supported as they restrict unduly the
freedoms of navigation and overflight available in an EEZ. 135 In 2013, OPRF reviewed
and revised the Guidelines, and in doing so renamed them ―Principles for Building
Confidence and Security in the Exclusive Economic Zones of the Asia-Pacific.‖136 Even
so, the Principles have not garnered sufficient attention from regional States.
The controversy over military activities in the EEZ arises from different
interpretations of LOSC provisions, particularly articles 58, 88, 300 and 301. It is
unclear whether or not military activities are included in the freedoms of navigation and
overflight and ―other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms,
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft [etc]‖ set out in article 58.
For instance, the United States view is that in a foreign EEZ, warships and military
aircraft enjoy the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms. Therefore, ―the
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existence of an exclusive economic zone in an area of naval operations need not, of
itself, be of operational concern to the naval commander.‖137 By contrast, Brazil issued
a declaration upon its signature to the LOSC on December 1982 which states that: ―The
Brazilian government understands that the provisions of the Convention do not
authorize other States to carry out in the exclusive economic zone military exercises or
manoeuvres, in particular those that imply the use of weapons or explosives, without the
consent of the coastal State‖.138 Article 88 of the LOSC states that ―the high seas shall
be reserved for peaceful purposes,‖ and this statement also applies to the EEZ under
article 58.139 Some States argue that under the ―peaceful purposes‖ provisions of the
LOSC, at least some types of military activities in the EEZ may not be permitted. 140
Indeed, article 300 of the LOSC requires that:
States Parties shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention
and shall exercise the rights, jurisdiction and freedoms recognized in this Convention in
a manner which would not constitute an abuse of right.141

There are different views on whether certain types of military activities in the
EEZ are a lawful exercise of the freedoms of navigation and overflight or an abuse of
the rights of navigation and overflight.142 Article 301 of the LOSC reinforces the
―peaceful purposes‖ of article 88 by requiring States to ―refrain from any threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State‖. 143
However, the term ―peaceful purposes‖ used in the LOSC does not preclude all military
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activities.144 It is also worth noting that the sovereign rights of coastal States in their
EEZ, as specified in article 56 of the LOSC, are limited to the ―waters superjacent to the
seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil‖, thereby excluding the airspace above the
EEZ.145 Indeed, nothing in LOSC ―provides [a] legal basis for regulating military
activities in the airspace above the EEZ.‖146 As airspace over the EEZ is not part of the
EEZ, it has been proposed by some commentators that ―all aircraft have freedom of
overflight and, therefore, the right to conduct military operations.‖147
Under the LOSC, coastal States have jurisdiction over marine scientific research
in their EEZ.148 However, the LOSC has neither definitions nor provisions regarding
hydrographic surveys, military surveys or surveillance activities in the EEZ. The United
States defines ―hydrographic survey‖ as:
...the obtaining of information in coastal or relatively shallow areas for the purpose of
making navigational charts and similar products to support safety of navigation. A
hydrographic survey may include measurements of the depth of water, configuration
and nature of the natural bottom, direction and force of currents, heights and times of
tides and water stages, and hazards to navigation.149

A ―military survey‖ has been defined by the United States as:
...the collecting of marine data for military purposes and, whether classified or not...
generally not made publicly available. A military survey may include collection of
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oceanographic, hydrographic, marine geological, geophysical, chemical, biological,
acoustic, and related data.150

According to the United States, ―the primary difference between marine
scientific research and hydrographic surveys and military surveys is how the data is
used once it is collected.‖151 Thus, the United States affirms that marine scientific
research in the EEZ is subject to the coastal State‘s consent; however, ―the coastal
nation cannot regulate hydrographic surveys or military surveys conducted beyond its
territorial sea, nor can it require notification of such activities.‖152 By contrast, China
enacted its Surveying and Mapping Law in 2002, defining surveying and mapping as
―the surveying, collection and presentation of shape, size, spatial location and properties
of the natural geographic factors or the man-made facilities on the surface, as well as the
activities for processing and providing the obtained data, information and
achievements.‖153 Moreover, Article 7 of this statute stipulates that surveying and
mapping activities taking place ―in the domain of the People's Republic of China and
other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China‖ must be subject
to the approval of the People's Republic of China.154 With this very broad definition, the
statute purports to regulate hydrographic surveys, military surveys, as well as
surveillance activities in the EEZ.155 According to Zou Keyuan, ―it is hard to understand
the logic of the argument that while marine scientific research in the EEZ is subject to
consent of the coastal State, military activities can be conducted freely without any
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check by the coastal State.‖156 However, according to a fundamental legal principle,
Zou Keyuan agrees that ―nothing is illegal if there is no law to make it so.‖157
During the Cold War, military activities (such as intelligence gathering and
surveillance assessments), were freely conducted outside the national waters and
airspaces of coastal States by vessels and aircraft of both Western alliance countries and
Soviet bloc States without any legal protests.158 China has consistently protested U.S.
military activities in China‘s EEZ; however, China itself has conducted military
intelligence collection in the EEZs of other States.159 Therefore, it is hard to prohibit
these activities based on international law or the practice of States.
The LOSC is totally silent on the issue of weapons testing and military exercises
in the EEZ. The question is whether weapons testing and military exercises can be
categorised as ―internationally lawful uses of the sea‖ that are ―associated with the
operation of ships, aircraft [etc]‖ as permitted in article 58(1) of the LOSC, or whether
these activities violate the ―peaceful purpose‖ provisions of article 88 or constitute an
abuse of rights under article 300 of the LOSC. Another issue to be determined is
whether coastal States should be notified of such military activities, thereby ensuring
that their economic activities in the EEZ will not be disrupted. Some authors argue that
it is reasonable to notify the coastal State for certain types of military activities, such as
those involving live firing exercises, but that such notification may not be reasonable
for other activities, such as military reconnaissance.160
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Article 56 of the LOSC provides coastal States with jurisdiction in the EEZ with
regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment. However, article
236 makes it clear that provisions concerning this issue ―do not apply to any warship,
naval auxiliary, other vessels or aircraft owned or operated by a State and used, for the
time being, only on government non-commercial service.‖161 This means that sovereign
immune vessels and aircraft, whether in the EEZ or elsewhere, are not legally bound by
LOSC provisions regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment
as implemented in internationally accepted rules and regulations, such as those
contained in the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL).162 However, they shall ―act in a manner consistent, so far as is reasonable
and practicable‖, with the environmental provisions of the LOSC.163
4.3.1.6 High Seas
The LOSC defines the high seas as ―all parts of the sea that are not included in
the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or
in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.‖164 Under the LOSC, the high seas
are open to all States and no State may validly purport to subject any part of the high
seas to its sovereignty.165 All ships and aircraft enjoy the freedoms of navigation and
overflight on the high seas, provided due regard is shown for the interests of other
States and for the rights conferred by the LOSC with respect to activities in the Area.166
Article 92 makes it clear that a flag State has exclusive jurisdiction over vessels flying
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its flag on the high seas.167 There are, however, some exceptions to this rule, such as
piracy, slave trading, drug trafficking, unauthorised broadcasting and Stateless ships. In
these cases, warships and authorised government vessels have some rights of
interdiction over foreign flag vessels on the high seas.168 Warships and other
government vessels operated for non-commercial purposes have complete sovereign
immunity on the high seas.169 Article 88 requires that the high seas be reserved for
peaceful purposes.170 Article 301 of the LOSC, entitled ―peaceful uses of the seas‖,
makes it clear that ―States Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations.‖171 Some authors have suggested that the principle of peaceful use of
the high seas ―presupposes certain military activity, but any aggressive activities are
prohibited.‖172 Tsarev lists certain military activities that are considered illegal actions
on the high seas, including:
…tests of nuclear weaponry; establishing naval and aircraft proving grounds, combat
training areas within close proximity of the shore of foreign states or navigation routes
of significant importance to international navigation; missile, torpedo, artillery and
other shooting, in particular, in areas allocated by international programmes for
scientific research and requiring the permanent presence of scientific research vessels
for certain periods of time; and the installation of autonomous buoy stations.173
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Van Dyke has argued that military activities on the high seas can only be
deemed legitimate ―if they do not impede navigation, interfere with fishing activities,
cause any significant harm to the environment or threaten human settlements.‖174
Nevertheless, the official text of the LOSC does not contain any provisions expressly
prohibiting or permitting certain types of military activities on the high seas.
4.3.2

Other international laws related to the navigation of sovereign immune vessels
and aircraft at sea

4.3.2.1 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
Apart from the LOSC, another international legal instrument applicable to
sovereign immune vessels in a maritime context is the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs). COLREGs was adopted by the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) on 20 October 1972 and entered into force on 15 July
1977. All littoral States of the South China Sea as well as the United States are parties
to this Convention. COLREGs defines a vessel as ―every description of water craft,
including non-displacement craft and seaplanes, used or capable of being used as a
means of transportation on water.‖175 With the ―[desire] to maintain a high level of
safety at sea‖, COLREGs‘ rules ―apply to all vessels upon the high seas and in all
waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels‖. 176 Accordingly, sovereign
immune vessels (with the exception of submarines) are subject to COLREGs. Even
though COLREGs entered into force before the LOSC, the application of COLREGs to
all navigable waters connected to the high seas clearly includes the territorial sea and
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the new EEZ regime under the LOSC.177 LOSC article 94 stipulates that every State
shall take necessary measures to ensure ships flying its flag observe the applicable
international regulations relating to the prevention of collisions at sea.178 Rule 2 of the
COLREGs makes it clear that the ship‘s commander has to strictly comply with
COLREGs and ―the ordinary practice of seamen‖ to avoid collision.179 Meanwhile rule
8 requires that any action to avoid collision be ―made in ample time and with due regard
to the observance of good seamanship.‖180 The regulations set out in COLREGs are
widely known as the international maritime ―Rules of the Road.‖ Despite nations having
conflicting views on maritime boundaries and competing claims for jurisdiction over
certain maritime zones, their vessels and mariners are all bound by the rules set out in
COLREGs.181
4.3.2.2 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) was
adopted on 1 November 1974 and entered into force on 25 May 1980. The SOLAS
Convention is ―generally regarded as the most important of all international treaties
concerning the safety of merchant ships.‖182 Even though SOLAS does not apply to
warships, naval auxiliaries or other ships owned or operated by a Contracting
Government and used only on government non-commercial service, regulation 1 of
chapter V of SOLAS (regarding the safety of navigation), clearly states that these types
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of ships are ―encouraged to act in a manner consistent, so far as reasonable and
practicable, with this chapter.‖183 Regulation 14 of chapter V of SOLAS requires
contracting governments to adopt measures to ensure that ―all ships shall be sufficiently
and effectively manned‖ - a reference to the Principles of Safe Manning adopted by the
IMO by resolution A.890(21).184 Resolution A.890(21) requires all ships to maintain
safe navigational watches and comply with COLREGs at all times.185 Many navies have
applied similar SOLAS standards to their naval ships, with one widely accepted
example being the Naval Ship Code adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). This Code requires that in order to ensure the safety of life at sea, all ships
shall be sufficiently and efficiently manned, and personnel in charge of a navigational
watch are to have attained the appropriate standards of The International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW).186
4.3.2.3 Convention on International Civil Aviation
The Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention) was signed on 7
December 1944 and entered into force on 4 April 1947.187 Importantly, the Chicago
Convention applies to civil aircraft only; thus State aircraft, including aircraft used in
military, customs and police services (sovereign immune aircraft), are not subject to the
Convention‘s regulations.188 However, the Chicago Convention does prohibit state
aircraft from flying over the territory of another State without prior authorisation.189 The
term ―territory‖ is defined in article 2 of the Chicago Convention as including ―land
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areas and territorial waters.‖190 The LOSC article 2 clarifies the meaning of the term
―territorial waters‖, and does not provide the right of innocent passage over territorial
waters for foreign aircraft.191 The Chicago Convention does not contain any provisions
regarding the flight of state aircraft beyond the land areas and territorial waters of
coastal States. However, new obligations have been added for state aircraft in the
LOSC. Article 39 of the LOSC stipulates that in exercising transit passage through a
strait used for international navigation, state aircraft ―will normally comply‖ with the
safety measures of the Rules of the Air established by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) as they apply to civil aircraft, as well as ―operating with due
regard for the safety of navigation‖ at all times.192 This requirement applies mutatis
mutandis to archipelagic sea lanes of archipelagic States.193 During UNCLOS III, Spain
proposed to delete the word ―normally‖ from article 39 of the Convention, with the
effect that state aircraft would not need to comply with the Rules of the Air at all times.
However, this proposal was defeated.194 Thus, under the LOSC, state aircraft are
expected to comply with the Rules of the Air established by ICAO when exercising the
rights of transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage.
As the Chicago Convention was adopted before the LOSC, the world‘s airspace
(as reflected in the Chicago Convention) broadly consisted of national airspace above
the land areas and territorial waters of a State, as well as international airspace above the
high seas but beyond national airspace. National airspace is subject to exclusive
sovereignty of the State, while international airspace is subject to the Rules of Air
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adopted by ICAO.195 After the LOSC was opened for signature, ICAO conducted a
study on the impact of the LOSC EEZ regime on the application of the Chicago
Convention. The result of this study, which was published in 1987, was that all States
enjoy full freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ and that the EEZ ―is deemed
to have the same legal status as the high seas.‖196 Therefore, the international airspace
referred to in ICAO rules includes the airspace above the EEZ. Therefore, ICAO
considers the EEZ to be the same as the high seas with regard to the freedom of
overflight. ICAO‘s position on this issue lends support to the view that the freedom of
overflight of military aircraft on the high seas could be applied to the airspace above the
EEZ.197
In summary, the Chicago Convention and the LOSC both require States to
ensure that their state aircraft operate with ―due regard for the safety of navigation of
civil aircraft.‖198 The Chicago Convention does not address the interaction between state
aircraft in international airspace.
4.4

Conclusion
There are a number of international legal instruments applicable to the passage

of sovereign immune vessels and the overflight of aircraft at sea. In addition to the
LOSC, international instruments such as the Chicago Convention, SOLAS and
COLREGs contain provisions regarding navigation and/or overflight. The LOSC
provides detailed navigation regimes in different maritime jurisdictional zones. Indeed,
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Chicago Convention, Rules of the Air, Annex 2.
Consideration of the Report of the Rapporteur on ―United Nations Convention on the Law of the
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there are four broad passage regimes applicable to sovereign immune vessels and
aircraft. These include: (i) innocent passage through the territorial sea of coastal States
(a regime which only applies to ships, not aircraft); (ii) transit passage through straits
used for international navigation; (iii) archipelagic sea lanes passage through
archipelagic sea lanes; and (iv) the freedom of navigation and overflight in the EEZ and
on the high seas. In exercising these rights of passage, ships and aircraft shall comply
with the provisions of the LOSC with regard to each zone. However, as the aim of the
LOSC is to create a normative framework rather than deal with all issues of ocean
governance comprehensively199, there are a number of issues on which the LOSC
remains silent. States have different interpretations and conflicting views over many
provisions in the LOSC related to the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft,
particularly the right of innocent passage of warships and military activities in the EEZ.
Coastal States continually seek to extend their control over their maritime zones, while
maritime user States continue to assert their navigational rights in different maritime
zones. It is unlikely that the international community will reach a uniform legal stance
regarding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. That being so, and in
order to avoid unwanted incidents at sea, it is imperative that States exercise their rights
and duties in good faith, and while taking into account the interests of specific
stakeholders and the international community as a whole.
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Beckman and Davenport, above n 121, 16.
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5 COASTAL STATE PRACTICE IN IMPLEMENTING THE INNOCENT
PASSAGE REGIME
5.1

Introduction
Since its inception, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

(LOSC) has set out the navigational rights of vessels and aircraft in various maritime
jurisdictional zones. Indeed, the Convention establishes four different navigation
regimes, including innocent passage, transit passage, archipelagic sea lanes passage, as
well as the freedom of navigation. Despite the widespread ratification of, or accession
to, the LOSC, State practice is still divergent with regard to the passage of sovereign
immune vessels and aircraft under each passage regime. Within the geographical limits
of the South China Sea, innocent passage and the freedom of navigation are the two
relevant passage regimes which will be discussed in this chapter and the next
respectively.
The most controversial issue under the innocent passage regime is the right of
innocent passage for foreign warships. As discussed in the previous chapter, the LOSC
is silent on the passage of warships through the territorial sea of coastal States. Absent
any guidance from the LOSC, several States surrounding the South China Sea have
enacted laws and regulations restricting the innocent passage of warships and
government vessels in their territorial waters. The inconsistencies which exist between
the domestic laws of coastal States, international law, and State practice on this issue
have created confusion and controversies for sovereign immune vessels exercising the
right of innocent passage in this maritime region. To elucidate these challenges, this
chapter will examine the practice of South China Sea littoral States in implementing the
LOSC innocent passage regime, as well as a number of political and strategic factors
affecting contemporary trends in State practice.
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5.2
5.2.1

Domestic legislation and the practice of coastal States regarding the innocent
passage regime
China
The doctrine of innocent passage was first codified in treaty form at the first

United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 1958 (UNCLOS I) in the Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.1 At that time, the Republic of
China (Taiwan) still occupied China‘s seat in the United Nations, and thus the People‘s
Republic of China (China) was unable to attend.2
Despite China‘s absence from UNCLOS I, the resulting Conventions were
incorporated into China‘s domestic legislation. On 4 September 1958 China issued the
Declaration on China‘s Territorial Sea (the 1958 Declaration), which is considered to be
China‘s first legal instrument on the territorial sea.3 This Declaration states that the
breadth of China‘s territorial sea is 12 nautical miles. With regard to the innocent
passage regime, the Declaration provides that:
No foreign vessels for military use and no foreign aircraft may enter China's territorial
sea and the air space above it without the permission of the Government of the People's
Republic of China. While navigating in the Chinese territorial sea, every foreign vessel
must observe the relevant laws and regulations laid down by the Government of the
People‘s Republic of China4

The Declaration does not mention foreign merchant ships; however, it can be
understood from the text of the Declaration that foreign merchant ships enjoy the right
of innocent passage through China‘s territorial sea (provided they observe relevant
1

Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva on 29 April 1958 (entered into
force 10 September 1964), art 14. This Convention, however, failed to establish the breath of the
territorial sea.
< http://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/8_1_1958_territorial_sea.pdf>.
2
Zou Keyuan, China's Maritime Legal System and the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) 59.
3
Ibid 63.
4
See ‗Declaration on China‘s Territorial Sea‘ in Jeanette Greenfield, China and the Law of the Sea, Air,
and Environment (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1979) 243.
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Chinese laws and regulations).5 According to Zou Keyuan, the rationale for this
Declaration was to ―deter U.S. warships, which supported logistically the Nationalist
Chinese in Taiwan, from approaching the coast of the main land of China.‖6 In his 1959
article titled ―Questions Relating to the Territorial Sea of Our Country‖, Fu Zhu
asserted that:
First, since international law recognizes that the sovereignty of a State extends to its
territorial sea and the air space over the territorial sea, the coastal State, for purposes of
its security, naturally has the indisputable right to prescribe that all foreign aircraft and
military vessels cannot enter its territorial sea without prior authorization…Second, in
State practice quite a few States have provisions in their national laws similar to that
included in China‘s Declaration on the Territorial Sea.7

A contrary position was subsequently taken by Zhou Genshen, a leading
Chinese legal commentator. According to Zhou, the Geneva Convention grants ships of
all States, regardless of their status as warships or merchant vessels, the right of
innocent passage. Even so, he has conceded that ―this definitely cannot represent the
general State practice and is not a rule acceptable to all States…according to generally
recognized rules of international law States have nevertheless the right to prescribe that
for the passage of foreign warships advance authorization must be obtained.‖8
At the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),
the delegation from China argued that the innocent passage regime should apply to
merchant ships but not military vessels, and that foreign military vessels needed to

5

See also Zou Keyuan, 'Innocent Passage for Warships: The Chinese Doctrine and Practice' (1998) 29
Ocean Development & International Law 195, 202.
6
Ibid.
7
Fu Zhu, 'Questions Relating to the Territorial Sea of Our Country [in Chinese]' (1959) Beijing: People's
Daily Publishing House , 23 quoted in Keyuan, above n 5, 204; see also Shao Jin, 'The question of
innocent passage of warships after UNCLOS III' (1989) (January) Marine Policy 56, 59.
8
Zhou Genshen, 'International Law [in Chinese]' (1976) 1 Beijing: Commercial Press 370 quoted in Jin,
above n 7, 59.
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tender prior notification or obtain prior authorisation from coastal States before
exercising the right of innocent passage through a coastal State‘s territorial sea. 9 Due to
objections from the majority of participating States, the final text of the LOSC does not
contain any provisions specifically regulating the innocent passage of warships. On 9
December 1982, at the final session of UNCLOS III, the head of the Chinese delegation
Mr Han Xu stated that:
The Convention is not entirely satisfactory to us. At the previous sessions of the
Conference we repeatedly pointed out that in the articles of the Convention relating to
innocent passage through the territorial sea there were no clear provisions regarding the
regime of the passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea. A considerable
number of States, including China, time and again submitted an amendment in this
regard. To respond to the call of the President of the Conference, those sponsors of the
amendment did not insist on a vote at the session held last April so that the draft
convention on the law of the sea could be adopted by consensus. The statement made by
the President of the Conference at that session showed clearly that this would not affect
the principled position of the sponsors demanding that their security be ensured.10

On 9 February 1983 China enacted the Maritime Traffic Safety Law, which
entered into force on 1 January 1984. This law reaffirmed the stance taken by the 1958
Declaration in that it prohibited ―military vessels of foreign nationality...[from]
enter[ing] the territorial sea of the People‘s Republic of China without being authorized
by the Government thereof.‖11

9

Keyuan, above n 2, 61.
See Statement by Han Xu at the 191st Meeting, UN Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.191
<http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1982/docs/vol_XVII/a_conf-62_sr-191.pdf>.
11
See China's National People's Congress, Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People's Republic of
China, adopted 9 February 1983 (entered into force 1 January 1984), art 11.
< http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/mtslotproc496/>.
10
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More importantly, in 1992 China promulgated the Law on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone (China‘s Territorial Sea Law), in which ―non-military foreign
ships enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of the People's
Republic of China according to law.‖ In relation to foreign military ships, the statute
provides that such vessels ―must obtain permission from the Government of the People's
Republic of China.‖12 By virtue of this enactment, China expressly granted innocent
passage for foreign merchant vessels for the first time – a position consistent with the
LOSC.13 However, the prior authorisation requirement for the passage of foreign
warships in its territorial sea was protested by many maritime States, including the
United States.14
China‘s Territorial Sea Law also states that foreign submarines and other
underwater vehicles must navigate on the surface of the sea and show their flags when
passing through the State‘s territorial sea.15 If a foreign warship or foreign government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes violates these laws and regulations, the
relevant responsible organs of the People's Republic of China shall have the right to
order it to leave the territorial sea immediately. Moreover, any ―losses or damage
caused shall be borne by the nations whose flag is being flown by the ship in
question.‖16

12

See Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
1992 (effective 25 February 1992), art 6
< http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf>.
13
Keyuan, above n 2, 65.
14
The US protested the 1992 prior permission requirement and conducted operational assertions in 1992,
1993, 1994, and 1996; see China, People's Republic of (April 2013)
<http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/mcrm/China2013.pdf>.
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Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1992
(effective 25 February 1992), art 7.
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Apart from the passage of warships, China‘s Territorial Sea Law is generally
consistent with the provisions of the LOSC. However, with regard to the contiguous
zone, this Law states that:
The People's Republic of China has the authority to exercise powers within its
contiguous zone for the purpose of preventing or punishing infringement of its security,
customs, fiscal, sanitary laws and regulations or entry-exit control within its land
territories, internal waters or territorial sea.17

Article 33 of the LOSC makes it clear that in the contiguous zone, the coastal
State may exercise powers to ―prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration
or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea.‖18 The inclusion of
the word ―security‖ in China‘s Territorial Sea Law is inconsistent with article 33, 19 and
has the effect of restricting the passage of foreign sovereign immune vessels and aircraft
in China‘s contiguous zone.
When China ratified the LOSC in 1996, it made the following statement
regarding the innocent passage regime:
The People's Republic of China reaffirms that the provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea concerning innocent passage through the territorial
sea shall not prejudice the right of a coastal State to request, in accordance with its laws
and regulations, a foreign State to obtain advance approval from or give prior
notification to the coastal State for the passage of its warships through the territorial sea
of the coastal State.20

17

Ibid art 13.
LOSC, art 33.
19
Zou Keyuan, Law of the Sea in East Asia (Routledge, 2005) 36.
20
See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Declarations made upon signature, ratification,
accession or succession or anytime thereafter
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm>.
18
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According to the LOSC, ―no reservations or exceptions may be made to the
Convention unless expressly permitted by other articles of this Convention.‖21
Therefore, China may not make a reservation regarding the innocent passage of
warships in its territorial sea. Moreover, it is internationally recognised that a State
cannot invoke the provisions of its domestic law as justification for its failure to
perform its treaty obligations.22 Another problem with the above statement is that it is
inconsistent with the text of China‘s own Territorial Sea Law. Indeed, while the
statement above prescribes two alternative requirements for warships (i.e., advance
approval or prior notification), the State‘s Territorial Sea Law requires only prior
authorisation, not prior notification. According to Zou Keyuan, it is unclear whether the
intention behind the statement was to change the existing text of China‘s Territorial Sea
Law, and if so, it would be difficult for China‘s competent authorities to enforce two
alternative requirements.23 It is also unclear whether the two alternative requirements
apply to different types of warships or warships from different States.24
In practice, there have been a number of incidents involving Chinese military
vessels in the territorial sea. On 25 April 2001, three Australian warships were
challenged by a Chinese warship while sailing through China‘s territorial sea within the
Taiwan Strait. The Chinese warship requested Australia‘s warships to change their
course; however, the three Australian warships continued to sail through the strait
ignoring the radio request from the Chinese warship.25 China complained that the
passage of these three warships through its territorial sea had occurred without prior

21

LOSC, art 309.
See The United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted 22 May 1969 (entered into
force 27 January 1980), article 27.
23
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authorisation, and thus Australia had violated Chinese law. Australia, however, argued
that its ships had exercised the right of innocent passage recognised under international
law.26
Another incident took place on 10 November 2004, when a Japanese antisubmarine patrol aircraft detected a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine passing
submerged through Japan‘s territorial sea near Sakishima-Gunto.27 Japan lodged a
protest in relation to the incident, and China responded by stating that the incursion into
Japan‘s territorial waters was a mistake brought about by a ―technical cause‖ during its
normal training course.28
Article 20 of the LOSC makes it clear that ―in the territorial sea, submarines and
other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their
flag.‖29 Therefore, the submerged passage of the Chinese submarine through Japan‘s
territorial sea is contrary to international law. Even so, China did not go as far as to
apologise for the incursion, but simply expressed regret over the incident.30 Miyoshi
Masahiro has argued that ―China failed to carry out its responsibility for its incursion, if
unintended, into another country‘s territorial waters in a manner contrary to
international law.‖31 As China requires foreign submarines and other underwater
vehicles to navigate on the surface and to show their flags while passing through its
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territorial sea, the incident casts doubt on whether China would behave in a reciprocal
fashion regarding the innocent passage of foreign submarines.
On 30 January 2016, the U.S. Navy sent a guided missile destroyer, the USS
Curtis Wilbur, within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island in the Paracel Islands, claimed
by China, Vietnam and Taiwan, and without giving prior notice to any of these
claimants. Following the incident, China‘s Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Hua
Chunying commented that ―the U.S. warship violated Chinese law and entered China‘s
territorial sea without authorization. The Chinese side conducted surveillance and vocal
warnings to the U.S. warship.‖32 However, it is worth noting that in September 2015,
five Chinese warships transited through U.S. territorial waters, within 12 nautical miles
of the Aleutian Islands, in an exercise of innocent passage without prior notification to
the United States.33
In summary, China‘s domestic legislation requires prior authorisation for the
innocent passage of foreign warships through its territorial sea. However, in its
statement on the ratification of the LOSC, China stated that it requires prior notification
or prior authorisation. This reveals a startling inconsistency with regard to China‘s
policy on this issue. China‘s domestic legal framework on the regime of the contiguous
zone is inconsistent with the provisions of the LOSC. Moreover, China‘s practice
regarding the innocent passage of warships is incongruent with both its domestic
legislation and the LOSC.34 According to the international legal principle of pacta sunt
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servanda, China is obliged to abide by the LOSC. Therefore, China should amend its
domestic legislation to reflect the provisions of the LOSC.35
5.2.2

Taiwan
Taiwan's membership in the United Nations was terminated in 1971 by United

Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 25 October 1971.36 According
to this Resolution, the representatives of the People‘s Republic of China are the only
legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations.37 As a result, Taiwan was not
able to participate in UNCLOS III or become a party to the LOSC. The Chinese
Government has claimed Taiwan as part of China; however, the Taiwanese government
currently has territorial jurisdiction over Taiwan. In 1992, China and Taiwan reached a
verbal consensus on a ―one China, respective interpretations‖ concept (1992
Consensus), in which:
Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one China. However, the two
sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning of ―one China.‖ To Peking,
―one China‖ means the ―People‘s Republic of China (PRC),‖ with Taiwan to become a
―Special Administration Region‖ after unification. Taipei, on the other hand, considers
―one China‖ to mean the Republic of China (ROC), founded in 1911 and with de jure
sovereignty over all of China. The ROC, however, currently has jurisdiction only over
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. Taiwan is part of China, and the Chinese
mainland is part of China as well.38
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Like China, Taiwan has adopted laws and regulations with regard to its maritime
zones. It is interesting to note that as China and Taiwan have each claimed governance
over the whole of China, their maritime claims are identical.39 However, the laws and
regulations that apply to these claimed areas are different. In practice, China and
Taiwan have only publicised the baselines for measuring the territorial sea for actual
areas under their jurisdiction, and ―the laws of both sides only apply to the respective
territorial sea areas within the exercise of their actual jurisdiction.‖40
In 1980, Taiwan issued Regulations on the Control of Foreign Military Vessels
Entering into ROC Territorial Waters and Harbours. Under these Regulations, foreign
military vessels seeking to enter Taiwan‘s territorial waters or harbours were required to
obtain prior approval from Taiwan‘s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at least ten days prior
to passage.41 However, these Regulations were suspended after the promulgation of the
Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic of China in 1998
(Taiwan‘s Territorial Sea Law). Regarding the innocent passage regime, article 7 of
Taiwan‘s Territorial Sea Law states that:
Foreign civil vessels may, under the reciprocity principle, enjoy the right of innocent
passage through the territorial sea of the Republic of China as long as the passage is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of the Republic of China…
Foreign military or government vessels shall give prior notice to the authorities
concerned before their passage through the territorial sea of the Republic of China….42
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According to this article, the innocent passage of civil vessels requires
reciprocity. This requirement is inconsistent with the provisions of the LOSC, which do
not require such reciprocity. In comparison with China‘s Territorial Sea Law, the
requirement of prior notification for the passage of foreign military vessels is ―softer‖
than prior authorisation. However, it is still inconsistent with the LOSC. Moreover, the
requirement of prior notification applies not only to military vessels but also other
government vessels. This is an untenable position as the innocent passage of
government vessels (other than military vessels) is hardly a controversial issue in
international law.
Article 10 of Taiwan‘s Territorial Sea Law states that:
For protecting national security and national interests, the Government of the Republic
of China may suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent
passage of foreign vessels.43

The inclusion of ―national interests‖ in this article is inconsistent with the
LOSC. Indeed, article 25 of the LOSC only allows a coastal State to suspend
temporarily the innocent passage of foreign ships ―if such suspension is essential for the
protection of its security, including weapons exercises‖, not for the protection of the
coastal State‘s interests in general.44
Although Taiwan is not a party to the LOSC, the territorial sea provisions of the
LOSC reflect customary international law which is binding on all States. For this
reason, Taiwan‘s Territorial Sea Law should reflect the relevant provisions of the
LOSC.

43
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Ibid article 10.
See LOSC, art 25(3).
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5.2.3

Vietnam
Vietnam made its first law of the sea-related declaration on 12 May 1977,

known as the Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (1977 Statement). In this Statement, Vietnam
claimed a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles and a contiguous zone extending 12
nautical miles beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea. 45 Vietnam declared that it
―exercises full and complete sovereignty over its territorial sea as well as the
superjacent airspace and the bed and subsoil of the territorial sea.‖46 This Statement was
generally in conformity with the wording of the Negotiation Text of the fourth
UNCLOS session, 1976.47 However, regarding the contiguous zone, the 1977 Statement
provides that:
The Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam exercises the necessary control in
its contiguous zone in order to see its security and custom and fiscal interests and to
ensure respect for its sanitary, emigration and immigration regulations within the
Vietnamese territory or territorial sea.48

As with China, Vietnam‘s Statement contains an express reference to security
control in the contiguous zone. Indeed, by that time a total of 14 States had included a
reference to security purposes in connection with their 12 nautical mile contiguous
zone.49 Nevertheless, the 1977 Statement was made before the LOSC was opened for
signature. Furthermore, paragraph 6 of the 1977 Statement made it clear that all

45
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questions relating to Vietnamese maritime zones would be dealt with in detail in further
regulations and ―in keeping with international law and practices.‖50
The 1977 Statement did not mention the right of innocent passage of foreign
ships in the Vietnamese territorial sea. Vietnam‘s first official statement regarding the
innocent passage regime was the Regulation for Foreign Vessels to Operate on Sea
Areas of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam dated January 29, 1980 (Decree No.30-CP).
According to article 3 of the decree, foreign military vessels, including warships and
auxiliary vessels seeking to enter the contiguous zone and the territorial sea of Vietnam,
must apply for permission from the Vietnamese Government through diplomatic
channels at least 30 days prior to passage. Once permission has been granted, a 48 hour
pre-entry notification to the Vietnamese Ministry of Communications and Transport is
required before passing through the State‘s contiguous zone.51 Foreign submarines are
required to navigate on the surface and show their flags if permitted to enter the
contiguous zone. In addition, foreign submarines must observe the regulations
pertaining to foreign surface ships operating in Vietnam‘s maritime zones.52 These
requirements are inconsistent with the provisions of the LOSC because: (i) the
contiguous zone is a special part of the EEZ in which States can exercise only limited
policing powers; and (ii) the contiguous zone is subject to the freedom of navigation
regime. Moreover, article 5 of Decree No.30-CP states that:
Unless otherwise authorized by the Government of the SRVN, not more than three
warships of the same nationality may be present simultaneously in the territorial sea or
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internal waters of Vietnam and the maximum stay of all or any of such ships must not
exceed one week.53

Article 5 is also at variance with the LOSC because the right of innocent passage
is not conditional on the number of ships in the territorial sea at any one time. As
Decree No.30-CP was issued before the LOSC opened for signature, and after
longstanding struggles for the unification of the country, the Decree is very much a
product of Vietnam‘s political milieu at that time. Indeed, Vietnam was more concerned
with sovereignty matters than its international obligations. Upon signing the LOSC on
December 10, 1982, Vietnam made no declarations or statements. However, a statement
was made when Vietnam ratified the LOSC on 25 July 1994. The statement provides
that:
The National Assembly authorizes the National Assembly's Standing Committee and
the Government to review all relevant national legislation to consider necessary
amendments in conformity with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, and to safeguard the interests of Viet Nam.54

The effect of this Statement is that after becoming a party to the LOSC, Vietnam
would consider amending its domestic legislation to make it consistent with the
provisions of the LOSC. In 2012 the Law of the Sea of Vietnam was enacted, with the
statute providing that:
1. The provisions of this Law shall prevail in case there are differences between the
provisions of this Law and those of other laws in relation to the sovereignty and
legal status of Vietnam‘s maritime zones.

53
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2. In case there are differences between the provisions of this Law and those of an
International treaty to which the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is a contracting
party, the provisions of the international treaty shall prevail.55

It is clear that after entering into force on 1 January 2013, the Law of the Sea of
Vietnam replaced all previous regulations in relation to the sovereignty and legal status
of Vietnam‘s maritime zones. It is also clear that Vietnam will not invoke provisions of
its Law of the Sea as justification for its failure to perform its treaty obligations. This is
because under the State‘s new law, the international treaty prevails to the extent of any
inconsistency. Regarding the innocent passage regime, article 12 of the Law of the Sea
of Vietnam states that:
Vessels of all States enjoy the right of innocent passage through Vietnam‘s territorial
sea. Foreign military vessels exercising the right of innocent passage through Vietnam‘s
territorial sea shall give prior notice to competent Vietnamese authorities.56

According to Vietnam‘s new Law of the Sea, foreign military vessels seeking
passage through the State‘s territorial sea are only required to give prior notification,
with no particular timeframe being set for such notification and no limitation on the
number of vessels seeking passage at any one time. Article 26 of the Law of the Sea of
Vietnam states that the Government of Vietnam may suspend or restrict the exercise of
innocent passage in its territorial sea for the purposes of ―safeguarding the sovereignty,
national defence, security and interests or security of navigation, protecting marine
resources and the marine ecology, combating pollution, tackling maritime accidents or
marine environmental disasters, [and] preventing the spread of epidemics.‖57 The prior
notice requirement, as well as the very broad conditions for suspension or restriction of
55
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innocent passage in Vietnam‘s territorial sea, are inconsistent with the LOSC. Indeed,
compared to Decree No. 30 CP, Vietnam has attempted to bring its domestic law into
alignment with the LOSC with this new enactment.
Regarding the contiguous zone, the Law of the Sea of Vietnam states that:
1. The State exercises sovereign rights, jurisdiction and other rights stipulated in
Article 16 of this Law over the contiguous zone.
2. The State exercises control within the contiguous zone to prevent and punish acts of
infringement of the law on customs, tariff, health or immigration committed in the
territory or the territorial sea of Vietnam.58

Considering that article 16 of this law focuses on the legal status of the EEZ,
Vietnam recognises the contiguous zone as a special part of the EEZ subject to coastal
State control over matters of customs, tariff, health and immigration. This is generally
consistent with the provisions of the LOSC.
In summary, apart from the requirement for prior notification for the passage of
foreign warships, and the application of broad conditions for the suspension or
restriction of innocent passage, the Law of the Sea of Vietnam is generally consistent
with the LOSC. Indeed, there have been no incidents regarding the passage of foreign
warships through the territorial sea of Vietnam since the Law of the Sea of Vietnam
came into force.
5.2.4

Indonesia
Indonesia is an archipelagic State bordering the South China Sea. It is the largest

archipelago in the world, comprising 17,508 islands and encompassing in excess of 7.9
million square kilometres of sea area.59 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the LOSC
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allows an archipelagic State to draw straight archipelagic baselines joining the
outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs form archipelagic waters
enclosed by archipelagic baselines.60 From the archipelagic baselines, an archipelagic
State has the right to establish the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the EEZ and the
continental shelf in accordance with the provisions of the LOSC.61 Regarding
navigation, there are three different passage regimes through Indonesia‘s maritime
zones, including archipelagic sea lanes passage, innocent passage and the freedom of
navigation. However, within the geographical limits of the South China Sea as set out in
this thesis, only innocent passage through Indonesia‘s territorial sea will be analysed.
Indonesia has issued a number of laws and regulations regarding the innocent
passage regime, including Act No.4 of 18 February 1960 on Indonesian Waters (Act
No.4/1960),62 Act No.6 of 8 August 1996 regarding Indonesian Waters (Act No. 6/
1996),63 and Government Regulation Number 36 of 2002 on Rights and Responsibilities
of Foreign Ships Exercising Innocent Passage through Indonesian Waters (Government
Regulation No.36/2002).64 According to Act No.4/1960, ―Indonesian waters consist of
the territorial sea and the internal waters of Indonesia‖.65 As ―archipelagic waters‖ was a
new concept at the time, it was not included in Act No.4/1960. All waters enclosed by
Indonesia‘s baselines have been classified as Indonesian internal waters, and ―innocent
passage through the internal waters of Indonesia is open to foreign vessels.‖66 For the
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implementation of Act No.4/1960, Indonesia issued Government Decree No.8 of 1962 Foreign Ships - Innocent Passage in the Indonesian Waters, which states that:
Before beginning their peaceful passage through the Indonesian waters or Indonesian
internal waters, the foreign warships and foreign government ships which are not
commercial ships are obliged to inform the Minister-Chief of Navy Staff, except that
they sail in shipping lanes fixed by the Minister-Chief of Navy Staff.67

In 1971 the President of Indonesia enacted Presidential Decree No.16 of 1971
titled Authority of Issuing Sailing Permits for Activities of Foreign Vessels in
Indonesian Waters. According to this statute, foreign warships passing through
Indonesian waters were required to obtain security clearance from the Minister of
Defence and Security.68 However, after Indonesia ratified the LOSC in 1985, it enacted
Act No.6/1996 to implement the LOSC, thereby replacing Act No.4/1960 which was
considered ―not suitable anymore.‖69 As Act No.4/1960 was terminated, it could be
argued that all laws and regulations which were passed to support and implement Act
(including the Presidential Decree No.16 of 1971) are should be no longer valid. Article
11(1) of Act No.6/1996 states that: ―Vessels of all countries, coastal as well as noncoastal countries, enjoy peaceful crossing rights through the territorial sea and waters of
the Indonesian archipelago.‖70 Article 11(2) defines ―crossing‖ and ―peaceful crossing‖
in a similar way to the LOSC.71 Article 13(1) of Act No.6/1996 states that:
The Government of Indonesia can temporarily postpone the peaceful crossing of all
kinds of foreign ships in certain regions of the territorial sea or the archipelagic waters
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if such postponement is necessary for the protection of its security, including the
purpose of arms/weapons training.72

Regarding the passage of foreign warships and government vessels, article 17 of
Act No.6/1996 states that:
The further provisions concerning the rights and obligations of foreign merchant ships,
warships and Government vessels operated for commercial and non-commercial
purposes in conducting a peaceful crossing right through the Indonesian waters, shall be
regulated by Government Regulation.73

For the implementation of Act No.6/1996, Indonesia promulgated Government
Regulation No.36/2002. However, there is no provision in this Regulation regarding the
passage of warships and government vessels. Therefore, as both the Act and the
Regulation are silent on the passage of warships through Indonesia‘s territorial waters, it
would appear that neither prior notification nor prior authorisation is required for the
passage of warships and government vessels in Indonesian waters.
In 1992 and prior to the enactment of the above laws, Indonesia suspended the
right of innocent passage through its territorial sea of the Lusitania Expresso - a
Portuguese-registered car ferry which was carrying peace activists from Australia to
East Timor. The suspension was made on grounds of public order and security.74
However, the question which arose was whether such suspension was consistent with
the provisions of the LOSC. Article 19(1) of the LOSC states that: ―Passage is innocent
so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State.‖75
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In a letter from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the United Nations to the
UN Secretary General, Indonesia argued that:
Far from being a voyage of peace and of respect for human rights, it was politically
motivated from the start, aimed at instigating confrontation, aggravating tension,
including divisiveness and inciting disturbances in East Timor. For these reasons, the
voyage was prejudicial to the peace, good order and security of Indonesia, and thus
contrary to the established notions of innocent passage.76

Regarding the suspension of the right of innocent passage, article 25(3) of the
LOSC makes it clear that:
The coastal State may, without discrimination in form or in fact among foreign ships,
suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of
foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security, including
weapons exercises. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly
published.77

The question is whether the suspension of the right of innocent passage of a
single vessel is discrimination within the context of article 25(3) of LOSC. Rothwell
argues that even if ―the intended voyage of the Lusitania Expresso could...be considered
to constitute a threat to Indonesia‘s internal security, how is it possible for Indonesia to
justify suspension of innocent passage for a single vessel?‘78 In response to this
suspension, Portugal issued a diplomatic statement which asserted that Indonesia has
used force to deny the right of innocent passage of the Lusitania Expresso.79
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Nevertheless, Indonesia did suspend the passage of the Portuguese vessel and there
were no further disputes lodged in relation to this case.
In conclusion, as both Act No.6/1996 and Government Regulation No.36/2002
are silent on the issue of innocent passage of foreign warships, it can be assumed that
neither prior notification nor prior authorisation is required. Thus, Indonesia‘s domestic
legislation is generally consistent with the provisions of the LOSC with regard to the
innocent passage of foreign warships.
5.2.5

The Philippines
The Philippines is also an archipelagic State bordering the South China Sea.

Indeed, it is entirely surrounded by sea and consists of 7,107 islands.80 The Philippines
is the world‘s second largest archipelagic State after Indonesia. In 1898, Spain ceded the
Philippines to the United States by the Treaty of Paris of 10 December 1898, and doing
so set the boundary limits for the Philippine Islands.81 These boundary limits were then
supplemented by the Treaty between the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of
America for Cession of Outlying Islands of the Philippines 190082, and by the
Convention between the United States and Great Britain Delimiting the Boundary
between the Philippine Archipelago and the State of North Borneo 1930.83 These
instruments provide that the Philippine Archipelago ―comprehends the Philippine
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Islands described as the archipelago in Article III of the Treaty of Paris, with the
addition of the islands included by the two companion treaties referred to above.‖84 In
1961 the Philippines enacted The Philippine Baselines Law, known as Republic Act No.
3046 of 17 June 1961(Act No. 3046). It states that ―the baselines from which the
territorial sea of the Philippines is determined consist of straight lines joining
appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago‖85, and ―all waters within
the baselines provided for in Section one hereof are considered inland or internal waters
of the Philippines.‖86 Act No. 3046 also affirmed that ―all the waters beyond the
outermost islands of the archipelago but within the limits of the boundaries set forth in
the aforementioned treaties comprise the territorial sea of the Philippines.‖87 The
boundaries set forth in these treaties (international treaty limits) encompass a huge
maritime area measuring 600 miles in width and 1200 miles in length - far more than
the 12 nautical mile territorial sea limit specified in the LOSC.88 After the passing of
Act No.3046 a number of States, including the United States, the United Kingdom and
Australia, made formal protests to the Philippine Government regarding (among other
matters) the passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea claimed by the
Philippines.89
The current 1987 Constitution of the Philippines defines the national territory as:
The Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and all
other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of
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its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the
subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between,
and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.90

The Philippine archipelago referred to in this Constitution includes all islands in
the above mentioned treaties. As a result, all waters ―around, between, and connecting
the islands of the archipelago‖ are considered internal waters.
During UNCLOS III, the Philippine delegation were at pains to emphasise the
unique nature of the State‘s international treaty limits and pleaded for recognition of its
territorial sea on the basis of historic and legal title. Even so, the Philippine proposal
was not included in the draft of the negotiating texts.91 On 10 December 1982, at the
final session of UNCLOS III, the head of Philippine delegation Mr Tolentino stated
that: ―we would really have some problem with the 12-mile limit on breadth of the
territorial sea provided in this Convention. My Government has studied the problem; it
is a very difficult one for us.‖92 He then went on to add that ―when we sign the
Convention we shall submit also a declaration in exercise of the right granted under
article 310.‖93
Upon signing the LOSC on 10 December 1982, and in accordance with its
earlier pronouncement, The Philippines made the following Statement:
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1. The signing of the Convention by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
shall not in any manner impair or prejudice the sovereign rights of the Republic of the
Philippines under and arising from the Constitution of the Philippines.
2. Such signing shall not in any manner affect the sovereign rights of the Republic of
the Philippines as successor of the United States of America, under and arising out of
the Treaty of Paris between Spain and the United States of America of 10 December
1898, and the Treaty of Washington between the United States of America and Great
Britain of 2 January 1930.94

The purpose of this Statement was to make it clear that, following ratification of
the LOSC, the Philippines had no intention of harmonising its domestic legislation with
the provisions of the LOSC. The Philippines also declared that:
The concept of archipelagic waters is similar to the concept of internal waters under the
Constitution of the Philippines, and removes straits connecting these waters with the
economic zone or high seas from the rights of foreign vessels to transit passage for
international navigation.95

With this statement, the Philippines refused to make a distinction between
archipelagic waters and internal waters, effectively removing the rights of transit
passage and archipelagic passage provided for in the LOSC.96
Thus, for the Philippines, all waters landward of its baselines are internal waters,
and all waters seaward of its baselines to the outermost boundaries of the
aforementioned treaties constitute the territorial sea (sea figure 5.1). With the
contradictions that exist between the LOSC, the State‘s constitutional documents, as
well as its domestic legislation, the Philippines has faced difficulties in implementing
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the LOSC after becoming a party to the Convention. In 2009, the Philippines passed the
Baselines Law (Act No. 9522) - ―an Act to amend Certain Provisions of Republic Act
No. 3046, as amended by Republic Act No. 5446, to define the Archipelagic Baselines
of the Philippines, and for Other Purposes.‖ However, this new Baselines Law ―is a
mere clinical and technical adjustment of the base points under the old Baselines Law‖ ,
and does not change the character of the waters under Act No. 3046/ Act No. 5446.97
Figure 5.1 Boundary of the Philippine Treaty Limits

Source: Lowell B. Bautista, ‗Philippine Territorial Boundaries: International
Tensions, Colonial Baggage, Ambivalent Conformity‘ (2011) 16 (December) Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies
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Regarding the passage of foreign warships in the territorial sea, there have been
no domestic laws or regulations directly addressing this issue. However, in practice, the
Philippines requires prior notification or authorisation for the passage of foreign
warships through its territorial sea.98 In 1965, Australia and the Philippines reached an
agreement whereby the Australian Defence Attaché would inform the Philippines Navy
―at low level‖ of the passage of its naval vessels through the territorial sea of the
Philippines.99 Three years later, and in response to the passage of combined units of
British and Australian naval vessels through the territorial sea claimed by the
Philippines, the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines stated that:
…the…combined units of British and Australian armed public vessels, or any other
armed foreign public vessel for that matter, cannot assert or exercise the so-called right
of innocent passage through the Philippine territorial sea without the permission of the
Philippine Government.100

The Philippines also restricts the passage of nuclear cargo vessels through its
territorial sea.101 According to the Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes
Control Act of 1990 (Act No.6969 of 1990), the Philippines ―prohibit the entry, even in
transit, of hazardous and nuclear wastes and their disposal into the Philippine territorial
limits for whatever purpose.‖102 This requirement is inconsistent with the provisions of
the LOSC, which state that nuclear cargo ships have the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea of a foreign state provided they ―carry documents and observe
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special precautionary measures established for such ships by international
agreement.‖103
In summary, the current domestic laws and regulations of the Philippines are
inconsistent with the LOSC insofar as the territorial sea and innocent passage regime
are concerned. As a party to the LOSC, the Philippines should seek to harmonise its
domestic legislation by bringing it into conformity with the provisions of the LOSC.
5.2.6

Malaysia
Malaysia signed the LOSC on 10 December 1982, with ratification of the

Convention taking place on 14 October 1996.104 One of the State‘s earlier territorial searelated instruments was the Emergency Ordinance No.7/1969. According to this
Ordinance, the breadth of Malaysia‘s territorial waters was 12 nautical miles. However,
the Ordinance did not mention the baselines from which the territorial sea was to be
measured.105 In 1984, Malaysia claimed an exclusive economic zone by virtue of the
Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984 (Act No. 311), which entered into force on 1 May
1985. This Act defined the territorial sea as ―the territorial waters of Malaysia
determined in accordance with the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance
No.7/1969‖106, and affirmed that Malaysia‘s EEZ extends to a distance of 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breath of the territorial sea is measured.107
Again, Malaysia did not formally declare its baselines. On 1 May 2007, Malaysia
enacted the Baselines of Maritime Zones Act 2006, formally declaring that the baselines
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used for determining the State‘s maritime zones include normal baselines and straight
baselines.108 However, this Act provides no geographical coordinates of base points,
instead stating that: ―[The] Yang di-Pertuan Agong, on the recommendation of the
Minister may, by order published in the Gazette, declares the geographical coordinates
of base points from which the baselines of Malaysia may be determined.‖ 109 It may be
assumed from this statute that Malaysia prefers to preserve the status quo, without
declaring coordinates for its baselines.110 It is interesting to note that on the maps
appended to the Executive Summary of the 2009 Malaysia-Vietnam Joint Submission to
the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, it can be seen
that Malaysia employs straight baselines for the purpose of this joint submission.
However, no official list of coordinates for these baselines has been submitted to the
United Nations.111 The Emergency Ordinance No.7/1969 ceased to have effect in 2012,
and Malaysia enacted the Territorial Sea Act 2012 on 22 June 2012 to replace it. The
object of this Act is ―to provide for the territorial sea of Malaysia and for connected
matters.‖112 It reaffirms the breadth of the territorial sea, which is 12 nautical miles from
the baselines established in accordance with the Baselines of Maritime Zones Act 2006.
However, this Act again does not provide geographical coordinates of base points.
Malaysia‘s domestic laws do not mention the passage of foreign warships in its
territorial sea. The only article of the Territorial Sea Act 2012 referring to Malaysia‘s
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sovereignty in respect of the territorial sea is article 4, which states that: ―The
sovereignty in respect of the territorial sea, and in respect of its bed and subsoil, is
vested in and exercisable by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in right of Malaysia.‖113
However, upon ratification of the LOSC, Malaysia made a declaration regarding
innocent passage:
In view of the inherent danger entailed in the passage of nuclear-powered vessels or
vessels carrying nuclear material or other material of a similar nature and in view of the
provision of article 22, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Law of the Sea
concerning the right of the coastal State to confine the passage of such vessels to sea
lanes designated by the State within its territorial sea, as well as that of article 23 of the
Convention, which requires such vessels to carry documents and observe special
precautionary measures as specified by international agreements, the Malaysian
Government, with all of the above in mind, requires the aforesaid vessels to obtain prior
authorization of passage before entering the territorial sea of Malaysia until such time as
the international agreements referred to in article 23 are concluded and Malaysia
becomes a party thereto…114

This statement is inconsistent with Article 23 of the LOSC. Indeed, while
Article 23 requires foreign nuclear-powered ships and other ships with inherently
dangerous or noxious cargo to carry documents and observe special precautionary
measures, it does not require such vessels to obtain prior authorisation from the coastal
State.115 Given that most nuclear-powered vessels are sovereign immune vessels, this
statement, if fully enforced, would affect the innocent passage of foreign sovereign
immune vessels in Malaysia‘s territorial sea. However, as there are no provisions on the
innocent passage of foreign sovereign immune vessels in Malaysia‘s domestic
113
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legislation, this statement alone might not be of sufficient legal force to exclude the
innocent passage of foreign nuclear-powered vessels in Malaysia‘s territorial sea.
In summary, there are also no provisions in Malaysia‘s domestic legislation that
clearly address the innocent passage of foreign vessels in the State‘s territorial sea. In
order to implement the LOSC fully, Malaysia needs to establish its baseline system and
promulgate, through domestic laws and regulations, detailed provisions regarding the
innocent passage regime in its territorial sea.
5.2.7

Brunei
Brunei has a coastline length of only 161km.116 It gained full independence on 1

January 1984, having been a British protected State since 1888. 117 Brunei signed the
LOSC on 5 December 1984 and ratified it on 5 November 1996.118 It made no
declaration on either signature or ratification to the LOSC. In the Territorial Waters of
Brunei Act 1982, Brunei declared the breadth of its territorial waters as 12 nautical
miles; however, as with Malaysia, it has not provided the baseline system from which
its territorial sea can be measured.119 None of the State‘s domestic laws or regulations
mention innocent passage. There have been no incidents regarding innocent passage of
foreign vessels in Brunei‘s territorial sea. Thus, it could be argued that Brunei‘s practice
has been consistent with the LOSC.

116

Geography of Brunei Darussalam Commonwealth Governance
<http://www.commonwealthgovernance.org/countries/asia/brunei_darussalam/geography/>.
117
See Brunei Darussalam : History The Commonwealth <http://thecommonwealth.org/our-membercountries/brunei-darussalam/history>
118
See United Nations, Treaty Collection
<https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI~6&chapter=21&Te
mp=mtdsg3&lang=en>.
119
Article 16 of the LOSC requires States to either publish their baselines on charts or provide a list of
geographical coordinates of base points to the United Nations; See LOSC, art 16; See also Territorial
Waters of Brunei Act, 1982
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/BRN_1982_Act.pdf>.

179

5.3

Political security and strategic factors that have influenced State practice
It can be seen from the above discussion that political security and strategic

factors have heavily influenced the development of domestic legislation of South China
Sea littoral States on the innocent passage regime.
Since the 19th century, China has been ―invaded‖ by Western powers and Japan
on a number of occasions, with most of these invasions having come from the sea.120
After the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, there have
allegedly been many foreign ―intrusions‖ into China‘s territorial waters which were
condemned by China as violations of the State‘s territorial integrity and sovereignty. 121
According to Zou Keyuan, the requirement of prior authorisation for the passage of
foreign warship through China‘s territorial sea was ―triggered by the frequent intrusions
by American warships.‖122 Hungdah Chiu has highlighted that in the 1963 alone China
issued 15 ―serious warnings‖ to the United States for alleged intrusions of its warships
into China‘s territorial sea.123 As China‘s maritime defence capabilities were weak at
the time, security concerns were perhaps the driving force behind China instituting the
prior authorisation requirement for the passage of foreign warships in its 1958

120

Keyuan, above n 2, 81. In the First Opium War between Great Britain and China (1839-1842), China
was defeated in a series of naval conflicts. As a result, the British were in a position to make a large
number of demands from the weaker Qing Government of China in the Anglo-Chinese Treaty of Nanjing.
It was under this Treaty that China ceded the island of Hong Kong to the British. In the Second Opium
War (1857–1858), Britain attacked the Chinese port cities of Guangzhou and Tianjin. In the wake of these
attacks, France, Russia and the United States signed treaties with China at Tianjin in quick succession in
1858. Under the most-favoured-nation clause, all of the foreign powers operating in China were permitted
to seek the same concessions of China that Great Britain had earlier achieved by force. On 22 August
1984, in a significant naval encounter between France and China, the Chinese flag ship was sunk, all
other Chinese ships were set on fire and 500 Chinese sailors were killed. Being defeated in the SinoJapanese War of 1894-1895, China had to sign the treaty of Shimonoseki in which China recognised the
independence of Korea and ceded the Liaodong Peninsula, the islands of Taiwan, as well as Penghu to
Japan. For more information, see Philip Jowett, China's Wars: Rousing the Dragon 1894-1949 (Osprey
Publishing, 2013), 20-36; see also Opium Wars, Global Security,
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/opium-wars.htm>.
121
Keyuan, above n 5, 212.
122
Ibid.
123
Hungdah Chiu, 'China and The Question Of Territorial Sea' (1975) 1(1) Maryland Journal of
International Law 29, 57.

180

Declaration. Another political factor at play was that, as a socialist State, China chose to
support the Soviet Union and other socialist States which, at that time, required prior
authorisation for the passage of foreign warships through their territorial sea.124 During
and after UNCLOS III, China‘s position on the innocent passage of foreign warships
was essentially the same as in its 1958 Declaration, while the Soviet Union‘s views on
the innocent passage of foreign warships were in transition, with a change occurring in
1989 following the signing of a joint statement with the United States titled Uniform
Interpretation of the Rules of International Law Governing Innocent Passage.125 As
Zou Keyuan has observed, the traditionally sensitive security concerns of China (and
particularly the State‘s painful history of having been repeatedly attacked from the sea),
made China reluctant to grant foreign warships the right of innocent passage in its
territorial sea without prior authorisation.126 When China ratified the LOSC in 1996, it
made a statement to the effect that foreign warships must ―obtain advance approval
from or give prior notification‖ for their passage through China‘s territorial sea. 127 The
additional alternative requirement of ―prior notification‖ to the original position of
―prior authorisation‖ reflects a change in China‘s attitude towards the innocent passage
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of warships.128 Throughout history, the United States and the former Soviet Union have
both altered their positions on the innocent passage of warships. This has occurred in
response to a changing security landscape as well as the enhancement of the maritime
defence capabilities of these two powers.129 With the rapid growth of China‘s naval
power, Chinese naval ships will undoubtedly need to sail through the territorial seas of
other States. For the benefit of its navy, therefore, China may need to change its
position on the innocent passage of foreign warships through the territorial sea. Sienho
Yee has argued that if China chooses not to abide by international law rules, in the
future ―China may find itself in a straightjacket that it has helped to make but from
which it cannot free itself.‖130 According to Zou Keyuan, although China is in a position
to bring its domestic law into line with the LOSC, such action will certainly take some
time.131
Taiwan, on the other hand, was not allowed to participate in UNCLOS III and
thus could not become a party to the LOSC. As previously mentioned, Taiwan is a small
island which China has claimed as its province. As a result, maritime security has
always been an significant concern for Taiwan, especially with the rise of China as a
formidable maritime power. In order to provide its navy with full access to the blue
waters of the Pacific Ocean, China is attempting to encircle and control Taiwan.132
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Taiwan is not bound by the LOSC, and with its fear of being invaded by China, it is
unlikely that Taiwan will change its position regarding the innocent passage of foreign
warships and government vessels through its territorial sea.
Security concerns have also featured prominently in Vietnam‘s approach to the
innocent passage regime. During UNCLOS III, Vietnam was enjoying its status as a
newly independent State, having long struggled for unification. The importance of
security for Vietnam was reflected in its 1977 Statement in which it claimed ―security‖
as a function of the contiguous zone.133 By using the straight baseline system and
claiming the contiguous zone for security purposes, Vietnam has created a maritime
security buffer zone that, in some areas, extends to more than 100 nautical miles from
its coast.134 Like other socialist States at the time, particularly the Soviet Union and
China, Vietnam did not recognise the innocent passage of foreign warships in its
territorial sea. In 1980, Vietnam issued Decree No.30-CP which requires foreign
warships to obtain prior authorisation before entering Vietnam‘s contiguous zone.135
Throughout UNCLOS III the Soviet Union, as a major ally of Vietnam, shifted its
position to support the innocent passage of warships, while China –which at that time
was perceived by Vietnam as a potential aggressor, supported a restrictive doctrine that
required foreign warships to obtain prior authorisation from coastal States before
passing through their territorial sea. Vietnam found itself in a difficult political situation
that ultimately resulted in its decision to remain silent on this issue.136 On 10 December
1982, at the final session of UNCLOS III, the head of the Vietnamese delegation Mr
Kim Chung stated that: ―Although we are not entirely satisfied with certain provisions
133
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of the Convention, my delegation willingly subscribes to the global compromise and the
method for the overall settlement of all law-of-the-sea problems.‖137 Unfortunately, Mr
Chung did not clarify which of these ―certain provisions‖ he was referring to.
With the changing security environment in the South China Sea, especially
―China‘s new wave of aggressive assertiveness in the [region]‖138, Vietnam enacted the
Law of the Sea of Vietnam in 2012 in an attempt to bring its domestic legislation in line
with the provisions of the LOSC. As Duong Danh Huy has observed, ―the more this
Vietnam Maritime Law complies with the provisions of UNCLOS, the more convenient
the international support for Vietnam will be.‖139 However, regarding the innocent
passage regime, Vietnam still requires prior notification for the passage of foreign
warships in its territorial sea – a stance inconsistent with the LOSC. It took Vietnam
more than 20 years (from 1980 to 2012) to change its position from prior authorisation
to prior notification for the innocent passage of foreign warships; therefore, it is hard to
predict whether Vietnam will modify its Law of the Sea 2012. However, Vietnam‘s
response to the USS Curtis Wilbur incident may hint at the State‘s future direction on
this point. As previously mentioned, the USS Curtis Wilbur was a U.S. Navy destroyer
which, in January 2016, exercised innocent passage within 12 nautical miles of Triton
Island claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan without giving prior notice to any of
these claimant States. In responding to the incident, Vietnamese Foreign Ministry
spokesman Le Hai Binh proclaimed that: ―Vietnam respects the right of innocent
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passage through its territory in accordance with international law, particularly Article 17
of the Law of the Sea Convention.‖140
For Indonesia, a State comprising thousands of islands with various ethnic
groups, coupled with the State‘s vast maritime estate and tumultuous colonial past, it is
axiomatic that national security and political stability were at the fore of Indonesia‘s
agenda at UNCLOS III.141 Indeed, the Indonesian delegate to UNCLOS III expressed
the view that:
Any Law of the Sea Conference must recognize the need for, and ensure the
achievements of national unity, political stability, economic and social development, as
well as the safeguard of national defence and security of an archipelagic state like
Indonesia.142

Decree No.16 of 1971, which required foreign warships passing through
Indonesian waters to obtain security clearance from the Minister of Defence and
Security, reflected the State‘s deep concern over maritime security at the time.
However, after becoming a party to the LOSC in 1985, Indonesia‘s domestic legislation
remained silent on the innocent passage of foreign warships in its territorial sea and
archipelagic waters. Perhaps the new concept of the archipelagic State (which had
finally been incorporated in the LOSC) took into account Indonesia‘s national interests,
and therefore Indonesia was predominantly satisfied with the LOSC. In a statement
made on behalf of the Indonesian delegation at the final session of UNCLOS III, Mr
Kusumaatmadja asserted that: ―We believe that the present text is the maximum that
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could be achieved by the whole community. Each and every one of us has made
concessions to achieve a universally acceptable Convention.‖143
Unlike Indonesia, the Philippines faced difficulty in attempting to harmonise its
Constitution with LOSC provisions on the limits of the territorial sea. Indeed, such
difficulty was encountered despite the Philippines being content with the new concept
of the archipelagic State. As a result, the Philippines made statements both on its
signature to, and ratification of, the LOSC, and which were earlier found to be
inconsistent with the Convention. The seeming contradictions that exist between the
State‘s domestic legislation and the LOSC have been a major obstacle for the
Philippines in implementing the LOSC. In 2009, the Philippines enacted its new
Baselines Law, which represented an attempt to harmonise its domestic law with the
LOSC. However, this law created controversy between the Government and Philippines
petitioners on the basis that it violated the Philippine Constitution. Based on the view
that the 2009 Baselines Law is only a statutory mechanism for the Philippines to delimit
its maritime zone, and plays no role in the acquisition or loss of territory, the Supreme
Court of the Philippines has already declared that the 2009 Baselines Law is
constitutional.144 As the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the law in the Philippines
legislative hierarchy, it is clear that the 2009 Baselines Law will be enforced. The
Supreme Court also commented that:
Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the
Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the
breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is a recipe for a
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two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely
enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our
archipelago; and second, it weakens the country‘s case in any international dispute over
Philippine maritime space.145

In light of the above pronouncement, it is clear that the 2009 Baselines Law is
intended to garner international support for the State‘s national security, as well as its
interest in the escalating territorial disputes with neighbouring States in the South China
Sea.
In the case of Malaysia and Brunei, the domestic regulations of both States are
silent on the passage of foreign warships. As discussed above, these States have
declared a 12 nautical mile territorial sea; however, neither Malaysia nor Brunei has
publicised the baselines from which their territorial seas are measured. Compared to
other South China Sea littoral States, maritime disputes are a less urgent concern for
these two States, as no incidents have occurred in relation to the innocent passage of
foreign sovereign immune vessels in their territorial seas. For this reason, it is unclear
when Malaysia or Brunei will pass domestic regulations on the innocent passage
regime.
5.4

Conclusion
The text of the LOSC makes it clear that ―ships of all States, whether coastal or

land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.‖146 After the
entry into force of the LOSC, the littoral States of the South China Sea enacted
domestic legislation in order to implement the provisions of the LOSC. However, when
it comes to the passage of sovereign immune vessels in the territorial sea of coastal
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States, the practice of South China Sea littoral States remains divergent and inconsistent
with the LOSC. The table below summarises the domestic regulations and practices of
South China Sea littoral States regarding the innocent passage of foreign warships in
their territorial seas.
Table 5.1 Innocent Passage of Foreign Warships: the Practice of South China Sea
littoral States
States
Domestic regulations
Brunei

Current domestic regulations do not refer to the innocent
passage of foreign military vessels.

China

Foreign warships are required to obtain prior authorisation.

Indonesia

Current domestic regulations do not refer to the innocent
passage of foreign military vessels.

Malaysia

Current domestic regulations do not refer to the innocent
passage of foreign military vessels.

The Philippines

No domestic regulations in place, but in practice foreign
warships are required to give prior notification or obtain prior
authorisation.

Taiwan

Foreign military and government vessels are required to give
prior notification.

Vietnam

Foreign military vessels are required to give prior notification.

The provisions of the LOSC dealing with maritime zones and navigation
regimes are widely recognised as reflecting customary international law, and are thus
binding on all states.147 Indeed, the text of the LOSC clearly provides that ships of all
States enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. Therefore, the
passage of warships should not represent an exception. As parties to the LOSC, South
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China Sea littoral States should harmonise their domestic legislation with the provisions
of the LOSC in accordance with the international legal principle of pacta sunt
servanda,148 as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.149 As
discussed above, political security and strategic factors have heavily influenced the
practice of South China Sea States. The degree to which these factors have impacted
policy decisions will, of course, vary from State to State. In the interest of political
stability and safe navigation in the South China Sea, some States may choose to adjust
their domestic laws and regulations to ensure consistency with the LOSC. However, this
will inevitably take some time and will be subject to changes in the security
environment.150
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6 COASTAL STATE PRACTICE IN IMPLEMENTING NAVIGATIONAL
REGIMES IN THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
6.1

Introduction
As discussed in Chapter Four, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) was one of

the newer concepts to be introduced in the LOSC. Indeed, it is considered a compromise
between the divergent interests of coastal States on the one hand and major maritime
States on the other. The LOSC defines the EEZ as a separate functional zone of a sui
generis character, with neither residual territorial sea characteristics nor residual high
seas characteristics.1 Coastal States have sovereign rights over living and non-living
resources of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, as
well as other economic activities related to economic exploration and exploitation of the
zone (such as the production of energy from water, current and wind).2 Article 56 of the
LOSC also makes it clear that within the EEZ, coastal States have jurisdiction with
regard to the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures,
marine scientific research, and the protection and preservation of the marine
environment.3 In addition to the jurisdictional rights mentioned above, the regime of the
high seas also applies. In this regard, all States enjoy the freedoms of navigation and
overflight, as well as the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines referred to in
Article 87 and ―other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms,
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft [etc].‖4
However, in practice, States have different interpretations of the provisions of
the LOSC regarding the EEZ regime. One of the most controversial issues in
implementing the EEZ regime has been the legality of foreign military activities in the
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zone. South China Sea coastal States tend to regulate (and sometimes even restrict)
activities of foreign military vessels and aircraft in their EEZ, while maritime user
States consider military activities to be included in the freedoms of navigation and
overflight granted by article 87 of the LOSC.
As discussed in Chapters Two and Three, the South China Sea is not only
important for merchant shipping, but also for military transits and operations. Indeed,
maintaining the safety and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea
are key strategic interests for many States. Given that the majority of waters in the
South China Sea are within EEZs claimed by coastal States, the different interpretations
of the EEZ regime, together with the prevailing uncertainty over EEZ boundaries, have
resulted in a number of maritime disputes and confrontations in the area. Against this
backdrop, the objectives of this chapter are to: (i) analyse the practice of littoral States
in implementing the navigational regime of the LOSC in the EEZ; (ii) outline the
ambiguous nature of EEZ maritime claims in the South China Sea; and (iii) discuss
future prospects for the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in this
maritime region.
6.2
6.2.1

The practice of coastal States
China
Although China signed the LOSC in 1982, it was not until 1996 (and upon

ratification of the Convention), that China made its first statement on the EEZ.
According to this statement, China ―shall enjoy sovereign rights and jurisdiction over an
exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles and the continental shelf.‖5 Two years
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later, on 26 June 1998, China enacted the Law of the People's Republic of China on the
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf (China‘s EEZ Law). This law
stipulates that China‘s EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from its baselines.6 Article 11 of
China‘s EEZ Law states that:
All countries, provided observing the international law and laws and regulations of the
People's Republic of China, enjoy the freedom of navigating in and flying over the
exclusive economic zone of the People's Republic of China, enjoy the freedom of laying
down submarine cables and piping in the exclusive economic zone and the continental
shelf of the People's Republic of China, and enjoy other conveniences related to the
freedom above-mentioned for legal use of ocean. The route of laying down submarine
cables and piping must be subject to the consent of the competent authorities of the
People's Republic of China.7

It can be understood from this article that foreign vessels and aircraft seeking to
exercise the freedoms of navigation and overflight in China‘s EEZ must comply not
only with international law rules but also China‘s relevant domestic legislation. Article
58(3) of the LOSC makes it clear that in exercising their rights and performing their
duties in the EEZ, States ―shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the
coastal State in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.‖8 If China‘s
domestic laws and regulations are not in keeping with the provisions of the LOSC, then
China‘s requirement that other States comply with such laws and regulations is also
inconsistent with this position. Moreover, article 14 of China‘s EEZ Law states that:
―[T]he provisions of this Act shall not affect the historical rights of the People's
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Republic of China.‖9 It is unclear precisely what China means by ―historical rights‖, as
well as the geographic areas to which such rights may apply. According to Zou Keyuan,
this provision indicates that China‘s maritime claims in the South China Sea are based
on the controversial ―nine-dash line‖ – a claim which encompasses about 80 per cent of
the ocean space in the South China Sea.10 However, Zou has also asserted that ―[as]
China has refused to recognise the Gulf of Tonkin as historic waters...how [can] the
entire South China Sea become historic waters?‖11 According to Clive Symmons, a
claim of ―historic rights‖ must meet the general requirements of having formal claim,
continuous and effective exercise of jurisdiction, as well as international acquiescence.12
A leading Vietnamese author has argued that ―[a] long time ago, regional countries
pursued their normal activities in the East Sea (South China Sea) without encountering
any Chinese impediment and they have never recognized historical rights of China
there.‖13 Indeed, Vietnam has officially lodged a protest against China‘s EEZ Law,
claiming that Vietnam:
[s]hall not recognize any so–called ―historical interests‖ which are not consistent with
international law and violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of Viet Nam and Viet
Nam‘s legitimate interests in its maritime zones and continental shelf in the Eastern Sea
as mentioned in article 14.14
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The original nine-dash line consisted of eleven interrupted lines and was first
published in 1947 by the Government of the Republic of China (presently Taiwan), and
before the founding of the People‘s Republic of China (China).15 The map was then
adopted by China with the deletion of two lines in the Gulf of Tonkin, thus becoming
the nine-dash line map.16 However, China has not yet clarified what areas it claims
within this nine-dash line. According to two commentators, given that the nine-dash
map was poorly drawn ―in the most inaccurate possible way‖ and without any
geographical coordinates, it is ―highly unlikely that any international court or tribunal
charged with assessing the Chinese claim would attribute any substantial value to the
map.‖17 It is also worth noting that in 1993, Taiwan, the original author of the nine-dash
map, claimed as historic waters areas within the nine-dash line.18 However, it can be
seen from the 1998 Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic
of China that Taiwan has dropped its original position on historic waters. 19 Moreover,
on 12 July 2016, the arbitral tribunal ruled that ―China‘s claims to historic rights, or
other sovereign rights or jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South
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China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ―nine-dash line‖ are contrary to the
[LOSC] and without lawful effect.‖20
As the LOSC does not contain any provisions which directly address the issue of
foreign military activities in the EEZ of coastal States, a number of States made
declarations or statements upon signature and ratification of the Convention, restricting
the freedoms of navigation and overflight of foreign military vessels and aircraft in their
EEZs. Interestingly, China made no such statement.21 However, it can be deduced from
a number of interpretative statements made by Chinese officials that the freedoms of
navigation and overflight in the EEZ have certain restrictions, and should not include
the freedom to conduct military activities in and over the EEZ. 22 Some Chinese authors
have also argued that the phrase ―other internationally lawful uses of the sea‖ in the
LOSC does not include the freedom to conduct military activities in the coastal State‘s
EEZ, and that foreign military activities in EEZ ―encroach or infringe on the national
security interests of the coastal State, and can be considered a use of force or threat to
use force against that State.‖23 In a statement concerning joint naval exercises between
the United States and South Korea in 2010, China‘s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong
Lei proclaimed: ―We hold a consistent and clear-cut stance on the issue. We oppose any
party to take any military acts in our exclusive economic zone without permission.‖24
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One of the controversial issues regarding military activities in the EEZ is
military surveys and hydrographic surveys. In relation to marine scientific research
(MSR), Art 9 of China‘s EEZ Law states that:
Any international organization, foreign organization or individual engaging in marine
scientific research in the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the People's
Republic of China must have the approval of the competent authorities of the People's
Republic of China and shall comply with the laws and regulations of the People's
Republic of China.25

This position is generally consistent with the LOSC.26 However, the LOSC does
not define the terms ―marine scientific research‖ or ―military surveys.‖ The silence of
the LOSC on this issue has led to different interpretations being advanced by States.
According to one Chinese author, ―the so-called military survey activities are
completely subsumed under the category of study called marine scientific research.‖27
Zhang Haiwen, the Deputy Director-General of China‘s Institute for Marine Affairs, has
argued that any kind of marine data collecting activities in the EEZ ―could be
categorized as marine scientific research which is subject to the jurisdiction of the
coastal State.‖28 Similarly, Zou Keyuan has expressed the view that ―it is hard to
understand the logic of the argument that while marine scientific research in the EEZ is
subject to consent of the coastal State, military activities can be conducted freely
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Yu Zhirong, 'Jurisprudential Analysis of the U.S. Navy‘s Military Surveys in the Exclusive Economic
Zones of Coastal Countries' in Peter Dutton (ed), Military Activities in the EEZ: A U.S.-China Dialogue
on Security and International Law in the Maritime Commons (U.S. Naval War College, 2010) vol 7, 43.
28
Zhang Haiwen, 'Is It Safeguarding the Freedom of Navigation or Maritime Hegemony of the United
States? -Comments on Raul (Pete) Pedrozo's Article on Military Activities in the EEZ' (2010) Chinese
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without any check by the coastal State.‖29 Professor Xue Guifang has even suggested
that ―hydrographic and military surveys in the EEZ should be under the jurisdiction of
the coastal state.‖30 However, Ian Townsend–Gault and Clive Schofield have opined
that ―any activity such as hydrographic surveying, which is not expressly declared to be
within the jurisdiction of the coastal State, remains one of the freedom [sic] of the
seas.‖31 For Pedrozo, hydrographic surveys and military surveys are different from
marine scientific research.32 He explains that as military marine data collection is used
for military, not scientific purposes, these activities are not subject to approval by the
coastal State.33 Indeed, Sam Bateman concurs with Pedrozo on this point, with the
former asserting that ―military activities are among the ―other internationally lawful
uses of the sea‖ related to the freedoms of navigation and overflight in an EEZ‖.
Nevertheless, Bateman has conceded that ―there is very little difference between how
MSR data and hydrographic data are used after the data are collected.‖34
In 1992, China enacted the Surveying and Mapping Law of the People‘s
Republic of China (1992 Surveying and Mapping Law) which stated that:
Surveying and mapping to be conducted in the territorial air, land and waters, as well as
other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People‘s Republic of China by a foreign
organization or individual alone or in cooperation with the relevant department or unit
of the People‘s Republic of China shall be subject to the approval by the Government of
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the People‘s Republic of China or by the department authorized by it. A foreign
organization or individual that with due approval conducts surveying and mapping in
the territorial air, land and waters, as well as other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the
People‘s Republic of China either alone or in cooperation with the relevant department
or unit of the People‘s Republic of China, must comply with relevant laws and
administrative rules and regulations of the People‘s Republic of China…35

The 1992 Surveying and Mapping Law, however, did not define the term
―surveying and mapping.‖ In 2002 China replaced this law with a new Survey and
Mapping Law (the 2002 Survey and Mapping Law), which entered into force on 1
December 2002. This new law defines survey and mapping activities as: ―the activities
conducted to determine, collect and formulate the key elements of physical geography
or the shapes, sizes, space positions, attributes, etc. of man-made surface installations,
as well as to process and provide the data, information and results gained therefrom.‖36
According to this law, foreign organisations or individuals can only conduct surveying
and mapping within areas under Chinese jurisdiction with the approval of the People‘s
Republic of China.37 Article 7 of this law also states that:
Foreign organizations or individuals that wish to conduct surveying and mapping in the
territorial air, land or waters of the People's Republic of China shall, as required by law,
join hands with the relevant departments or units of the People's Republic of China in
the form of Chinese-foreign equity joint venture or Chinese-foreign contractual joint
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venture and such surveying and mapping may not involve State secrets or endanger
State security.38

It can be seen from the 2002 Survey and Mapping Law that, due to security
concerns, surveying and mapping activities conducted by foreign organizations or
individuals within areas under Chinese jurisdiction must now take the form of
cooperative partnerships with Chinese governmental agencies or private sector actors.
According to Pedrozo, the effect of the above law is that China is seeking to regulate all
activities in its EEZ – including hydrographic surveys, military oceanographic surveys
and surveillance activities. Such action, however, is inconsistent with customary
international law and the LOSC.39
In practice, there have been a number of incidents involving the passage of
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in China‘s EEZ. In 2001, the USNS Bowditch
was conducting hydrographic surveys in the Yellow Sea (and within China‘s claimed
EEZ) when it was confronted by a Chinese warship and ordered to leave the area.40 On
1 April 2001, a Chinese naval F-8II fighter jet collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3
reconnaissance plane in the airspace above China‘s claimed EEZ, approximately 70
nautical miles south-east of Hainan Island.41 This collision resulted in the death of a
Chinese pilot and forced an emergency landing of the EP-3 on Hainan.42 China argued
that the surveillance activity in China‘s EEZ violated the principle of ―overflight
freedom‖ as stipulated in the LOSC and amounted to an abuse of right, damaging
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China‘s security interests.43 However, according to the United States, the EP-3 was
enjoying the freedom of overflight in international airspace, which includes airspace
over the EEZ.44 Eight years later, on 9 March 2009, another incident occurred within
China‘s EEZ. This one involved a U.S. Navy ocean surveillance vessel, the USNS
Impeccable, and a number of Chinese civilian and law enforcement ships approximately
75 nautical miles south of Hainan Island.45 The United States lodged a formal protest in
relation to the standoff, asserting that China‘s actions were ―illegal, unprofessional and
dangerous.‖46 In response, China claimed that the USNS Impeccable had violated
international law and threatened China‘s national security. China also ―demand[ed] that
the United States put an immediate stop to related activities and take effective measures
to prevent similar acts from happening.‖47 On 19 August 2014, a Chinese fighter jet
intercepted a U.S. Navy P-8 Poseidon aircraft in international airspace, approximately
135 miles east of Hainan Island and in a manner which U.S. Department of Defence
spokesperson Admiral John Kirby described as ―unprofessional...unsafe...and...certainly
not in keeping with the kind of military-to-military relations that we‘d like to have with
China.‖48 In response, Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun stated that:
―[I]f the United States really hopes to avoid impacting bilateral relations, the best course
of action is to reduce or halt close surveillance of China.‖49
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It is interesting to note that Chinese military vessels have conducted a number of
military activities within the EEZs of other States without providing advance
notification. According to the U.S. Department of Defence, there have been several
instances of Chinese naval activities in the EEZs around Guam and Hawaii.50 At the
Maritime Security Session of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on 1 June 2013,
Senior Colonel Zhou Bo of the Foreign Affairs Office of China‘s Ministry of National
Defence stated that China had ―sort of reciprocated America‘s reconnaissance in our
EEZ by sending our ships to America‘s EEZ for reconnaissance a few times.‖ 51 In May
2014, China installed an oil rig in the EEZ and on the Continental Shelf claimed by
Vietnam, and also sent its military and maritime law enforcement forces to protect the
operation of the rig.52 This action created a high degree of tension and led to several
crashes between sovereign immune vessels of the two countries. In July 2014, a Chinese
Dongdiao-class auxiliary general intelligence ship was detected while collecting
military intelligence in the EEZ of the United States, off the coast of Hawaii, during the
Rim of the Pacific Exercise.53 Commenting on this situation, Admiral Sam Locklear,
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, stated that ―this is within the law and it‘s
their right to do it.‖54 In response, China‘s Defense Ministry stated that: ―[T]he People‘s
Liberation Army naval ships‘ operation in waters outside the territorial seas of other
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countries is in line with international law and international practice.‖55 Therefore, the
United States accepts foreign military activities in its EEZ. Meanwhile, China, though
prohibiting foreign military activities in its own EEZ, considers it has the right to
conduct military activities in EEZs of other States.
In summary, as a party to the LOSC, China has enacted a number of domestic
laws and regulations to implement the LOSC regarding the EEZ. The inclusion of so–
called ―historic waters‖ in China‘s EEZ Law has created controversies and led to
protests by other States. Moreover, it is inconsistent with the LOSC for China to impose
conditions on foreign vessels and aircraft exercising the freedoms of navigation and
overflight or to restrict foreign military activities in China‘s EEZ. Indeed, that China
conducts military activities in the EEZs of other States while restricting such activities
in its own EEZ reveals a startling inconsistency in its policy. As Raul Pedrozo has
correctly highlighted: ―It therefore appears that China is applying a double standard.‖56
6.2.2

Taiwan
Taiwan declared an EEZ of 200 nautical miles in 1979 by Presidential Decree

No. 5046.57 In 1998 it promulgated the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the
Continental Shelf of the Republic of China (Taiwan‘s EEZ Law). 58 This law reaffirms
Taiwan‘s EEZ as being 200 nautical miles measured from the baselines of the territorial
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sea.59 It is interesting to note that only article 11 of Taiwan‘s EEZ Law mentions the
navigation regime, stating that:
For any vessel navigating in the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of China
which commits a discharge violation causing marine environmental pollution, the
Republic of China may request that vessel to give information regarding its identity, its
port of registry, its last and its next port of call and other relevant information required
to establish whether a violation has occurred.60

As sovereign immune vessels and aircraft are not subject to the provisions of the
LOSC regarding the protection and preservation of the marine environment, they are not
required to observe coastal State law on the prevention of marine pollution. It is worth
noting that article 11 of Taiwan‘s EEZ Law is silent on the overflight of foreign aircraft
and foreign military activities in the State‘s EEZ. Regarding its claim to ―historic
waters‖, Taiwan‘s 1993 Policy Guidelines for the South China Sea maintained that
―[t]he South China Sea area within the historic water limit is the maritime area under
the jurisdiction of the Republic of China, in which the Republic of China processes all
rights and interests.‖61 In 1995, Taiwan‘s Minister of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed this
position, proclaiming that ―our government has sovereignty over the historic U-shaped
territory.‖62 However, unlike China‘s EEZ Law, Taiwan‘s EEZ Law does not contain
any provision regarding historic waters, and there have been no official statements made
by Taiwan on its ―historic waters‖ claim since the passage of this particular law.63
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Generally, Taiwan‘s EEZ Law is consistent with the LOSC. 64 However, in relation to
marine scientific research, article 9(5) of this law states that the undertaking of maritime
scientific research in the EEZ or on the continental shelf of Taiwan shall ―not prejudice
the security and benefits of the Republic of China in using such research data.‖ This
provision is inconsistent with the LOSC as Part XIII of the Convention does not contain
any provision which imposes security conditions on marine scientific research.65
As China claims Taiwan as its province, theoretically China also claims the EEZ
claimed by Taiwan. However, in reality, Taiwan‘s EEZ law applies to waters under
Taiwan‘s jurisdiction. Between 1995 and 1996 China conducted a number of missile
tests and military exercises near Taiwan‘s coastline and within the EEZ claimed by
Taiwan.66 According to Yann-huei Song, Taiwan is a ―de facto State, satisfying all the
generally accepted criteria for statehood‖ as well having full diplomatic relations with
28 States.67 Given that China does not recognise foreign military activities in its EEZ,
the question which arises is whether it is justifiable for China to conduct military
activities in Taiwan‘s EEZ.
In summary, even though Taiwan is not a party of the LOSC, it has enacted laws
and regulations to implement the EEZ regime, notably Taiwan‘s EEZ Law. However,
this law is silent on the freedoms of navigation and overflight in the State‘s EEZ. As
China claims Taiwan as a province, and all coastal States in the South China Sea
recognise ―one China‖ policy, the practical implementation of Taiwan‘s EEZ law is
fraught with difficulty.
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6.2.3

Vietnam
Vietnam officially declared its EEZ in 1977 with its Statement on the Territorial

Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf. 68 In
this Statement, Vietnam declared an EEZ to extend 200 nautical miles from the baseline
used to measure the breadth of its territorial sea.69 However, this statement did not
contain any provisions regarding the navigation and overflight of foreign vessels and
aircraft. Rather, Vietnam‘s first official statement relating to the issue of navigation in
its EEZ was Decree No. 30-CP, 1980 on Regulations for Foreign Ships Operating in
Vietnamese Maritime Zones (Decree No.30-CP). According this Decree, foreign ships
operating in the contiguous zone, the territorial sea or the internal waters of Vietnam are
not permitted to ―conduct military exercises, use force or the threat of force to threaten
the security, or disturb the good order of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.‖70
Unfortunately the Decree only mentions the operation of foreign ships and aircraft
outside the contiguous zone, but not within Vietnam‘s EEZ. As discussed above, the
treatment of the contiguous zone as a security zone in the Decree is inconsistent with
the LOSC. Article 2 of Decree No.30-CP states that all foreign ships operating in
Vietnamese maritime zones ―must respect the sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam over each maritime zone.‖71 This means that, at that time, Vietnam used the
term ‗sovereignty‘ in respect of all its maritime zones, without distinguishing between
sovereignty and sovereign rights. Article 13 of the decree also made it clear that foreign
ships operating in Vietnamese maritime zones must not ―conduct acts prejudicial to the
68
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defence of the peace, security or good order of the SRVN, or carry out propaganda
against the SRVN.‖72 With the entering into force of the Law of the Sea of Vietnam in
2013, Vietnam‘s position on the contiguous zone has changed to be consistent with the
provisions of the LOSC.73 Regarding the navigation regime in the EEZ, the Law of the
Sea of Vietnam states that:
The State of Vietnam respects freedom of navigation and overflight, the right to lay
submarine cables and pipelines and lawful uses of the sea by other States in Vietnam‘s
exclusive economic zone in accordance with this Law and treaties to which the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam is a contracting party, provided that those operations are not
detrimental to the sovereign rights, jurisdiction and national maritime interests of
Vietnam.74

As the LOSC grants the coastal States with specific rights and jurisdiction
within their EEZs, the addition of ―national maritime interests‖ in this article is
considered inconsistent with the LOSC EEZ provisions. There is no article specifically
addressing military activities in Vietnam‘s EEZ. Therefore, it would appear that as long
as these activities are considered to be ―lawful uses of the sea‖, they are permitted. In
practice, there have been no incidents regarding foreign military activities in Vietnam‘s
EEZ. However, during the maritime standoff between China and Vietnam in 2014 in
relation to the drilling of a Chinese oil rig in Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ, many
confrontations occurred between sovereign immune vessels and aircraft of the two
States.75
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6.2.4

Indonesia
On 21 March 1980, Indonesia issued the Declaration by the Government of

Indonesia concerning the Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia (1980 Declaration),
which stated that the breadth of Indonesia‘s EEZ extends 200 nautical miles from the
baselines from which its territorial sea is measured.76 Article 4 of this Declaration
provides that:
In the Exclusive Economic Zone of Indonesia, the freedoms of navigation and
overflight and of the laying of sub-marine cables and pipelines will continue to be
recognized in accordance with the principles of the new international law of the sea.77

After the LOSC was opened for signature in December 1982, Indonesia passed
Act No. 5 of 1983 on the Indonesian exclusive economic zone of 18 October 1983(Act
No. 5) in order ―to provide a solid basis for the exercise of the sovereign right, other
rights, jurisdiction and duties within the exclusive economic zone.‖78 This Act
reaffirmed that the breadth of the State‘s EEZ is 200 nautical miles measured from its
baselines.79 Regarding the navigation regime, article 4(3) states that:
Within the Indonesian exclusive economic zone, the freedom of international navigation
and overflight, as well as the freedom of laying submarine cables and pipelines, shall be
respected in accordance with the principles of the international law of the sea.80

This article repeats verbatim article 4 of the 1980 Declaration. Not a single
provision of the act mentions the passage of warships or aircraft in Indonesia‘s EEZ.
However, in 2007, at a meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in Manila,
76
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Indonesia, together with Malaysia, objected to an ARF-proposed military exercise in the
EEZs of the two States.81
In relation to foreign marine scientific research in the EEZ, Indonesia requests
prior consent and imposes conditions.82 Act No. 5 also embraces a very broad definition
of ―scientific research.‖ Article 1(c) defines ―scientific research‖ as ―any activity in
connection with the research on any maritime aspects on the water surface, in the water
column, on the seabed and in the subsoil thereof the sea floor in the Indonesia exclusive
economic zone.‖83
It is unclear whether Indonesia intends on including military activities (such as
hydrographic surveys and military surveys) within the scope of ―scientific research.‖
However, in practice, there have been no incidents involving the passage of military
vessels and aircraft in Indonesia‘s exclusive economic zone.
6.2.5

The Philippines
The Philippines established an exclusive economic zone by virtue of Presidential

Decree No. 1599 of 11 June 1978 (Decree No. 1599), declaring that the State‘s EEZ
―shall extend to a distance of two hundred nautical miles beyond and from the baseline
from which the territorial sea is measured.‖84 Section 4 of the Decree states that:
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Other States shall enjoy in the exclusive economic zone freedoms with respect to
navigation and overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea relating to navigation and communications.85

It is clear that the Philippines respects the freedoms of navigation and overflight
and ―other internationally lawful uses of the sea‖ granted by the LOSC. However, as
mentioned previously, a vast portion of the Philippine EEZ overlaps with the
rectangular area established by the Treaty of Paris (and in respect of which the
Philippines has claimed ―historic territorial waters‖).86 Indeed, in some areas, the
historic territorial sea of the Philippines extends further than its EEZ. 87 Section 2 of the
Decree affirms that the rights exercisable by the State in its EEZ shall not
―prejudice...the rights of the Republic of the Philippines over its territorial sea‖. 88 In
2009 the Philippines passed a new baselines law in an attempt to bring its maritime
claims into close conformity with the provisions of the LOSC. However, it has neither
amended its Constitution nor formally abandoned its historic maritime claim.89 As a
result, the freedoms of navigation and overflight and ―other internationally lawful uses
of the sea‖ may only apply to a small portion of the EEZ outside the limits established
by the Treaty of Paris.90
Regarding research activities, section 3 of Decree No. 1599 states that ―any
research‖ conducted in the Philippine EEZ shall be approved under authority by the
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Republic of the Philippines.91 However, there is no definition for the term ―research‖ in
this Decree. Therefore, it is not clear whether military activities such as hydrographic
surveys and military surveys fall within the ambit of the term ―research.‖ Upon
signature and ratification to the LOSC, the Philippines made no statement regarding
military activities in its EEZ. And although there are no provisions in the national
legislation of the Philippines restricting foreign military activities in its EEZ, there have
been a number of occasions where the Philippines has opposed foreign military
activities in its EEZ.92 However, in practice, there have been no incidents directly
involving the Philippines regarding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and
aircraft in the Philippine EEZ.
6.2.6

Malaysia
In 1984 Malaysia passed the Exclusive Economic Zone Act (Act No. 311),

declaring an EEZ extending 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the
breath of the territorial sea is measured.93 Act No. 311 does not mention the freedoms of
navigation and overflight in Malaysia‘s EEZ. Regarding research activities in its EEZ,
Malaysia requires its consent for the carrying out of any search, excavation, drilling
operations or marine scientific research.94 There is no provision in Act No. 311 dealing
with foreign military activities. However, upon ratification of the LOSC on 14 October
1996, Malaysia made a declaration stating that:
The Malaysian Government also understands that the provisions of the Convention do
not authorize other States to carry out military exercises or manoeuvres, in particular
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those involving the use of weapons or explosives in the exclusive economic zone
without the consent of the coastal State.95

With this statement, Malaysia made it clear that it does not permit foreign
military activities in its EEZ. As discussed above, the LOSC allows States to make
declarations or statements upon signature, ratification or accession to the Convention,
provided such declarations or statements ―do not purport to exclude or to modify the
legal effect of the provisions of [the] Convention.‖96 Similarly, article 309 of the LOSC
prevents States from making any reservations or exceptions to the Convention ―unless
expressly permitted by other articles of [the] Convention.‖97 According to Hamzah,
―Malaysia views foreign military activities in its EEZ as not only undermining and
threatening its security; it goes against the concept of peaceful uses of the sea, which it
unconditionally supports.‖98 Although the LOSC uses the terms ―peaceful uses‖ and
―peaceful purposes‖, the Convention eschews any definition of these terms. Many
commentators agree that the concept of peaceful uses/purposes used in the LOSC do not
prohibit all military activities, only those which are inconsistent with the UN Charter.99
It is also worth noting that, in relation to the peaceful use of the seas, a 1985 report of
the United Nations Secretary-General on the naval arms race stated that:
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[M]ilitary activities which are consistent with the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations, in particular with Article 2, paragraph 4,
and Article 51, are not prohibited by the Convention on the Law of the Sea.100

Among the littoral States of the South China Sea, only Malaysia has made a
statement regarding military activities in the EEZ. However, Malaysia has not enacted
any domestic legislation to enforce this statement.101 In 2013, when China sent a flotilla
to patrol the area near James Shoal, a reef claimed by Malaysia and located well inside
its mainland claimed EEZ, Malaysia responded only diplomatically, with restraint, to
this incident.102
6.2.7

Brunei
With the passage of the Brunei Darussalam Fishery Limits Act in 1983, Brunei

claimed a fishery limit to 200 miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.103 As Brunei has not yet established its EEZ, there are no
laws or regulations in place concerning the passage of sovereign immune vessels and
aircraft in the EEZ.
6.3

The uncertain EEZ boundary
As discussed above, all littoral States of the South China Sea have claimed an

EEZ extending to 200 nautical miles from the baselines (Brunei has claimed fishery
limits rather than an EEZ). However, the outer limits of the EEZs in this maritime
region remain unclear.104 According to Clive Schofield and Robert Beckman, ―none of
the States bordering the South China Sea have issued official charts or lists of
100
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geographic coordinates showing the outer limit lines of their EEZ.‖105 Indeed, there are
a number of factors which make the delimitation of EEZ boundaries in the South China
Sea a difficult task.
Firstly, the straight baselines declared by a number of coastal States have been
criticised and protested against by other States, while some coastal States have not
defined the baselines from which their other maritime zones are measured. The straight
baselines declared by Vietnam, China and Taiwan have been protested against by the
United States.106 In particular, the straight baselines defined by China around the
Paracel Islands were objected to by Vietnam, the United States and Taiwan. 107 The
archipelagic baselines defined by Indonesia and the Philippines (pursuant to their 2009
baselines law) are considered to be generally consistent with the LOSC,108 while
Malaysia and Brunei have not officially published their baselines. However, it can be
seen from the map contained in the Joint Submission by Malaysia and Vietnam to the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in 2009 that straight
baselines have been used by Malaysia.109 (See on the Malaysia-Vietnam CLCS
submission, figure 6.1.)
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Figure 6.1 Vietnam-Malaysia Joint Submission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf2009

Source: Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
Secondly, mid-ocean island maritime zones in the South China Sea remain
unresolved. China has employed straight baselines around the Paracel archipelago, but
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no maritime zones have been generated from these baselines. Meanwhile, ―Vietnam has
not indicated whether it is claiming an EEZ or continental shelf from the Paracel
Islands.‖110 China, Taiwan and the Philippines have all claimed sovereignty over
Scarborough Shoal, but none of them have established baselines around this Shoal. 111 In
the north-eastern part of the South China Sea, China and Taiwan have both claimed
sovereignty over the Pratas Islands, despite Taiwan exercising full control over this
feature. Taiwan claims an EEZ around its main island and also an EEZ around the
group, with the latter extending 200 nautical miles from the baselines.112 The EEZ
claimed by Taiwan overlaps with the EEZ claimed by the Philippines in the area of the
Luzon Strait.113 However, as the Philippines officially recognises a ―one China‖ policy,
it is highly unlikely that an EEZ boundary delimitation will be reached between Taiwan
and the Philippines in this maritime area.114 Unlike the Paracels, no baselines have been
defined around the Spratlys. Littoral States have different views on whether some
features of the Spratlys can be classified as islands which can generate their own EEZs
in accordance with article 121 of the LOSC.115 In 2009, Vietnam and Malaysia made a
joint submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, but neither State claimed an EEZ from any of the Spratly Islands. 116 However, in
a Note Verbale submitted to the UN Secretary-General on 14 April 2011, China stated
that the Spratly Islands ―are fully entitled to a territorial sea, exclusive economic zone
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and continental shelf.‖117 According to Clive Schofield, if the 200 nautical mile limit of
the EEZ is constructed from straight baselines and archipelagic baselines of littoral
States, then there exists a small high seas pocket in the centre part of the South China
Sea. However, if the disputed islands of the South China Sea can generate their own
EEZs, then no high seas pocket will exist in this maritime region. 118 It is worth noting
that the arbitral tribunal, in its final award in the South China Sea Arbitration, held that
all the high-tide features in the Spratly Islands ―do not generate entitlements to an
exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.‖119
Thirdly, the so–called ―nine-dash line‖ map claimed by China has created
ambiguity and confusion when identifying maritime boundaries in the South China Sea.
As discussed above, China has not officially declared what it claims within the ninedash line (which encompasses about 80 percent of the ocean space in the South China
Sea). According to Beckman, ―it is not possible to identify the overlapping claim areas
in the South China Sea‖ until China clarifies its claim.120 If China claims sovereignty
over all offshore features within the nine-dash line, as well as the associated maritime
zones which can be generated from these features under the LOSC, then, putting to one
side disputed sovereignty claims with other littoral States over these offshore features,
its claim would appear to be consistent with international law. However, if China claims
sovereignty or sovereign rights over all waters and offshore features within the ninedash line, then a feasible solution to maritime boundary delimitation in the South China
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Sea would be almost impossible.121 Fortunately, as discussed above, the arbitral tribunal
has already ruled that the nine-dash line claimed by China has no legal basis. As the
arbitral tribunal‘s award is legally binding (despite China‘s rejection of it), the ninedash line claimed by China should be ignored in any future negotiation regarding
maritime delimitation in the South China Sea where China is a party. However, ignoring
the nine-dash line, many offshore features of the South China Sea have been claimed
and occupied by other States. As sovereignty disputes over these features are unlikely to
be resolved, maritime delimitation involving these features is unlikely to be achieved
anytime soon.
In summary, the remaining disputes over sovereignty claims to offshore islands
between coastal States together with the different perspectives between China and other
littoral States over maritime zones that may be generated from these offshore islands
will remain and are unlikely to be resolved. If China respects international law and the
arbitral tribunal‘s rulings, then the disputed maritime areas in the South China Sea will
be narrowed down. However, it has appeared that this might not be the case. The
uncertain nature of the remaining EEZ boundary, together with the variations which
exist in the implementation of the LOSC‘s EEZ regime by coastal States, renders
jurisdictional rights over this maritime zone even more ambiguous.
6.4

Future prospects
It is clear that maritime boundaries in the South China Sea remain uncertain and

difficult to resolve. While other littoral States have sought to bring their maritime
claims into conformity with the LOSC, China continues to claim its maritime zones
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based not just upon the LOSC but also upon historical grounds. 122 Some authors have
argued that as each of the coastal States in the region claim areas that are immediately
contiguous to their territorial seas, their conflicting claims could be harmonized.
However, as ―China claims the entirety of the South China Sea...there is no possibility
of compromise with [its] position, since it is all or nothing.‖123 The LOSC makes it clear
that all disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the provisions of the
LOSC shall be submitted to the court or tribunal having jurisdiction under Section 2,
Part XV of the Convention.124 According to article 287 of the LOSC, when signing,
ratifying or acceding to this Convention, States are free to choose one or more of four
methods for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention, including adjudication before the International Court of Justice (ICJ);
adjudication before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS);
arbitration under an arbitral tribunal in accordance with Annex VII of the LOSC; or
arbitration under a special arbitral tribunal in accordance with Annex VIII of the
LOSC.125 However, none of the claimant States in the South China Sea have made a
selection pursuant to article 287 of the LOSC.126 Moreover, upon ratification of the
LOSC in 1996, China made the following Declaration under article 298 of the
Convention: ―The Government of the People's Republic of China does not accept any of
the procedures provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to
all the categories of disputes referred to in paragraph 1(a)(b) and (c) of Article 298 of
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the Convention.‖127 This means that China has opted out of the compulsory dispute
settlement regime of the LOSC concerning maritime boundary delimitation; historic
bays or titles; military activities and law enforcement activities; and disputes in respect
of which the Security Council of the United Nations is exercising the functions assigned
to it.128
The issue of the EEZ regime is separate from the issue of maritime boundary
delimitation. This is because even if all the territorial disputes in the South China Sea
were resolved, States could continue to implement the EEZ regime of the LOSC
differently, especially with regard to foreign military activities.129
As at 23 September 2016, 168 States and entities have ratified or acceded to the
LOSC, and only a minority of States (30 in total) continue to exercise some form of
extra-sovereign control over their EEZs which might infringe foreign military
activities.130 Within the South China Sea region, only Malaysia has made a formal
statement restricting foreign military activities in its EEZ. Even so, it has not enacted
any domestic legislation on this issue. As discussed above, China grants foreign States
the freedoms of navigation and overflight in its EEZ, but this does not include ―the
freedoms to conduct military and reconnaissance activities, to perform military
deterrence or battlefield preparation or intelligence gathering.‖131 China is the only
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littoral State to have challenged foreign military activities in its EEZ, particularly those
activities conducted by the United States. As China transitions to become a significant
naval power, its naval vessels and aircraft will transit across the oceans. Therefore, for
the security and safety of navigation, China will need to conduct military activities of
some kind in the EEZ of other States. Indeed, the Chinese navy recently conducted a
number of intelligence collection activities in foreign EEZs.132 Some legal
commentators are of the opinion that China might change its position on foreign
military activities in the EEZ of other States.133 However, based on recent incidents
between the United States and China in the South China Sea, it seems that even if China
increases its military operations in foreign EEZs, it will continue to try to restrict
foreign military activities in its own EEZ.134 Other littoral States have actively sought to
bring their domestic legislation into close conformity with the LOSC. Nevertheless,
none of them have officially supported or restricted foreign military activities in their
EEZ.
6.5

Conclusion
All littoral States of the South China Sea have enacted laws and regulations to

implement the LOSC EEZ regime. However, in practice, these States have different
interpretations, particularly those pertaining to the freedoms of navigation and
overflight of foreign military vessels and aircraft. The table below summarises the
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practice of South China Sea littoral States in relation to foreign military activities in the
EEZ.
Table 6.1 The Practice of South China Sea Littoral States in relation to Foreign Military
Activities in the EEZ
Name of State
State Practice
Brunei

Current domestic regulations do not mention foreign military
activities in its EEZ.

China

Restricts foreign military activities in its EEZ.

Indonesia

Current domestic regulations do not restrict foreign military
activities in the EEZ, but on a few occasions Indonesia has
objected to foreign military activities in this zone.

Malaysia

Consent required for foreign military activities in the EEZ.

The Philippines

Current domestic regulations do not restrict foreign military
activities in the EEZ, but on a few occasions the Philippines
has objected to foreign military activities in this zone.

Taiwan

Current domestic regulations do not mention foreign military
activities in its EEZ.

Vietnam

Current domestic regulations do not mention foreign military
activities in its EEZ.

In order to promote stable, secure and safe navigation in the South China Sea,
States should seek to not only respect international law, harmonise their domestic laws
and regulations with international law provisions (and particularly those of the LOSC),
but also cooperate with each other regarding the freedoms of navigation and overflight
in this region. However, as States have interpreted the LOSC differently, the domestic
legislation and practices of individual States are far from uniform. As a result, and due
to strategic tensions outlined in Chapters Two and Three, there have been a number of
incidents involving a variety of dangerous manoeuvres of sovereign immune vessels
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and aircraft at sea, within the EEZs claimed by coastal States. The next chapter will
analyse incidents in and over the South China Sea in greater depth.
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7 INCIDENTS INVOLVING SOUTH CHINA SEA LITTORAL STATES
7.1

Introduction
Throughout the development of the international law of the sea, the freedom of

navigation enjoyed by foreign States, and the jurisdiction of coastal States in maritime
areas adjacent to their coastlines, have been the subject of international negotiations and
debate.1 After centuries of evaluation, compromises were made to balance the divergent
interests of States, with these compromises being codified in the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 (LOSC).2 However, as discussed in previous
chapters, States have implemented the provisions of the LOSC differently, particularly
those provisions regarding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in and
over the territorial seas and the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of coastal States.
Indeed, such inconsistencies have marred other international law instruments, including
the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs)3 and the
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)4. As a result, there
have been a number of incidents at sea involving vessels and aircraft of South China
Sea littoral States. This chapter will analyse selected incidents, as well as provide a table
of all well-known incidents which have occurred in the territorial seas and claimed
EEZs of South China Sea littoral States in recent years. By analysing incidents which
have occurred both within the South China Sea and outside the South China Sea but
involving South China Sea littoral States, this chapter will explore the difficulties in
implementing the navigational regime of the LOSC, as well as the lack of uniformity in
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the way States observe other international laws and regulations regarding the navigation
and overflight of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft.
7.2

Incidents involving the passage of sovereign immune vessels in the territorial
sea
As discussed in Chapter five, incidents involving the passage of foreign vessels

in the territorial sea of coastal States have become commonplace due to the divergence
in State practice. Since the entry into force of the LOSC, there has been a dearth of case
law involving the innocent passage of warships. However, there have been a number of
incidents reflecting the practice of South China Sea littoral States that are critically
analysed in this section.
7.2.1

The ―ANZAC Day incident‖
On 17 April 2001, a flotilla of three Australian warships, including two frigates

and a supply ship, were traversing through the Taiwan Strait when it was challenged by
a Chinese warship.5 The Chinese captain radioed to request the flotilla leave the Taiwan
Strait because it was breaching Chinese laws and intruding into China's territorial sea
without prior authorisation.6 However, the flotilla ignored the warning and continued to
sail through the strait without changing course.7 China then raised an official protest
with the Australian Embassy in Beijing over the incident.8 In response, a spokesman
from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade stated: ―Our position is
[that] our ships were exercising their rights under the international law of the sea which
provides that foreign vessels can pass through another country's territorial waters, under
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the right of innocent passage, as it's described.‖9 Australia‘s Prime Minister at the time,
John Howard, asserted that there had been a ―long-standing difference‖ between China
and other States on the interpretation of the right of innocent passage. However, he
noted that the passage of Australian warships on this occasion was legal and entirely in
accordance with international law.10 The incident did not pose a serious problem for the
bilateral relationship between China and Australia, as any residual tension was diffused
through constructive dialogue.11 However, it appears that differences in State practice
between China and Australia regarding the innocent passage of warships continue to
exist.
Indeed, this incident raises the question of whether foreign warships have the
right of innocent passage in the Chinese territorial sea, and particularly in the Taiwan
Strait.12 To address this question, the status of the Taiwan Strait and the right of
innocent passage as it applies to warships will be analysed.
The Taiwan Strait is a vital international shipping route connecting the East
China Sea and the South China Sea. More than 170 nautical miles long, the Strait varies
in width from 93 nautical miles to 116 nautical miles, with an average depth of around
of 60 metres.13 The LOSC defines a ―strait used for international navigation‖ as a strait
which is ―used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an
exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone.‖14 However, ―if there exists through the strait a route through the high seas or
through an exclusive economic zone of similar convenience with respect to navigational
9
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and hydrographical characteristics‖, then the provisions of the LOSC applicable to a
―strait used for international navigation‖ do not apply to the strait.15 The Taiwan Strait
falls within this exception as there is an existing EEZ corridor within the strait. 16 As a
result, the LOSC transit passage regime does not apply to the Taiwan Strait.17 In this
case, ships and aircraft transiting through the EEZ corridor of the Taiwan Strait enjoy
the freedoms of navigation and overflight. However, within the bordering territorial seas
of China and Taiwan, ships enjoy only the right of innocent passage, while aircraft have
no such right.18
With regard to the Anzac Day incident, as the three Australian warships were
passing through China‘s territorial sea within the Taiwan Strait, the innocent passage
regime of the LOSC applied to them. The LOSC stipulates that ―ships of all States,
whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the
territorial sea.‖19 However, as discussed in Chapter Five, States interpret this provision
differently. While Australia applies a ―rigid application of what LOSC expressly
includes‖, a number of States (including China) require prior authorisation for the
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passage of foreign warships through their territorial seas.20 The Law of the People‘s
Republic of China Concerning the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone 1992
(China‘s Territorial Sea Law) states that in order to enter the territorial sea of the
People's Republic of China, ―foreign military ships must obtain permission from the
Government of the People's Republic of China.‖21 Although this prior approval
requirement is inconsistent with the LOSC, China‘s domestic legislation nonetheless
prescribes it.22 Currently, there is no evidence suggesting that China intends on revising
its domestic law regarding the innocent passage of foreign warships in its territorial sea.
As the LOSC does not contain any provisions directly addressing the passage of
warships in the territorial sea of coastal States, and is silent on the requirement for prior
notification or authorisation, it is understandable that States will adopt conflicting
interpretations in accordance with their own strategic objectives.
The Anzac Day incident occurred just two weeks after the EP-3 incident which
involved a collision between a Chinese naval F-8II fighter jet and a U.S. Navy EP-3
reconnaissance plane in the airspace above China‘s claimed EEZ. The collision resulted
in the death of a Chinese pilot and forced the EP-3 to make an emergency landing on
Hainan Island. For Zou Keyuan, the timing of the Anzac Day incident clearly indicated
that ―Australia...support[ed]...its American ally by sending altogether three of its
warships through China‘s territorial sea.‖23 Keyuan has also expressed the view that
good intentions are an important factor when exercising the right of innocent passage,
adding that ―the timing and number of warships was provocative and showed no good
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intentions from the Australian side.‖24 This suggests that China‘s protest over the
incident was ―inherently political rather than simply legal.‖25 Fortunately, the incident
was handled peacefully through diplomatic representations and discussions. Sam Blay
has observed that this incident highlights ―the unique relationship between politics and
law in international discourse.‖26 Even though China and Australia have different legal
positions on innocent passage, the bilateral relationship between the two States ―appears
well insulated.‖27 However, Blay has conceded that ―one can hardly overlook the
potential for such disagreements to degenerate into major incidents and conflicts.‖28
The Anzac Day incident highlights the uncertainties which still exist in the
LOSC regarding the innocent passage of warships. As discussed in Chapter Four,
warships are included in the term ―ships of all states‖ under Article 17, and therefore
have the right of innocent passage in the territorial sea of a coastal State. As the
provisions relating to innocent passage in China‘s Territorial Sea Law impose
restrictions on the passage of warships – restrictions which do not conform to the LOSC
– incidents involving such vessels will likely continue to take place in the future.
7.2.2

The ―Han incident‖ 2004
In the early morning of November 10, 2004, a Chinese Han-class nuclear-

powered submarine, on its return to Meigezhuang Naval Base from its operating area in
the Philippine Sea, passed submerged through the territorial sea of Japan in the Ishigaki
Strait for almost two hours before leaving the Strait.29 The Japanese Maritime SelfDefence Force (JMSDF) had passively tracked the submarine well before it entered
24
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Japanese waters, but when the submarine crossed into Japan‘s territorial sea, a Japanese
aircraft began using active sonar to track the submarine, expressly warning the
submarine that it was being tracked.30 However, the submarine ignored the warning and
continued submerged through the strait.31 As a result of this intrusion, the JMSDF was
put on alert under a special (high-level) security order by Defense Agency Director
General Yoshinori Ono for only the second time since the end of World War II. 32 The
JMSDF continued tracking the submarine until it was well beyond the Japanese
coastline.33 Japan then confirmed the submarine was a Chinese nuclear-powered
submarine and lodged a protest, demanding an official apology from China. Six days
later, China formally responded to the incident, confirming that the submarine was a
Chinese Han-class nuclear-powered submarine. China did not apologise for the
intrusion, but rather expressed regret that the submarine had entered Japan‘s Ishigaki
Channel for ―technical reasons‖.34 Japan quickly interpreted this as an apology from
China in order to diffuse political tensions.35
The incident highlights a number of international legal implications regarding
the passage of foreign submarines in the territorial sea of coastal States, as well as the
diverging interpretations of the LOSC adopted by coastal and maritime States.
The Ishigaki Strait lies between Japan‘s Ishigaki and Tarama Islands. It has a
breath of approximately 18 nautical miles and connects two parts of Japan‘s EEZ.36
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Under the LOSC, foreign submarines exercising innocent passage in the territorial sea
are required to navigate on the surface and show their flag.37 However, if there exists a
strait used for international navigation between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and
another part of the high seas or an EEZ, and that strait overlaps with the territorial sea of
a coastal State (the breadth of this type of strait is usually less than 24 nautical miles),
then all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage. 38 Under the transit passage
regime of the LOSC, ships and aircraft may transit in their ―normal modes‖, which
means that submarines may pass through the strait submerged. 39 According to Japan‘s
Territorial Sea Law, ―the territorial sea of Japan comprises the areas of the sea
extending from the baseline to the line 12 nautical miles seaward thereof‖, but excludes
the five key straits of the Sya Kaikyo, the Tugaru Kaiky, the Tusima Kaiky Higasi Suid,
the Tusima Kaiky Nisi Suid and the Osumi Kaiky.40 In these five straits, Japan only
claims a 3 nautical mile territorial sea limit, thereby leaving a sea corridor in each strait.
Indeed, this suggests that Japan considers the five straits to be straits ―used for
international navigation‖, and thus straits to which the transit passage regime applies.
However, by leaving a sea corridor in each strait, Japan avoids granting transit passage
rights to foreign ships and aircraft under the LOSC.
Major maritime powers, particularly the United States, do not accept Japan‘s
claim that there are only five straits ―used for international navigation‖ through
Japanese waters. According to the United States, the transit passage regime applies to
every strait that encloses the territorial sea and is capable of navigation between two
37
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parts of the high seas freedoms.41 China, on the other hand, has a restrictive view on
transit passage rights. During the Third International Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III), China expressed its support for strait States enforcing their control over
straits used for international navigation.42 In 1973, China submitted its Working Paper
on Sea Area within the Limits of National Jurisdiction to the UN Seabed SubCommittee, stating that ―[a] strait lying within the territorial sea, whether or not it is
frequently used for international navigation, forms an inseparable part of the territorial
sea of the coastal State.‖43 This suggests that China ―favoured a regime of innocent
passage for straits used for international navigation.‖44 When the LOSC was adopted,
China made no statements or declarations. However, upon ratification of the LOSC,
China made a Statement to the effect that it reserves the right to request foreign
warships passing through its territorial sea to obtain advance authorisation or give prior
notification.45 Interestingly, the Statement does not mention the regime of transit
passage. According to Zou Keyuan, the reason for this is that there is no ―strait used for
international navigation‖ in China‘s territorial sea.‖46 Nevertheless, China, like Japan,
has adopted a restrictive approach when defining the phrase ―straits used for
international navigation.‖ Indeed, an official People‘s Liberation Army (PLA)
publication on international law expresses the view that transit passage rights only apply
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to straits which ―straddle important international sea lanes‖ and which have ―important
implications for the national interests of certain countries.‖47
Japan claims a 12 nautical mile territorial sea in the Ishigaki Strait, but does not
categorise this strait as a ―strait used for international navigation.‖ As a result, Japan
applies the innocent passage regime in the Ishigaki Strait. Therefore, according to
Japan, the submerged passage of a Chinese Han-class submarine through the Ishigaki
Strait violated Japan‘s sovereignty. As a result of this intrusion, the JMSDF used
destroyers and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) aircraft to track the submarine for more
than two hours, with the surveillance continuing until the submarine was well beyond
the Japanese coastline.48 As China did not argue that its submarine transited submerged
through the Ishigaki Strait in ―normal mode‖, it may be assumed that China has the
same view as Japan – that is, that the Ishigaki Strait is not a ―strait used for international
navigation‖, and thus not a strait to which transit passage rights apply. Only if the
Ishigaki Strait is not a ―strait used for international navigation‖, would the submerged
passage of the Chinese submarine through the territorial sea of Japan be clearly
inconsistent with article 20 of the LOSC. For Miyoshi Masahiro, China‘s unwillingness
to issue a formal apology for the intrusion means that it failed to carry out its State
responsibility under international law.49
Another implication of China only expressing regret over the Han incident is
that it demonstrates that China is resisting a wide interpretation of ―straits used for
international navigation‖. Indeed, even though China may be transitioning to a maritime
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power with a blue water navy, it still adheres to a restrictive view on the passage of
foreign warships through its coastal waters.50
As China did not use the Han incident to embrace a more expansive
interpretation of transit passage rights, what did it seek to accomplish by sending a
submerged submarine through Japan‘s territorial sea? This question is particularly
pertinent if one considers that Han-class submarines are fairly noisy and easily detected.
China explained that the incident occurred due to technical reasons, and Japan officially
accepted this explanation. However, after examining the waters of the Ishigaki Strait, as
well as the actual voyage of the submarine through the Ishigaki Strait, Peter Dutton has
opined that China‘s explanation for the intrusion was just ―a face-saving cover.‖51
Indeed, Dutton has suggested several possible reasons for the intrusion, including a
covert mapping exercise, a demonstration of China‘s sea power, or perhaps even an
opportunity to test the anti-submarine warfare capability of the JMSDF.52 Whatever the
reason(s), the submerged passage of a Chinese submarine through Japan‘s territorial sea
undercuts China‘s restrictive and long-held position on the passage of foreign warships
in the waters adjacent to coastal States.53 Japan, on the other hand, acted quickly to
demand an official apology from China, thereby strengthening its restrictive definition
of ―straits used for international navigation‖, as well as to demonstrate its willingness to
use military power to protect its national security and interests.54
Suffice to say, the incident spurred mutual distrust between the two States. The
Japane Defense Agency expressed the view that the ―intrusion of a Chinese submarine
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into Japan‘s territorial waters was a highly provocative act by the Chinese Navy.‖55
Even though the incident did not lead to military confrontation, it did increase Japan‘s
growing suspicion of China‘s intentions and objectives in the region, and led to Japan
adopting a tougher political stance against China.56
The 2004 ―Han-incident‖ reveals the divergent interpretations of international
law which States often adopt, as well as the communication difficulties experienced by
States when discussing security incidents. The incident also highlights that the covert
nature of submarine operations, hence, some States would prefer their submarines to
transit submerged (provided navigational conditions allow for this). However, as
unidentified submarines detected in the territorial sea could be considered a security
threat by coastal States, serious consequences could stem from situations which are not
well-managed. Therefore, better communication, including military exchanges and
dialogue among armed forces operating in sensitive areas, is necessary in order to avoid
small incidents triggering a crisis.57
7.3

Incidents involving the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in
the EEZ
As discussed in previous chapters, within the EEZ all vessels and aircraft enjoy

the freedoms of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines, and ―other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms,
such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft [etc].‖58 However, in
practice, States have different interpretations of the LOSC EEZ regime. One of the more
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controversial issues is foreign military activities in the EEZ. Some coastal States want
to restrict activities of foreign military vessels and aircraft in their EEZ, while maritime
user States consider military activities to be part of the freedoms of navigation and
overflight granted by the LOSC. Apart from disputes over military activities in the EEZ,
the disregard of international instruments such as COLREGs and the Chicago
Convention by sovereign immune vessels and aircraft has resulted in incidents
involving South China Sea littoral States. This section will analyse a number of
incidents which have occurred in the EEZs of coastal States in order to highlight
uncertainties and gaps in international law concerning the passage rights of sovereign
immune vessels and aircraft in the EEZ.
7.3.1

The EP-3 incident
On 1 April 2001, a Chinese F-8 fighter jet collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3

surveillance aircraft in the South China Sea.59 The incident occurred approximately 70
nautical miles off the coast of China‘s Hainan Island, in the airspace above China‘s
claimed EEZ.60 The incident resulted in the Chinese F-8 fighter jet crashing into the sea,
killing the pilot on board.61 The EP-3 was seriously damaged and was forced to make an
emergency landing on Hainan Island.62 Upon landing, all 24 crew members were taken
into custody and the EP-3 was examined by the Chinese.63 A ―solemn representation
and protest‖ was lodged by China‘s Foreign Ministry against the United States
government on April 1 in relation to the collision, and a further protest was lodged on

59

Shirley A Kan, 'China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy
Implications' (Congressional Research Service, October 2001), 1.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Margaret K. Lewis, 'An Analysis of State Responsibility for the Chinese-American Airplane Collision
Incident' (2002) 77 New York University Law Review 1404, 1409.

237

April 2 alleging infringement by the United States of China's sovereignty and airspace.64
China‘s Foreign Ministry Spokesman at the time, Zhu Bangzao, argued that the
surveillance flight went far beyond the scope of EEZ overflight permitted under
international law, amounting to an abuse of the principle of overflight freedom.65
Bangzao added that the U.S. plane had violated international flight rules causing the
crash, and thus the United States should bear full responsibility for the incident. He
further asserted that by entering China's territorial airspace and landing at a Chinese
airport without China's approval, the EP-3 had violated both international law and
Chinese domestic laws, forfeiting the sovereign immunity which may otherwise have
attached to the military aircraft.66 Following the incident, China‘s then-President, Jiang
Zemin, made a public statement demanding the United States accept full responsibility
for the collision, apologise for the incident, and cease its reconnaissance flights in the
airspace close to China‘s coast.67 In response to China‘s demands and protests, the
United States contended that the crash was caused by the F-8 pilot flying in a risky
manner. Even so, the United States said that it was sorry for the loss of the Chinese pilot
and aircraft, and for the EP-3 entering China‘s airspace and landing on Hainan Island
without verbal clearance.68 However, the United States also asserted that the EP-3
aircraft made an ―emergency landing after following international emergency
procedures.‖69 Despite the United States saying ―sorry‖, it is clear they did not accept
legal responsibility for the incident. On a CBS talk show on April 8, 2001, U.S.
Secretary of State Colin Powell declared that ―we‘ve expressed sorrow for it, and we‘re
64
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sorry that that happened, but it can‘t be seen as an apology, accepting responsibility.‖70
He also added that ―our reconnaissance flights, when we fly them, how we will fly them
in international air space over international waters will be something that the United
States government will decide.‖71
After 11 days of exchanging views through diplomatic and political channels, all
crew members aboard the EP-3 aircraft were released. However, it took three months
for the disassembled EP-3 to be returned to the United States.72 China requested $1
million for costs associated with the incident, but the U.S. Department of Defense
offered a ―non—negotiable‖ amount of

$34,567.00 as a ―fair figure for services

rendered and assistance in taking care of the aircrew and some of the materials and
contracts, and what not, to remove the EP-3 itself.‖73
As China and the United States blamed each other for the violation of
international law, no negotiated agreement was reached. The incident was not brought
before any court or tribunal, nor did it lead to further deterioration in the bilateral
relationship between the two States.
The incident reveals a number of uncertainties in international law, including: (i)
the types of military activities that can be carried out by sovereign immune aircraft
above the EEZ of a coastal State; (ii) the rules of the air applicable to military aircraft;
and (iii) the sovereign immune status of military aircraft in cases which call for an
emergency landing on foreign State territory.

70

See Face the Nation Transcript - April 8, 2001 (April 8, 2001) CBS NEWS
<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ftn-transcript-april-8-2001/>.
71
Ibid.
72
Lewis, above n 63, 1410.
73
U.S. Pays China for Spy Plane Incident (August 9, 2001) ABC NEWS
<http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=80651>.

239

Under the LOSC, all foreign aircraft, whether civilian or military, enjoy the
freedoms of overflight and of laying of submarine cables and pipelines, ―and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms‖ over the EEZ of a
coastal State.74 According to Andrew Williams, this implies that ―the right of overflight
is not limited to mere transit over the EEZ but that aircraft may perform operations
previously permitted under international law.‖75 However, in exercising their rights and
performing their duties, foreign military aircraft shall have ―due regard‖ to the rights
and duties of the coastal State.76 Moreover, the LOSC makes it clear that:
In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention, State
Parties shall refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.77

The United States is yet to ratify the Convention. However, as the EEZ now
forms part of customary international law, the LOSC EEZ regime undoubtedly applies
to the United States.78 Indeed, with the exception of deep seabed mining provisions, the
United States Ocean Policy respects LOSC provisions precisely because the Convention
accurately reflects customary international law.79
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With regard to the EP-3 incident, China argued that the EP-3‘s reconnaissance
acts went far beyond the scope of ―overflight‖, thus abusing the freedom of overflight
and causing a serious threat to China's security interests.80 The United States
acknowledged the ―due regard‖ requirement but argued that military surveillance flights
over the EEZ of coastal States are lawful acts under international law.81 China‘s
restrictive view on military activities in the EEZ has been supported by a number of
coastal States, including Brazil, India, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Pakistan.82 However,
other maritime States hold the same view as the United States, including Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.83
As the LOSC does not contain any provisions directly addressing military
activities in the EEZ, it is to be expected that China and the United States will adopt
interpretations which suit their own interests. However, it is important to note that the
sovereign rights of coastal States in the EEZ (as specified in article 56 of the LOSC),
are limited to the ―waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil‖,
and this does not include the airspace above the EEZ. 84 Many authors have argued that
as the airspace above the EEZ is not part of the EEZ, and the LOSC provides no
provisions regarding military activities in this particular zone, all aircraft enjoy the
freedom of overflight (and thus the ability to conduct military aviation activities).85

80

See FM Spokesman Gives Full Account of Air Collision, above n 64.
See The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations (Department of Defense, The United
States, 2007), 2-12. The Handbook provides that ―military aircraft may engage in flight operations,
including ordnance testing and firing, surveillance and intelligence gathering, and support of other naval
activities. All such activities must be conducted with due regard for the rights of other nations and the
safety of other aircraft and of vessels.‖
82
See Declarations and Statements ( 29 October 2013) Oceans and the Law of the Sea
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm>.
83
Ibid.
84
LOSC, art 56; see also Raul Pedrozo, 'Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The Right to
Conduct Military Activities in China‘s Exclusive Economic Zone' (2010) 9(1) Chinese Journal of
International Law 9, 12.
85
See Chris Rahman and Martin Tsamenyi, 'A Strategic Perspective on Security and Naval Issues in the
South China Sea' (2010) 41(4) Ocean Development & International Law 315, 325; Pedrozo, above n 84,
81

241

Moreover, as China has been conducting a number of surveillance activities in the EEZs
of other States, including the U.S. EEZs around Guam and Hawaii, it is doubtful
whether China‘s practice is consistent with its restrictive views on foreign military
activities in its own EEZ.86
Regarding the collision, China and the United States agreed that China has the
right to monitor the operations of aircraft over its EEZ, but they blamed each other for
the risky manoeuvres of each other‘s pilots. According to China, ―the United States
plane suddenly veered at a wide angle toward the Chinese plane‖, and ―by veering and
ramming the Chinese jet at a wide angle, against flight rules, the U.S. surveillance plane
caused the crash of the Chinese jet.‖87 The U.S. countered this accusation by saying that
the EP-3 ―was on auto-pilot, and did not deviate from a straight and level path until it
had been hit by the Chinese fighter aircraft.‖88 In addition, the United States contended
that the F-8 made two aggressive passes within three to five feet of the EP-3, and that it
was on the third pass that the F-8 approached ―too fast and closed on the EP-3‖, thus
causing the collision.89
Given the differing accounts of the collision and the lack of an impartial
observer, it is impossible to definitively conclude which State was at fault.90 However,
it is important to note that all aircraft must operate with ―due regard‖ for the safety of
other aircraft. The Chicago Convention, which has been signed and ratified by both the
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United States and China, prescribes that ―[an] aircraft shall not be operated in such
proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.‖91 Unfortunately, the Chicago
Convention contains no provisions regarding the operation of State aircraft, including
military aircraft, beyond the land areas and territorial waters of a coastal State. And
although the Convention requires States to ensure their state aircraft operate with due
regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft, there are no provisions addressing
the interaction between state aircraft in international airspace. 92 The collision thus
reveals a startling gap in international law regarding the rules of the air applicable to
military aircraft in international airspace in times of peace.
In relation to the landing of the EP-3 on Hainan Island, China contended that ―it
was illegal for the U.S. military spy plane to enter China's territorial space and to land at
a Chinese airport without China‘s approval.‖93 Therefore, this act ―constituted an
infringement upon China‘s sovereignty and territorial space.‖94 It is clear that the EP-3
landed on Chinese territory without verbal clearance. However, the United States
explained that the EP-3 aircraft made an ―emergency landing after following
international emergency procedures.‖95 U.S. Secretary of Defense at the time, Donald
Rumsfeld, noted that the EP-3 had made approximately 25 attempts to broadcast
Mayday and distress signals to alert the world and Hainan Island of the collision, but
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that it was unclear whether or not these distress signals had been acknowledged by
China.96
Whether a military aircraft in distress may land on a foreign State‘s territory
without prior authorisation is unclear. Article 3 of the Chicago Convention provides that
―[n]o State aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the territory of another State, or
land thereon without authorization by special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance
with the terms thereof.‖97 In cases of distress, civil aircraft may land on a foreign state‘s
territory without prior authorisation; however, the Chicago Convention contains no
provisions regarding distressed military aircraft.98 There is no international treaty that
grants military aircraft in distress the right to enter the territory of a foreign State
without prior approval. Under the LOSC, all ships in distress, including warships, have
the right to enter a foreign State‘s port for the purpose of rendering assistance without
losing their sovereign immunity.99 Some authors argue that by analogy, military aircraft
should have the right to land on foreign territory when necessitated by distress. 100
However, other authors take the view that military aircraft do not have the right to make
emergency landings in a foreign State without permission.101 State practice regarding
this issue appears to support the United States perspective. The United States authorises
emergency landings by foreign military or state aircraft without a clearance procedure
―if, in the opinion of the installation commander, denial of a landing request could
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endanger the safety of the aircraft or its crew.‖102 In 1974, a Soviet AN-24
reconnaissance aircraft made an emergency landing at Gambell Airfield in Alaska. The
United States allowed the aircraft to be refuelled the next day and to depart without the
aircraft or its crewmembers being detained.103 Similarly, in 2015, a Pakistan Air Force
aircraft carrying five military personnel was allowed to make an emergency landing at
Chowdhury Charan Singh airport in India for the purpose of refuelling.104
As the EP-3 incident was resolved without any negotiated agreement and
without the matter being brought before any court or tribunal, it is hard to draw any
conclusion regarding the legal responsibilities and liabilities of each side. However, it is
clear that China and the United States will continue to interpret international law in
ways which suit their own strategic interests. China will continue to apply its restrictive
view on foreign military activities in the EEZ, while the United States will continue to
conduct military activities in other State‘s EEZs by asserting the freedoms of navigation
and overflight granted by customary international law and the LOSC.105
With the inherent ambiguities of the LOSC, as well as the existing international
law gaps regarding the rules of the air applicable to sovereign immune aircraft, similar
incidents to the EP-3 collision may occur in the future. In order to avoid such incidents,
States should work together to produce an agreement on the interpretation of the LOSC
in this area, as well as devise pragmatic measures for the safe overflight of sovereign
immune aircraft at sea.
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7.3.2

The Impeccable incident
On 8 March, 2009, a U.S. ocean surveillance ship, the USNS Impeccable, was

conducting routine operations in the South China Sea when it was surrounded and
harassed by a collective of five Chinese vessels, including a naval vessel, an
oceanographic patrol vessel, a government fisheries surveillance vessel, and two fishing
trawlers.106 According to the United States, only a day earlier a Chinese naval ship had
―challenged Impeccable via bridge-to-bridge radio broadcast, calling the U.S. vessel‘s
operations illegal and directing it to leave the area or ‗suffer the consequences.‘‖ 107 On
8 March 2009, two Chinese ships manoeuvred within 25 feet of Impeccable and then
intentionally stopped ―directly ahead of [the vessel], forcing Impeccable to conduct an
emergency ―all stop‖ in order to avoid collision.‖108 The incident occurred
approximately 75 nautical miles from the coast of Hainan Island, in China‘s claimed
EEZ. Following the incident, the American Embassy in Beijing lodged an official
protest with the Chinese government, and a Pentagon spokesman made a statement
characterizing China‘s actions as ―unprofessional‖, ―dangerous‖ and as constituting a
―violation(s) under international law to operate with due regard for the rights and safety
of other lawful users of the ocean.‖109 In response to the protest from the United States,
a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, Ma Zhaoxa, propounded that Impeccable had
―conducted activities in China‘s special economic zone in the South China Sea without
China‘s permission‖, describing the claims of the United States as ―gravely in
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contravention of the facts and confus[ing] black and white...they are totally
unacceptable to China.‖110 Ma also added that ―[we] demand that the United States put
an immediate stop to related activities and take effective measures to prevent similar
acts from happening.‖111
On 9 March 2009, White House spokesman Robert Gibbs confirmed that U.S.
Navy ships would ―continue to operate in those international waters, and we expect the
Chinese to observe international law around that.‖112 Indeed, Impeccable returned to the
area the next day to continue its survey work – this time with the escort of a guided
missile destroyer, the USS Chung-Hoon.113
The Impeccable incident led to increased tensions between the United States and
China, with the two States accusing each other of violating international law. 114 The
incident brings to the fore not only the legal question of whether States may conduct
military activities in a foreign State‘s EEZ, but also the safety of maritime navigation
under international law.
The Impeccable is an ocean surveillance ship which directly supports the U.S.
Navy to detect and track undersea threats using both passive and active sonar. 115 After
the incident, the Pentagon protested to China, stating that:
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We believe firmly that what that naval ship was doing in those international waters is
not only fully consistent with international law, it is common practice. And we hope
that the Chinese would behave in a similar way, that is, according to international
law.116

According to the United States, military activities are part of those
internationally lawful uses of the sea associated with the freedom of navigation under
Article 58 of the LOSC. Therefore, ―[c]oastal States do not have a right under
international law to regulate foreign military activities in the EEZ.‖ 117 China, on the
other hand, argued that the activities of the Impeccable in China‘s EEZ took place
―without [their] permission‖ and ―have broken international laws as well as China‘s
laws and regulations.‖118 On 10 March 2009, a press conference was held to elucidate
the specific international and Chinese laws that had been contravened by the Impeccable
incident. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Ma Zhaoxu, stated that:
While answering the questions, I mentioned three laws: UN Convention on the Law of
the Sea, Law of the People‘s Republic of China on the Exclusive Economic Zone and
the Continental Shelf, and Regulations of the People‘s Republic of China on the
Management of Foreign-related Marine Scientific Research.119

Both China and the United States agreed that the incident occurred in China‘s
claimed EEZ; however, as the United States is not a party to the LOSC, its statement
used the term ―international waters‖ rather than EEZ. The United States also substituted
the terms ―international law‖ and ―common practice‖ for ―the LOSC‖. However, as
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discussed above, since the EEZ now forms part of customary international law, it is
clear that the EEZ provisions in the LOSC would apply to the United States.120
According to some authors, military uses of the sea are lawful pursuant to
customary international law, and the LOSC affirms this by confining such activities to
the territorial seas, archipelagic waters, and straits used for international navigation, but
not in the EEZ.121 The United States view is that:
Military activities, such as anchoring, launching and landing of aircraft, operating
military devices, intelligence collection, exercises, ship and aircraft operations and
conducting surveys, are recognized high seas uses that are preserved by Article 58.122

Therefore, the United States was firmly of the view that the activities of the
Impeccable were fully consistent with international law. China, on the other hand, did
not officially refer to any specific provisions of the LOSC to support its position
regarding the Impeccable incident. However, some Chinese scholars have proffered an
explanation for China‘s position based on certain provisions of the LOSC. Ji Guoxing
proposed that the military survey activities conducted by the Impeccable in China‘s
EEZ ―violated the fundamental principle‖ of the LOSC on ―peaceful uses of the sea.‖123
Ji added that the Impeccable was involved in collecting military information, and that
such conduct constituted a threat against China‘s territorial integrity and political
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independence, thus breaching the ―peaceful purposes‖ provision of the LOSC.124 As the
LOSC provides neither a definition nor any criteria for ―peaceful purposes‖, this
argument is hardly convincing. According to Rahman and Tsamenyi, ―no sound
argument can be made in the context of the LOS Convention, or any other international
legal instrument, that peacetime surveillance activities in the EEZ threaten either the
territorial integrity or political independence of any coastal state.‖125 According to Sam
Bateman, as the Impeccable is classified as an ―ocean surveillance vessel‖ and is used
for collecting information for purely military purposes (and thus not marine scientific
research), its activities were not under coastal State jurisdiction but rather formed part of
the freedom of navigation on the high seas – a freedom which under the LOSC extends
to an EEZ.126 Bateman also has expressed the view that ―military uses of the seas are a
recognized right under international law, and it would be difficult for China to sustain
an argument that the activities of these ships posed a direct threat to its national
security.‖127 In support of this view, Stuart Kaye has pointed to the San Remo Manual
on the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea – a document which reflects customary
international law and confirms that armed conflict can take place in the EEZ of a neutral
State. Therefore, it is difficult to assert that military surveillance activities in a foreign
state‘s EEZ are contrary to international law.128
Another viewpoint which supports China‘s position on the Impeccable incident
is that ―military survey activities are completely subsumed under the category of study
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called marine scientific research.‖129 Under the LOSC, marine scientific research in the
EEZ and on the Continental Shelf ―shall be conducted with the consent of the coastal
State.‖130 However, the LOSC does not define the term ―marine scientific research.‖
Zhang Haiwen has argued that there is almost no difference between the scientific
instruments and equipment on board U.S. naval data collection vessels, and those on
board normal marine scientific research vessels, making it is difficult to identify the real
purposes and uses of the collected data.131 Indeed, this has led Zhang to assert that
―marine data collecting activities conducted in the EEZ could be categorized as marine
scientific research which is subject to the jurisdiction of the coastal State.‖132 However,
the United States distinguishes between marine scientific research (which requires
coastal State consent), and hydrographic and military surveys (which come under the
freedom of navigation and do not require the consent of coastal states).133 Other authors
support the U.S. view by arguing that ―if the whole incident arose from China‘s desire
to keep its 200 nautical mile limit clear of foreign warships, then it was acting beyond
its rights at international law.‖134
Apart from the legal debate over the activities conducted by the Impeccable in
China‘s claimed EEZ, the incident raises concerns over the safety of navigation at sea.
Article 94 of the LOSC stipulates that every State shall take necessary measures to
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ensure that ships flying its flag observe the applicable international regulations relating
to the prevention of collisions at sea.135 All sea going vessels, except submarines, are
bound by the rules set out in COLREGs. These Regulations, which are commonly
known as ―the rules of the road‖ or navigation rules, make it clear that the ship‘s
commander must strictly comply with COLREGs and ―the ordinary practice of seamen‖
to avoid a collision.136 In regard to the Impeccable incident, Admiral Timothy Keating
stated that ―[t]he Impeccable incident is certainly a troubling indicator that China,
particularly in the South China Sea, is behaving in an aggressive, troublesome manner
and [is] not willing to abide by acceptable standards of behavior or ‗rules of the
road.‘‖137 The United States became a party to COLREGs on 15 July 1977, while China
became a party on 7 January 1980.138 The COLREGs‘ rules apply to all vessels,
including sovereign immune vessels, ―upon the high seas and in all waters connected
therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.‖139 The COLREGs entered into force before
the LOSC; however, as noted in Chapter Four, the reference to ―all navigable waters
connected to the high seas‖ in COLREGs would clearly include the new EEZ regime.140
With regard to the Impeccable incident, Odom has contended that two of the Chinese
vessels ―unilaterally created a risk of collision with the Impeccable by failing to ‗keep
out of the way‘ and crossing its bow, even though the circumstances gave them ample
opportunity to avoid doing so.‖141 Odom has further proposed that if a collision had
occurred, the Chinese vessels would have been solely responsible, as they had created a
135
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risk-of-collision situation themselves.142 In the aftermath of the incident, the United
States released photos and video footage showing the two Chinese vessels intentionally
stopping ahead of Impeccable. However, China refuted the U.S. accusation, stating that
―[t]he U.S. assertion is flatly inaccurate and unacceptable to China.‖ 143 The incident,
however, raises significant concerns about the safety of maritime navigation,
particularly the extent to which sovereign immune vessels observe the ―rules of the
road‖. The incident also reveals that flag States may be unwilling to enforce the
provisions of COLREGs when an incident involves their own sovereign immune
vessels. The incident also involved China‘s fishing vessels. However, as this type of
―irregular‖ fishing vessels were used to support China‘s maritime claims, it is unlikely
that China will enforce the COLREGs provisions on them.
Unlike the EP-3 incident, the Impeccable incident resulted in neither a collision
nor the loss of life. However, the incident was considered a ―trigger point‖ for the most
serious confrontation between the United States and China since the EP-3 incident in
2001.144 Thankfully the incident did not escalate into a full scale international crisis, but
in the absence of any ruling by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or any other
tribunal, it is difficult to derive from the incident any broadly accepted principle on
military activities in a foreign state‘s EEZ.
With the Impeccable incident taking place eight years after the EP-3 incident, it
is clear that neither the United States nor China intend to change their stance regarding

142

Ibid.
See Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu's Regular Press Conference, above n 118; for more
information on these photos and video footage, see Jonathan G. Odom, 'The "Case" of USNS Impeccable
Versus 5 Chinese Ships: A Close Examination of the Fact, the Evidence, and the Law' in Jon M. Van
Dyke et al (eds), Governing Ocean Resources: New Challenges and Emerging Regimes: A Tribute to
Judge Choon-Ho Park (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013) .
144
See Guoxing, above n 123, 16; see also Anil Dawar, Naval standoff threatens US-China military
relations (13 March 2009) The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/13/us-chinanaval-standoff>.
143

253

military activities in EEZs. Indeed, this ambiguity in international law allows States to
continue adopting conflicting interpretations which suit their own strategic interests. To
avoid similar incidents from occurring in the future, coastal and maritime States should
strive for an international agreement on military activities in the EEZ of foreign States,
as well as ensuring that their vessels respect internationally accepted standards on the
safety of navigation.
7.3.3

Haiyang Shiyou-981 Oil Rig Crisis 2014
On 2 May 2014, the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corporation

(CNOOC) placed the Haiyang Shiyou 981 (HYSY 981) oil rig at 15029‘.58‘‘N;
111012‘06‘‘E to conduct exploratory drilling, with the rig being moved to 15033‘38‘‘N;
111034‘62‘‘E on 27 May 2014.145 Both of these locations lie well within the EEZ and
continental shelf claimed by Vietnam, approximately 130-150 nautical miles off the
Vietnamese coast.146 To support the operation of the rig, China deployed approximately
80 escort vessels to the area, including seven military ships and a number of military
aircraft.147 In response, Vietnam dispatched approximately 30 law enforcement vessels,
including patrol vessels of the Vietnamese Coast Guard and surveillance vessels of the
Fisheries Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. These vessels issued
warnings to the Chinese contingent and demanded that the rig be removed from
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Vietnam‘s EEZ and continental shelf.148 Vietnam also sent Notes Verbales and
communicated with Chinese authorities at various levels more than 30 times with regard
to China‘s provocative placement of the oil rig and its deployment of escort vessels
within Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ. Indeed, Vietnam contended that these actions infringed
Vietnam‘s sovereign rights and jurisdiction, and were in violation of international
law.149 China argued that the oil rig was placed 17 nautical miles from Triton Island
(Đảo Tri Tôn in Vietnamese and Zhongjian Island in Chinese), in the Paracel Island
group (Quần đảo Hoàng Sa in Vietnamese and Xisha Islands in Chinese) and over
which China claims ―indisputable‖ sovereignty.150
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Paracel Islands have been controlled by China
since 1974.151 As China, Taiwan and Vietnam all claim sovereignty over all the Paracel
Islands, one can state with confidence that there is a sovereignty dispute over this
maritime area, thus refuting China‘s claim of ―indisputable‖ sovereignty.
On 5 May 2014, vessels from China‘s Maritime Safety Administration (MSAC)
established a three nautical mile exclusion zone around HYSY 981.152 During this
maritime standoff, Vietnam accused China‘s coast guard ships of aggressively firing
high-powered water cannons at, and intentionally ramming, Vietnamese ships while
Chinese aircraft circled above Vietnamese law enforcement vessels.153 Vietnam later
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released photos and video footage showing the Chinese vessels engaging in such
conduct – conduct which ultimately injured many law enforcement officers and led to
several Vietnamese vessels sustaining damage. As Tuoitrenews reported, by 27 June
2014, the attack had caused damage to 29 Vietnamese marine law enforcement vessels,
seven Vietnamese fishing boats, and resulted in 17 Vietnamese fisheries surveillance
officers sustaining injuries.154 In particular, on 1 June, 2014, China Coast Guard vessel
No. 46105 fired water cannons at, and rammed, Vietnamese Coast Guard vessel
No.2016 12 nautical miles from the oil rig, breaking four holes in the starboard side of
the Vietnamese vessel 40-50 cm above its waterline.155 On 23 June 2014, Vietnamese
fisheries surveillance vessel KN-951 was operating in an area approximately 11 nautical
miles from the rig when it was surrounded by seven Chinese ships, including Chinese
marine surveillance vessels and tug boats. One of the Chinese tug boats, named Bin Hai
285, intentionally rammed the KN-951, causing serious damage to the ship and injuring
two fisheries surveillance officers.156 In the most serious attack, which took place on 26
May 2014, Vietnam state television broadcast a video showing Chinese vessel No.
11209 ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat DNa 90152, which was
conducting normal fishing activity in Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ, approximately 17
nautical miles from the oil rig. The broadcast accused China of not only violating the
prohibition against the use of force under international law, but also of inhumane

(07 May 2014) Thanhnien News <http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/chinese-ships-ramvietnamese-vessels-in-latest-oil-rig-row-officials-26069.html>.
154
See Chinese vessels hit Vietnam's ship twice, injuring 2 officers (24 June 2014) Tuoitrenews
<http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/20552/chinese-vessels-hit-vietnamese-ship-twice-injuring-2-officers>.
155
See Vietnam International press conference on East Sea developments (5 June 2014) Vietnam law
guide <http://vietlaw4u.com/vietnam-international-press-conference-east-sea-developments/>.
156
See Chinese ships damage Vietnamese fisheries surveillance vessel (23 June 2014) Vietnam Breaking
News <http://www.vietnambreakingnews.com/2014/06/chinese-ships-damage-vietnamese-fisheriessurveillance-vessel/>; see also Press release of MFA Vietnam on June 26th 2014 (27 June 2014)
Consulate of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam in New York <http://vietnamconsulateny.org/news/2014/06/press-release-mfa-viet-nam-june-26th-2014>.

256

actions against seafarers.157 China, on the other hand, accused Vietnamese vessels of
deliberately ramming Chinese government ships more than 1400 times.158 However,
unlike Vietnam, China provided neither photos nor video footage to support its
accusation.
The 75-day maritime standoff ended on 16 July 2014, when China decided to
withdraw the drilling rig from the contested area a month ahead of its scheduled move
on 15 August. According to China National Petroleum Corporation, the rig was
removed as it had completed its work earlier than scheduled.159
In a letter from the Permanent Representative of Vietnam to the UN SecretaryGeneral dated 7 May 2014, Vietnam reaffirmed that:
[t]he area where the oil rig HYSY 981 and other Chinese protection vessels are
operating lies entirely within the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of
Vietnam; and the operation of the oil rig HYSY 981 and other Chinese protection
vessels seriously infringes upon Vietnam‘s sovereignty, sovereign rights and
jurisdiction as enshrined under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
1982, [and] violates the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea of
2002...160
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the UN Secretary-General, China argued that oil rig HYSY 981 was located 17 nautical
miles from Zhongjian island (Triton island) of the Xisha Islands (Paracel Islands) which
are ―an inherent part of China‘s territory, over which there is no dispute.‖161 China also
urged Vietnam to ―respect China‘s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction,
immediately stop all forms of disruption of the Chinese operation and withdraw all
vessels and personnel from the site.‖162
To properly assess this incident, there are three main legal questions that need to
be answered. Firstly, was the oil rig located in disputed waters? Secondly, if so, did
China violate international law and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea of 2002 (DOC) by placing the oil rig in such waters? And lastly, did
the activities of the Chinese vessels contravene international law?
In relation to the first question, it is clear that both Vietnam and China provided
evidence (by way of letters to the UN Secretary-General) to support their sovereignty
claims over the Paracel Islands. While Vietnam conceded that the area has long been the
subject of a sovereignty dispute, China maintained that no such dispute exists. The
purpose of this section is not to determine which country has the stronger legal
argument regarding sovereignty claims over the Paracel Islands. Indeed, it suffices to
say that many governments, academics and legal experts accept that these islands are
the subject of overlapping claims.163 China‘s claim that the oil rig was placed 17
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nautical miles from Triton Island in the Paracels (i.e., within the contiguous zone
generated from Triton Island) is also questionable. Triton Island is 1.2 km2 of sand and
coral cay and cannot ―sustain human habitation or [an] economic life‖ of its own.164
Accordingly, it could be classified as a ―rock‖, in which case it is only entitled to a 12
nautical mile territorial sea under the LOSC.165 Under this classification, Triton Island
cannot have a contiguous zone of its own. Moreover, under the LOSC, a coastal state‘s
sovereign rights over its natural resources, including exploration drilling, falls under the
regime of the EEZ, not the contiguous zone.166 Most importantly, the oil rig was placed
approximately 130 nautical miles from the coastline of Vietnam, well inside the EEZ
claimed by Vietnam in accordance with the LOSC. In summary, as both China and
Vietnam claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, any maritime zone generated from
this archipelago is still in dispute. Even if one assumes that Triton Island belongs to
China, it cannot have an EEZ of its own. From any perspective, the weight of evidence
points to the conclusion that oil rig HYSY 981 was located in disputed waters.
Turning to the second question, as the HYSY 981 was in a disputed area, it is
clear that China violated international law, particularly the LOSC. Articles 74(3) and
83(3) of the LOSC stipulate that if no agreement can be reached for the delimitation of
the EEZ and continental shelf, ―the States concerned, in a spirit of understanding and
cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical
nature and, during this transitional period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of
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the final agreement.‖167 In the 2007 Guyana v Suriname case, which was brought under
LOSC Annex XV, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that unilateral drilling in an
area of overlapping claims is a violation of articles 74(3) and 83(3) of the LOSC.168
Bower and Poling have argued that as HYSY 981 was clearly in a disputed area, China
violated the LOSC by unilaterally engaging in drilling operations.169 Carlyle Thayer has
also asserted that ―China‘s decision to deploy a mega oil rig in waters forming part of
the Vietnamese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was unexpected, provocative and, in
my professional opinion, illegal, although there is substantial international dispute over
this issue.‖170 In summary, by unilaterally placing the oil rig in a disputed area, it is
clear that China acted in violation of international law.
On the question of whether the DOC was contravened by China‘s actions, as the
DOC is a political statement and not a legal binding document, it cannot be used as a
reference for settling legal disputes. However, in the Position Paper of the Government
of the People‘s Republic of China on the matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea
Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippine, China stated that:
China wishes to emphasize that the DOC is an important instrument, adopted by China
and the ASEAN member States…Under the DOC, the parties concerned undertake to
resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes through friendly consultations and
negotiations…reaffirm their respect for and commitment to the freedom of navigation in
and overflight above, the South China Sea as provided for by universally principles of
international law…and undertake to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities
167
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that would complicate or escalate disputes…171

As China urges Parties to the DOC to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of
activities in disputed areas, China‘s contradictory tactic of placing the HYSY 981 oil rig
in disputed waters clearly violated not only the spirit of the DOC but also the principle
of good faith in international law.
On the third question, it is clear that the Chinese vessels violated a number of
international law instruments, particularly the LOSC and COLREGs. Firstly, under the
LOSC, a coastal State may establish reasonable safety zones around artificial islands,
installations and structures, but these safety zones must not exceed a distance of 500
metres.172 Therefore, the U.S. Senate resolved that the establishment of an exclusion
zone with a radius of 3 nautical miles round the oil rig, and the aggressive patrols
conducted by Chinese vessels in this area, ―undermines maritime safety in the area and
is in violation of universally recognized principles of international law.‖ 173 Secondly,
under the COLREGs, a ship‘s commander must strictly comply with the COLREGs and
―the ordinary practice of seamen‖ to avoid collision.174 As Jonathan G. Odom has
commented, States may have conflicting views on maritime boundaries and
jurisdictions; however, their vessels and mariners are all bound by the rules set out in
the COLREGs.175 The act of Chinese vessels aggressively patrolling and intentionally
ramming Vietnamese law enforcement vessels in Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ is clearly a
violation of the COLREGs.176
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7.4

Other incidents in the South China Sea involving sovereign immune vessels
and aircraft
In addition to the incidents discussed above, there have been other clashes in the

South China Sea involving sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. These incidents
reveal the need for more careful management of such vessels and aircraft in the region.
On 11 June 2009, a Chinese navy submarine hit the towed array sonar of the
destroyer USS John McCain near Subic Bay, approximately 144 miles off the coast of
the Philippines.177 The submarine and the destroyer did not collide; however, the array
was damaged.178 Although neither side made an official statement, the general
consensus was that the collision was not intentional.179 According to Jonathan G. Odom,
however, at the time of the collision China ―was apparently conducting military
surveillance operations in the exclusive economic zone of another nation – in this case
the Philippines.‖180 This incident demonstrates again that China‘s practice is
inconsistent with its restrictive views on foreign military activities in its own EEZ.
In June 2010, an Indonesian patrol boat captured a Chinese fishing vessel fishing
illegally in the Indonesian South China Sea EEZ claimed from Natuna Island. In
response, a Chinese maritime law enforcement vessel, the Yuzheng 311, pointed its
large-calibre machine gun at the Indonesian boat to force the release of the captured
vessel.181 In March 2013, an Indonesian law enforcement vessel boarded a Chinese
fishing boat operating in Indonesia‘s claimed EEZ, arresting nine fishermen. A Chinese
law enforcement vessel, the Yuzheng 310, arrived on the scene and threatened and
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harassed the Indonesian vessel, forcing it to release the Chinese prisoners. 182 Most
recently, in March 2016, an Indonesian law enforcement vessel captured a Chinese
fishing boat operating in the same general area, arresting all nine crew members. As the
Indonesian vessel began towing the Chinese boat to Natuna Island, a China Coast Guard
vessel arrived and rammed the fishing boat, freeing it from Indonesian authorities.183
Indonesia lodged a formal protest with China‘s Embassy in Jakarta, but China insisted
that the area where the incident took place was ―traditional Chinese fishing grounds.‖184
It is clear that under the LOSC coastal States enjoy sovereign rights over natural
resources in their EEZs. Therefore, China‘s assertion of ―traditional Chinese fishing
grounds‖ in another State‘s EEZ clearly contravenes the LOSC.
On 26 May 2011, three ships from China Marine Surveillance (numbered 12, 17
and 84) intentionally cut a cable towing seismic equipment by a Vietnamese seismic
survey vessel, the Binh Minh 02, at a coordinate of 12018‘25‘‘ latitude North; 111026‘48‘‘
longitude East, approximately 120 nautical miles from the Vietnamese coastline and
well within Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ.185 The following day, Vietnam lodged a
diplomatic protest with China‘s Ambassador, claiming that the actions of the three
China Marine Surveillance ships violated Vietnamese sovereign rights in its EEZ and
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on its continental shelf, as well as violating the LOSC and the spirit of the DOC. 186 In
response, Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Jiang Yu stated: ―What relevant Chinese
departments did was completely normal marine law-enforcement and surveillance
activities in China‘s jurisdictional sea area.‖187 However, China did not clarify the legal
basis for this water area being ―[within] China‘s jurisdictional sea area.‖ By contrast,
Vietnam‘s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Nguyen Phuong Nga, made it clear on 29
May 2011 that:
[t]he area where Vietnam conducted explorations is entirely within the 200-nautical
mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of Vietnam as stipulated by the
1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is neither a disputed area nor an area
"managed by China." China is intentionally misleading the public opinion into thinking
it is a disputed area.188

Unfortunately China did not clarify what it meant by ―China‘s jurisdictional sea area‖,
but it could have been a veiled reference to the area within the nine-dash line. In this
context, it is important to note that on 12 July 2016, the Arbitral Tribunal in the
Philippine case ruled that ―China‘s claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or
jurisdiction…..encompassed by the relevant part of the ‗nine-dash line‘ are contrary to
the Convention [LOSC] and without lawful effect.‖189
Putting to one side the dispute over waters claimed by China and Vietnam, it is
clear that the three Chinese marine surveillance ships violated COLREGs. Under
COLREGs, the Binh Minh 02 was a vessel with restricted-manoeuvre status, while the
186
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Chinese ships were ―power driven vessels.‖ Therefore, according to article 18 of the
COLREGs, the Chinese vessels were required to keep clear of the the Binh Minh 02.190
In fact, the Chinese ships deliberately cut the towing cable of the Binh Minh 02,
ignoring the warning signal from the Vietnamese captain.191 China claimed that the
conduct of their law enforcement ships ―was completely normal marine lawenforcement and surveillance activities.‖192 This suggests that China refuses to take any
responsibility for the unsafe conduct of its government-operated vessels – conduct
which is contrary to international regulations, and perhaps even instruct them to take
such action.
One of the most recent incidents involving sovereign immune vessels occurred
on 9 July 2016, when two China Coast Guard vessels (46102 and 56103), were accused
of ramming and sinking a Vietnamese fishing boat in the vicinity of the Paracel
Islands.193 Moreover, after sinking the Vietnamese fishing boat, the two Chinese vessels
allegedly prevented another Vietnamese fishing vessel from rescuing the fishermen
from the sunken vessel.194 Such action by Chinese law enforcement vessels, if indeed it
occurred as reported, not only violates rules of safe navigation under international law,
particularly the LOSC, the COLREGs and the SOLAS, but also constitutes
unacceptable behaviour in maritime practice.
In 2012, China and the Philippines were involved in a two-month standoff at
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Scarborough Shoal, over which both countries claim sovereignty. The incident was
prompted by two Chinese marine surveillance vessels preventing a Philippine warship,
the BRP Gregorio del Pilar, from arresting eight Chinese fishing vessels engaged in
alleged illegal fishing at the shoal.195 The following day, and having realised the
inherent risk of using a warship during a standoff with China, the Philippines withdrew
the Gregorio del Pilar, replacing it with a small coast guard vessel.196 By contrast,
China dispatched one of its largest and most advanced fishery patrol vessels, the
Yuzheng 310, to reinforce its presence.197 During the standoff, three Chinese law
enforcement ships surrounded a small Philippine coast guard vessel. According to
Rahman, China‘s vessels also conducted a number of dangerous manoeuvres that
threatened the safety of the Philippine vessel and crew.198 In mid-June 2012, while
consultations between China and the Philippines were on foot, the two States decided to
withdraw their vessels from the area due to a seasonal typhoon.199 However, after the
typhoon, China sent its vessels back to the shoal, with these vessels having maintained a
permanent presence, and hence securing effective control, ever since.200 On 27 January
2014, a Chinese coast guard vessel fired a water cannon at Philippine fishing boats near
the shoal to drive them away from the area.201 In February 2015, the Philippines lodged
a protest with China after a Chinese coast guard ship deliberately rammed and damaged
195
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three Philippine fishing vessels in the shoal.202 In April 2015, the Philippines accused
China‘s coast guard of firing water cannons at, and damaging, a number of Philippine
fishing vessels in the shoal.203 China defended the actions of its coast guard, asserting
that ―official Chinese vessels in waters near the Huangyan island (Scarborough Shoal)
carried out their duties and managed the relevant waters according to law.‖204 Setting
aside sovereign disputes over the shoal, it is clear that firing water cannons at fishing
vessels in disputed waters is not only provocative behaviour but also inhumane, as it has
the capacity to endanger the lives of fishermen.
The Philippine submission to the arbitral tribunal in the South China Sea
arbitration shed further light on the dangerous operation of Chinese law enforcement
vessels. On 28 April 2012, while the Philippine Coast Guard Ship BRP Pampanga was
stationary in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, a China Fisheries and Law Enforcement
vessel, the FLEC 310, approached it ―from port to almost dead ahead at a distance of
about 600 yards with speed of 20.3 knots.‖205 Another incident occurred on 26 May
2012, when MCS 3008, a vessel of the Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources, approached Scarborough Shoal. A Chinese marine surveillance vessel, CMS
71, increased its speed and attempted to cross MCS 3008 from its port bow at a distance
less than 100 yards, forcing the MCS 3008 to increase its speed to 20 knots and to alter
its course to starboard ―to evade a possible impact.‖206 Following this incident, three
other Chinese vessels, including FLEC 303, CMS 84 and FLEC 306, joined CMS 71 to
202
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manoeuvre dangerously around MCS 3008.207 In response to the incident, the
Philippines requested that the arbitral tribunal declare that ―China...breached its
obligations under the Convention (LOSC) by operating its law enforcement vessels in a
dangerous manner causing serious risk of collision to Philippine vessels navigating in
the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal.‖208 In its award, the arbitral tribunal ruled that:
…the conduct of Chinese law enforcement vessels in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal,
created serious risk of collision and danger to Philippine vessels and personnel. The
Tribunal finds China to have violated Rules 2, 6, 7,15, and 16 of the COREGS and, as a
consequence, to be in breach of Article 94 of the Convention (LOSC).209

On 5 December 2013, a U.S. guided missile cruiser, the USS Cowpens, was
shouldered by a Chinese amphibious ship while monitoring the Chinese aircraft carrier
Liaoning in the South China Sea. According to the United States, during this interaction
the Chinese vessel suddenly crossed the bow of the USS Cowpens at a distance of less
than 100 yards, forcing it to take evasive action to avoid a collision.210 At the time of the
incident, the Cowpens was operating approximately 32 nautical miles southeast of
Hainan Island, and therefore the United States asserted that its ship was conducting
lawful activities consistent with customary international law as reflected in the
LOSC.211 At a press briefing on 19 December 2013, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Chuck
Hagel, categorically stated that ―that action by the Chinese, cutting in front of [our]
ship, 100 yards out in front of the Cowpens, was not a responsible action. It was
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unhelpful. It was irresponsible (emphasis added).‖212 The U.S. Pacific Fleet also issued
a statement that ―this incident underscores the need to ensure the highest standards of
professional seamanship, including communications between vessels, to mitigate the
risk of an unintended incident or mishap.‖213 China, however, did not provide any
official comment in relation to the incident. According to Bateman, ―COLREGs can be
twisted to one‘s advantage‖, without all the details of the incident being available, it is
impossible to know which version of events is correct.214 Nevertheless, Bateman
warned that the incident has led to strategic mistrust between the two countries.215
Another analyst, Ian Storey, has also forecast a dire view of the region, suggesting that
―if China continues to challenge the presence of foreign naval ships in the South China
Sea, it is only a question of time before a serious and potentially deadly incident
occurs.‖216
On 19 August 2014, a Chinese Shenyang J-11B fighter jet intercepted a U.S.
Navy P-8 patrol aircraft over the South China Sea. The incident occurred in
international airspace approximately 135 miles east of Hainan Island. 217 According to
Pentagon spokesman Real Admiral John Kirby, the interception was ―very close, very
dangerous...pretty aggressive and very unprofessional.‖218 However, China‘s Defense

212

Department of Defense Press Briefing by Secretary Hagel and General Dempsey in the Pentagon
Briefing Room U.S Department of Defense
<http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=5345>.
213
Quoted in David Lerman and Anthony Capaccio, Chinese Military Ship Confronts U.S. Cruiser at Sea
(14 December 2013) Bloomberg <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-13/chinese-militaryship-confronts-u-s-cruiser-at-sea>.
214
Sam Bateman, 'The USS Cowpens Incident: Adding to Strategic Mistrust' (23 December 2013) RSIS
Commentaries , 2.
215
Ibid.
216
Quoted in John Hofilena, US, China warships narrowly avoid collision in South China Sea (17
December 2013) Japan Daily Press <http://japandailypress.com/us-china-warships-narrowly-avoidcollision-in-south-china-sea-1741082/>.
217
Christopher P. Cavas, Chinese Fighter Buzzes US Patrol Aircraft (22 August 2014) Defense News
<http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140822/DEFREG02/308220025/Chinese-Fighter-Buzzes-USPatrol-Aircraft>.
218
Quoted in ibid.

269

Ministry spokesman Colonel Yang Yujun countered this accusation by stating that ―the
operation by the Chinese pilot was professional and maintained a safe distance with the
U.S. plane.‖219 It is unclear which State has the stronger argument due to a lack of
evidence and impartial observers. However, what is clear is that close interceptions such
as this one will continue to occur as long as China and the U.S. advance divergent
interpretations of international law – interpretations which accord with their own
strategic interests.
On 20 May 2015, another U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft
conducted a flight over the artificial island built by China on Fiery Cross Reef in the
Spratlys. The Chinese navy issued eight warnings to the U.S. aircraft, requesting it to
leave in order to avoid misunderstanding.220 On 27 October 2015, a U.S. guided-missile
destroyer, the USS Lassen, conducted a patrol within 12 nautical miles of the artificial
island built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands under a freedom of navigation
exercise. However, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Lu Kang said that the U.S. ship
had ―illegally entered‖ the waters near the islands ―without receiving permission from
the Chinese government.‖221 China did not clarify what it meant by ―waters near the
islands‖; however, it is worth noting that in its final award issued on 12 July 2016, the
arbitral tribunal ruled that Subi Reef is a low-tide elevation.222 Accordingly, this reef
cannot generate a territorial sea.
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Taking into account all the incidents discussed above, it is clear that China‘s
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft, in an effort to bolster China‘s maritime claims in
the South China Sea, have operated both dangerously and in a manner inconsistent with
international safety standards, causing serious risk of damage and injury to vessels,
aircraft and crew of other States. Unfortunately, there are no signs indicating that China
will compromise its maritime claims in the region, or that it will respect any
international legal process regarding such claims or the operations of its sovereign
immune vessels and aircraft.
The table below lists all well-known incidents involving sovereign immune
vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea. Incidents are differentiated by the root
causes in order to provide a clear picture of the existing challenges for the navigation
and overflight of these types of vessels and aircraft in this region.
Table 7.1 Maritime incidents involving South China Sea littoral States
Incident/Date
U.S. Navy EP-3

Root Cause
Different perspectives over foreign military activities in the

(2001)

EEZ.

USS Impeccable

Different perspectives over foreign military activities in the

(3/2009)

EEZ.

USS John McCain

It is believed that this incident was unintentional.

(6/2009)
Indonesia-China

China claims its fishing vessels were operating legally in

standoff (6/2010)

what it considers ―traditional Chinese fishing grounds.‖
However, the fishing vessels were fishing in the EEZ claimed
by Indonesia. Therefore, this incident could be classified as a
dispute over jurisdiction/access to resources.

Binh Minh 02

Incident occurred in the EEZ claimed by Vietnam, but also

(5/2011)

within the nine-dash line claimed by China. Thus, it could be
classified as a dispute over jurisdiction/access to resources.
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Incident/Date
Scarborough Shoal

Root Cause
Sovereignty dispute over the Scarborough Shoal.

standoff (4-6/2012)
Indonesia-China

China claims its fishing vessels were operating legally in

standoff (3/2013)

what it considers ―traditional Chinese fishing grounds.‖
However, the fishing vessel was fishing in the EEZ claimed
by Indonesia. Accordingly, it could be classified as a dispute
over jurisdiction/access to resources.

USS Cowpens

Dispute over military activities in the EEZ.

(12/2013)
China-Philippines

Dispute over jurisdiction and access to resources.

standoff (1/2014)
Haiyang Shiyou-

Disputes concerning sovereignty claims over the Paracel

981 oil rig incident

Islands, and also over maritime boundaries and access to

(5-7/2014)

resources.

U.S. Navy P-8

Dispute over military activities in the EEZ.

(8/2014)
U.S. Navy P-8A

Disputes over freedom of navigation and overflight rights,

(5/2015)

and over maritime zones supposedly generated from artificial
islands.

USS Lassen

Dispute over freedom of navigation and overflight rights, and

(10/2015)

over maritime zones supposedly generated from artificial
islands.

Indonesia-China

China claims its fishing vessels were operating legally in

Standoff (3/2016)

what it considers ―traditional Chinese fishing grounds.‖
However, the fishing vessel was fishing in the EEZ claimed
by Indonesia. Therefore, it could be classified as a dispute
over jurisdiction/access to resources.

7.5

Conclusion
The rules and principles governing the operation of sovereign immune vessels and

aircraft at sea are chiefly found in the LOSC, COLREGs and the Chicago Convention.
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However, gaps still exist in the regulatory framework, coupled with ambiguities in
existing international law provisions. Indeed, these ambiguities have created room for
States to adopt conflicting interpretations of pertinent provisions – interpretations which
advance the strategic and national interests of individual States. As sovereign immune
vessels and aircraft are used to protect State interests, intentional and unintentional
incidents between these vessels and aircraft are difficult to avoid, especially in the South
China Sea where the geostrategic situation is quite complex.
By analysing the selected incidents in this chapter, it is clear that: (i) it will be
difficult for States in the region to reach a uniform interpretation of international law
provisions regarding the navigation and overflight of sovereign immune vessels and
aircraft at sea; (ii)

legal loopholes exist at the international level regarding the

interaction between sovereign immune aircraft in international airspace; (iii) China will
continue making maritime claims in the South China Sea based on a nationalistic view
of ―historic rights.‖ China will also keep interpreting international law provisions
narrowly (or completely disregarding them) to suit its own interests and with no regard
for formal legal processes; (iv) China‘s pattern of aggressive behaviour in the South
China Sea will likely escalate, resulting in more maritime incidents, both intentional and
unintentional. These incidents will be difficult to avoid, leading to further tension in the
region; and (v) navigation and overflight in the South China Sea by sovereign immune
vessels and aircraft will continue to be a contentious issue in the future.
It is important to highlight that, by virtue of concerted diplomatic efforts, none of
these incidents escalated into a major conflict. However, the incidents have added to the
strategic mistrust between the States concerned. In order to avoid similar incidents from
occurring in the future, States in the region should respect internationally accepted legal
instruments, strive to cooperate with each other (particularly with regard to existing
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international law gaps), enhance maritime confidence building measures, as well as
build better communication channels for the promotion of maritime safety and security
for the region as a whole. The next chapter addresses regional efforts to build
confidence and navigational safety.
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8 REGIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PASSAGE OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNE VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT
8.1

Introduction
In order to fill the gaps in international law and policy regarding the passage of

sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea, a number of regional initiatives have been
developed for the South China Sea region. These include: (i) conflict management
mechanisms initiated by regional institutions, including the 2002 ASEAN Declaration
on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC); (ii) the Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES) adopted at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 2014;
(iii) existing bilateral maritime cooperation and confidence building measures involving
South China Sea littoral States; (iv) Track II level regional workshops (notably the EEZ
Group 21 sponsored by the Ocean Policy Research Foundation); and (v) the unilateral
policies of individual maritime States which seek to preserve the navigational rights of
vessels and aircraft, particularly the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program. This chapter
will critically analyse and evaluate these existing regional efforts.
8.2
8.2.1

Regional efforts to develop guidelines for the passage of sovereign immune
vessels and aircraft
ASEAN and the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(DOC)

8.2.1.1 Background to the DOC
One of ASEAN‘s chief objectives of is to ―promote regional peace and stability
through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among
countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.‖1
Five of the ten member States of ASEAN are actively involved in South China Sea
1

Overview (13 March 2015) Association of Southeast Asian Nations <http://www.asean.org/asean/aboutasean/overview>.
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disputes, namely Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia. The
inclusion of Indonesia is due to its involvement in overlapping maritime jurisdictional
claims with China‘s ―nine-dash line.‖ The first ASEAN statement on the South China
Sea was in the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea signed in Manila 22 July
1992. This Declaration emphasised ―the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and
jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort
to force.‖2 The Declaration urged ―all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the
view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes.‖3 In March
1995, and in response to the Mischief Reef incident4, ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued
their second statement, expressing their ―serious concern‖ and ―call[ing] upon all parties
to refrain from taking actions that destabilize the region and further threaten the peace
and security of the South China Sea.‖5 In 1995, at the second ASEAN Regional Forum
held in Brunei, the Philippines proposed the adoption of a Code of Conduct for the
South China Sea that would, in the words of Carlyle Thayer, ―constrain China from
further encroachment.‖6 The idea of concluding a regional code of conduct which would
―lay the foundation for long term stability in the area and foster understanding among
claimant countries,‖ was endorsed by ASEAN foreign ministers at the 29th ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting held in Jakarta in July 1996.7 In 1999 ASEAN member States

2

1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (22 July 1992) Association of Southeast Asian
Nations <http://www.asean.org/1196.htm>
3
Ibid.
4
Mischief Reef is part of the Spratly Islands and located in the Philippines‘ claimed EEZ. On 8 February
1995, the Philippines discovered that China had built structures on the reef. The Philippines made a
protest against China‘s actions; however, the Chinese government rejected the protest and said that the
structures constituted shelter for fishermen.
5
Statement by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Recent Developments in the South China Sea (18
March 1995) Association of Southeast Asian Nations <http://www.asensec.org/2089.htm>.
6
Carlyle A Thayer, 'ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea' (2013) 33(2) SAIS
Review of International Affair 75, 76.
7
Joint Communique of The 29th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) (21 July 1996) Association of
Southeast Asian Nations <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-
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agreed on a draft Code of Conduct, and by that time China had prepared its own draft
Code of Conduct.8 In 2000 ASEAN member countries and China exchanged their
respective drafts in order to reach a final agreement on a regional Code of Conduct
(COC).9 However, an agreement could not be reached due to four major areas of
difference: the geographic scope of the COC, issues relating to construction on occupied
and unoccupied features, military activities in disputed waters, and the treatment of
fishermen in disputed waters.10

On 4 November 2002, and after several years of

negotiations, China and ASEAN member States agreed, as a compromise, to sign a nonbinding political statement known as the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC). The objective of the document was ―to enhance favorable conditions
for a peaceful and durable solution of differences and disputes among countries
concerned.‖11 This declaration contained four measures to build trust and confidence
between the parties, as well as five areas of cooperative engagement.12 Regarding
navigational issues, all parties ―reaffirm[ed] their respect for and commitment to the
freedom of navigation in and overflight above the South China Sea as provided for by
the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea‖13. The spirit of the DOC encourages all parties to
undertake cooperative activities regarding the safety of navigation and communication

community/item/joint-communique-of-the-29th-asean-ministerial-meeting-amm-jakarta-20-21-july1996>.
8
Thayer, above n 6, 76.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid 77; Yann Huei Song, 'The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties and a Code of Conduct in the
South China Sea: Recent Actions Taken by ASEAN' in Seokwoo Lee and Hee Eun Lee (eds), Northeast
Asian Perspectives on International Law: Contemporary Issues and Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013)
41.
11
See Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (4 November 2002) Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, <http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-theconduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea>.
12
Ibid; Thayer, above n 6, 77.
13
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, above n 11, point 3.
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at sea.14 Most importantly, all parties reaffirmed their intention to work towards the
adoption of a legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea on the basis of
consensus.15
The DOC was perceived by China and ASEAN ―as a milestone document which
embodies the collective commitment of ASEAN member States and China to promote
peace, stability and mutual trust in the South China Sea.‖16 However, it was not until
nine years later, in July 2011, that ASEAN and China reached an agreement on
guidelines for the implementation of the DOC.17 It is important to note, however, that
these guidelines do not contain provisions on the conduct of vessels or aircraft towards
one another, or any guidance on communication channels for contending vessels and
aircraft in the event of such contact.18 In January 2012 ASEAN and China agreed to
establish four expert committees for the implementation of the guidelines. These expert
committees span the areas of maritime scientific research, environmental protection,
search and rescue, as well as transnational crime. However, no expert committee was
charged with the responsibility for the safety of navigation and communication at sea. 19
And although discussions between the parties have continued, no projects have thus far
been implemented. In 2012, ASEAN drafted its own draft Code of Conduct, known as
ASEAN Proposed Elements of a Regional Code of Conduct. Indonesia then proposed a

14

Ibid point 6(c).
Ibid point 10.
16
Joint Statement of the 15th ASEAN-China Summit on the 10th Anniversary of the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (19 November 2012) The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations <http://www.asean.org/news/item/twentyfirst-asean-summit-phnom-penh-cambodia-18november-2012>.
17
Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC (July 2011)
<http://myoceanic.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/guidelines-on-the-implementation-of-the-doc1.pdf>.
18
See Sheldon W Simon, 'Conflict and Diplomacy in the South China Sea: The View from Washington'
(2012) 52(2) Asian Survey 995, 1005; Guidelines for the Implementation of the DOC 2011 (27 July 2012)
BienDong.net <http://www.southchinasea.com/documents/law/306-guidelines-for-the-implementation-ofthe-doc.html>.
19
Thayer, above n 6, 77.
15
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―Zero Draft‖ Code of Conduct for the South China Sea on the sidelines of the UN
General Assembly session in September 2012. Importantly, this version contained
―additional elements to make it more prescriptive and operational.‖ 20 For Carlyle
Thayer, the most significant contribution of this ―Zero Draft‖ Code of Conduct is that it
contains ―suggested rules, norms and procedures for carrying out confidence building
measures‖ and ―detailed provisions for preventing incidents and collisions at sea.‖21
However, according to Mark Valencia, the ―Zero Draft‖ contains ―bold language‖ that
makes it unlikely to be agreed upon by ASEAN members and China.22 For instance, it
contains provisions which require contracting parties to refrain from:
[c]onducting military exercise, military surveillance, or other provocative actions in the
South China Sea; occupying or erecting new structures on the islands, and land features
presently occupied or not; inhabiting the presently uninhabited islands and other land
features; and conducting activities that threaten navigational safety and/or polluting the
environment.23

Given that China is currently engaged in an extensive artificial island building
program in the Spratlys, it is unlikely that China would readily accept provisions that
prohibit parties from occupying and inhabiting islands and land features. Regarding
military exercises and military surveillance, while China and two other ASEAN States
(namely Malaysia and Thailand), have restrictive views on foreign military activities in
the EEZ, other ASEAN States have not officially expressed their views on this issue.
Even if China and ASEAN members were to agree with the proposed provisions in the

20

Ibid, 79; see also Mark J Valencia, 'What the 'Zero Draft' Code of Conduct for the South China Sea
Says (and Doesn't Say)' (2013) 8(1) Global Asia 73, 73-74; Carlyle A Thayer, 'ASEAN‘S Code of
Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-Building?' (2012) 10(34) Asia-Pacific
Journal 1, 2.
21
Thayer, above n 6, 79.
22
Valencia, above n 20, 75.
23
Quoted in ibid 79.

279

Indonesian ―Zero Draft‖ it is unlikely that other maritime States, particularly the United
States, would accept the provisions. It is also arguable that the provisions of the ―Zero
Draft,‖ which seek to restrict military activities in the South China Sea are contrary to
the LOSC. As the security and stability of the South China Sea is a priority for many
States, not only for littoral States, a Code of Conduct for the region should be set out in
such a way as to encourage outside maritime powers to accede to it, or at the very least,
respect it.
While ASEAN wishes to expedite the conclusion of a Code of Conduct, China,
on the other hand, wants to see the implementation of the DOC first, viewing a Code of
Conduct for the South China Sea as a long term objective. 24 In 2013, during his visit to
ASEAN States, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that all parties should have
―realistic expectations‖ and should take ―a gradual approach‖ to a proposed Code.25 In
August 2016, China and the ASEAN agreed to reach a framework for a code of conduct
for the South China Sea by the middle of 2017.26
8.2.1.2 The limitations of the DOC
After signing the DOC, China‘s Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the
DOC would ―send a clear signal to the outside that countries in the region can fully
handle differences between each other through dialogue and jointly maintain peace and

24

Ralf Emmers, 'ASEAN's Search for Neutrality in the South China Sea' (2014) 2(1) Asian Journal of
Peacebuilding 61, 73.
25
Joanna Chiu, Beijing tells Asean to be realistic in hopes for South China Sea code of conduct (6 August
2013) South China Morning Post <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1294453/foreign-ministerwang-yi-says-china-no-hurry-sign-south-china-sea-accord>.
26
Blanchard, Ben and Clarence Fernandez, China, ASEAN aim to complete framework of South China
Sea rules next year (17 August 2016) Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-chinaidUSKCN10S0DQ>
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stability in the South China Sea region through cooperation.‖27 Some Chinese scholars
have expressed the optimistic view that ―from now on, ASEAN and China are joining
hands together to establish common security and to gain common prosperity.‖28
However, other commentators have opined that as the DOC is only a political statement,
not a legally binding document, it is unrealistic to expect it to prevent parties from
undertaking activities that complicate the situation.29 In fact, tensions have continued to
rise in the South China Sea following the signing of the DOC, with the parties involved
continuing to accuse one another of violating the DOC. There have also been several
incidents involving sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea which
have violated the spirit of the DOC which are noted below. On 2 March 2011, two
Chinese patrol vessels aggressively harassed the MV Veritas Voyager, a seismic survey
ship charted by Forum Energy, a UK-based oil and gas company. The Philippine
government had awarded Forum Energy a contract to conduct the seismic survey in the
Reed Bank area.30 The incident occurred approximately 80 nautical miles from Palawan
Island, within the Philippine claimed EEZ.31 The May 2011 Chinese harassment of a
Vietnamese seismic survey vessel, including intentionally cutting a cable towing

27

Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi on the Achievements of Premier Zhu Rongji's Visit (16 August 2004)
Embassy of People's Republic of China in the Republic of Zimbabwe
<http://www.chinaembassy.org.zw/eng/xwdt/t149206.htm>.
28
Wu Shicun and Ren Huaifeng, 'More than a Declaration: A Commentary on the Background and the
Significance of the Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea' (2003) 2(1) Chinese
Journal of International Law 311, 319.
29
Nguyen Hong Thao, 'The Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea: A Vietnamese
Perspective 2002-2007' in Sam Bateman and Ralf Emmers (eds), Security and International Politics in
the South China Sea (Routledge, 2009) 211; Tran Thuy Truong, Recent Developments in the South China
Sea: Implications for Regional Security and Cooperation (30 June 2011) Center for Strategic and
International Studies <http://csis.org/publication/recent-developments-south-china-sea-implicationsregional-security-and-cooperation>.
30
Ian Storey, 'China and the Philippines: Implications of the Reed Bank Incident' (2011) 11(8) ChinaBrief
6, 7; Carlyle A Thayer, 'China-ASEAN and the South China Sea: Chinese Assertiveness and Southeast
Asian Responses' (Paper presented at the International Conference on Major Policy Issues in the South
China Sea: European and American Perspectives, Taipei, Taiwan, 6-9 October 2011), 4.
31
Storey, above n 30, 7; Truong, above n 29, 20.
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seismic equipment,32 led to Vietnam lodging a formal diplomatic protest, claiming that
China‘s actions violated international law and the spirit of the DOC.33 Following the
2012 standoff between China and the Philippines over the Scarborough Shoal,34 and the
subsequent January 2013 Philippines submission of a Notification and Statement of
Claim (Notification) against China before the Arbitral Tribunal established under
Annex VII of the LOSC.35 China rejected the Notification on the ground that ―the note
and related notice not only violate the consensus enshrined in the Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), but are also factually flawed and
contain false accusations.‖36 In its Position Paper on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the
South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, China claimed
that the Philippines had agreed, through the DOC, to settle their disputes through
negotiation. Therefore, according to China, the decision of the Philippines to
unilaterally initiate arbitration proceedings had violated international law. 37 And the 75
day standoff on the Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig in May 2014,38 Vietnam accused China
of ―seriously infring[ing]…Vietnam‘s sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction as

32

Carlyle A Thayer, 'Navigating the currents of legal regimes and realpolitik in East Asia's maritime
domain' in Wu Shicun and Zou Keyuan (eds), Securing the Safety of Navigation in East Asia: Legal and
Political Dimensions (Chandos Publishing, 2013) , 32; Tàu Trung Quốc ngang ngược xâm phạm vùng
đặc quyền kinh tế Việt Nam (27 May 2011) VNExpress (in Vietnamese) <http://vnexpress.net/tintuc/thoi-su/tau-trung-quoc-ngang-nguoc-xam-pham-vung-dac-quyen-kinh-te-viet-nam-2196171.html>.
33
VN condemns Chinese intrusion (28 May 2011) Vietnamnet
<http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/8551/vn-condemns-chinese-intrusion.html>.
34
M. Taylor Fravel, China's Island Strategy: "Redefine the Status Quo." (1 November 2012) The
Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/chinas-island-strategy-redefine-the-status-quo/>.
35
See Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines, Notification and Statement of Claim,
Manila 22 January 2013.
36
Quoted in China rejects Philippines' arbitral request: FM (19 February 2013) Xinhua.net
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-02/19/c_132178817.htm>.
37
See Position Paper of the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction
in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines (12 July 2014) Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml>.
38
Chinese aircraft intimidate Vietnam‟s law enforcement vessels (21 June 2014) Vietnamnet
<http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/105605/chinese-aircraft-intimidate-vietnam-s-lawenforcement-vessels.html>.
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enshrined under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982, and
violat[ing] the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea of 2002.‖39
The DOC urges all parties to ―refrain from action of inhabiting on the presently
uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their
differences in a constructive manner.‖40 However, since 2013, China has been
constructing artificial islands on a number of submerged features in the Spratlys and
ignoring protests from other ASEAN States.41 While other claimants of the Spratlys
have erected structures on existing land features, ―China is changing the size, structure
and physical attributes of land features themselves.‖42 At the 14th Shangri-La Dialogue
held in Singapore in May 2015, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter expressed serious
concern over China‘s massive ―land reclamations‖ in the Spratly islands, adding that
―China has reclaimed over 2,000 acres, more than all other claimants combined – and
more than in the entire history of the region. And China did so in only the last 18
months. It is unclear how much farther China will go.‖43 Carter further asserted that
―with its actions in the South China Sea, China is out of step with both the international
rules and norms.‖44 Greg Poling, an analyst from the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, has also expressed the view that China‘s action ―certainly violates

39

Annex to the letter dated 7 May 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Vietnam to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (A/68/870).
40
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, above n 11, point 5.
41
See Greg Torode, China to project power from artificial islands in South China Sea (19 February 2015)
Reuters <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/19/us-southchinasea-reefs-chinaidUSKBN0LN0J820150219>.
42
See Senators McCain, Reed, Corker, and Menendez Send Letter on Chinese Maritime Strategy (19
March 2015) United States Senate Committee on Armed Services <http://www.armedservices.senate.gov/press-releases/senators-mccain-reed-corker-and-menendez-send-letter-on-chinesemaritime-strategy>.
43
Quoted in Graeme Dobell, The US and China: cause, effect and uncertainty (1 June 2015) Australian
Strategic Policy Institute <http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-us-and-china-cause-effect-anduncertainty/>.
44
Quoted in US calls for China to stop sea reclamations (30 May 2015) Sky News
<http://www.skynews.com.au/news/world/asiapacific/2015/05/30/us-calls-for-china-to-stop-seareclamations.html>.
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the spirit of the 2002 Declaration of Conduct (DOC) between China and ASEAN, and is
at best on shaky legal grounds.‖45 When asked about China's maritime moves in the
South China Sea, Philippine President Benigno Aquino even made a veiled comparison
between China's activities in the region and Nazi Germany's expansionism before World
War II.46
It is clear that the DOC has been referred to by China and ASEAN States in their
statements regarding disputes and incidents in the South China Sea. However, its major
limitation of the DOC is that it is only a political statement with no legally binding
force. Indeed, concerned States in the region refer to the DOC as an important
agreement for conflict management in the South China Sea only because there is no
other viable alternative. Another major limitation is that it does not set out its
geographic scope, as those States which are party to it could not agree on which areas
were under dispute or indisputable. As a result, DOC signatory States can argue that
their actions are conducted in their own undisputed waters. Taking into account the
existing sovereignty disputes over offshore features in the South China Sea, China‘s
infamous and ambiguous nine-dash line claim as well as its rejection to the arbitral
tribunal ruling, it is highly unlikely that China and ASEAN will reach an agreement on
the identification of disputed areas in this maritime region in the near future.
Regarding the safety of maritime navigation and communication, neither the
DOC nor its Implementation Guidelines address the conduct of sovereign immune
vessels and aircraft of signatory States when they encounter each another at sea.
Furthermore, there exists no joint understanding or joint interpretation of the provisions
45

Quoted in Luke Hunt, China Challenges ASEAN with Land Fills in South China Sea (10 March 2015)
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46
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of the LOSC regarding navigation issues in various maritime jurisdictional zones
between China and ASEAN, either in the DOC or elsewhere.
As the above discussion has highlighted, disputes over sovereignty and maritime
boundaries in the region remain unresolved. China claims almost all of the South China
Sea and appears to be more aggressively asserting its claims while ignoring the
tribunal‘s ruling against it. The above-mentioned incidents would seem to indicate that
the hostile behaviour of Chinese vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea will
continue. Therefore, the need for binding ―rules of the road‖ and ―rules of the air‖ in a
COC between China and ASEAN members has never been more pressing. As
previously indicated, although China and ASEAN intend on keeping the DOC on foot,
it is unlikely there will be a legally binding Code of Conduct for the South China Sea in
the near future. Moreover, Taiwan is a party to the South China Sea dispute, but it is
neither a member of the DOC nor any official regional agreement. Therefore, any
disputes in the South China Sea involving Taiwan could pose a real challenge. Indeed,
the three-hour-standoff between a Philippines Coast Guard vessel and a Taiwanese
Coast Guard vessel in the South China Sea on 25 May 2015 illustrates this point.47 The
confrontation was the result of different views on the scope of maritime patrols in the
overlapping EEZs of the Philippines and Taiwan. Hence, the need to include Taiwan in
regional initiatives regarding navigation and overflight in the South China Sea is a
considerable unresolved issue.

47

See Joseph Yeh, Fishing incident due to differing legal opinions: foreign minister (27 May 2015) China
Post <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/foreign-affairs/2015/05/27/437000/Fishing-incident.htm>.
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8.2.2

Western Pacific Naval Symposium and the Code for Unplanned Encounters at
Sea

8.2.2.1 The development of the Code
In addition to ASEAN, the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) has
developed a Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES). The WPNS is a series of
biennial meetings where leaders of regional navies whose countries border the Pacific
Ocean region to discuss naval matters. Currently the WPNS consists of 21 members,
among others, including China, the United States, India, Japan, Australia and eight
ASEAN States (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand and Vietnam). In 1999, the Chief of the Royal Australian Navy initially
promulgated a Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES). The Code was based on
international legal and navigation principles and sought to promote the safe conduct of
navy ships and aircraft when they encounter each other at sea. The first draft of the
Code was released in 1999, but it has gone through various revisions since that time.
The purpose of the Code is to offer ―a means by which navies may safeguard and
advance their rights, duties, freedoms and responsibilities, develop mutually rewarding
international cooperation and transparency and provide leadership and broad-based
involvement in establishing international standards in relation to the use of the sea.‖48 In
2003 the Code was again reviewed and supplemented with ―safety measures and a
means to limit mutual interference and uncertainty and facilitate communication when
naval and public ships, submarines or aircraft make contact.‖49 At the WPNS held in
Malaysia in 2012, China was the only State that rejected the updated Code for Unalerted
Encounters at Sea (CUES 2003). According to Vice Admiral Ding – deputy commander
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of the People‘s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy), China felt that certain parts of the
document needed to be further discussed, and that the word ―code‖ implied a legally
binding agreement.50 Vice Admiral Ding also added that ―the CUES is not applicable to
the PLA Navy as the document is in English.‖51 At the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium Workshop held in Bangkok in 2013, China took issue with many of the
provisions of CUES 2003. China argued that the territorial sea should be deleted from
the applicable scope of the Code, as foreign warships entering China‘s territorial sea
need to seek prior authorisation from China‘s Government (and therefore there would
be no unalerted encounters between Chinese and foreign warships).52 China also argued
that the WPNS ―is not authorized to formulate a Code for Un-alerted Encounters at Sea
for public vessels and state aircraft.‖53 Therefore, it recommended that a Code for
Unalerted Encounters at Sea should only apply to naval warships and naval aircraft.54
Following the WPNS, CUES 2003 underwent a further review and was circulated to all
WPNS members in late 2013, with the document finally being adopted at the WPNS
held in China in April 2014.
The name of the adopted Code was changed from Code for Unalerted
Encounters at Sea to Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES 2014).55 Like
CUES 2003, CUES 2014 uses definitions which, where applicable, correlate with those
found in the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) and
under international law generally.56 CUES 2003 defines an ―Encounter at Sea‖ as:

50

See Minutes, 13th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (25-26 September 2012), 7-8.
Ibid.
52
Minutes, 13th Western Pacific Naval Symposium (21-23 May 2013), 4.
53
Ibid 5.
54
Ibid.
55
See Western Pacific Naval Symposium,Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, adopted 22 April 2014.
56
Ibid point 1.3
51

287

An encounter...when warships, submarines, public vessels or naval aircraft of one State
meet casually or unexpectedly with warships, submarines, public vessels or naval
aircraft of another State on the high seas, territorial waters, contiguous zones, exclusive
economic zone, and archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state.57

CUES 2014 defines ―Unplanned Encounters at Sea‖ as ―naval ships or naval
aircraft of one State meet[ing] casually or unexpectedly with a naval ship or naval
aircraft of another State.‖58 According to CUES 2014, a naval ship is ―a descriptor that
is assumed to include warships, naval auxiliaries, and submarines‖, while a naval
aircraft ―is to include helicopters, fixed wing aircraft and unmanned aerial systems or
vehicles.‖59 The objective of CUES 2014 is to offer ―safety procedures, a basic
communications plan and basic manoeuvring instructions for naval ships and naval
aircraft during unplanned encounters at sea.‖60 This means that many vessels and
aircraft, including coast guard patrol vessels, marine surveillance ships and aircraft, as
well as vessels belonging to fisheries agencies, are excluded from CUES 2014. Whereas
CUES 2003 was expressed as applying on the high seas, territorial waters, contiguous
zones, exclusive economic zones, and in the archipelagic waters of archipelagic states,
CUES 2014 does not specify the maritime zones in which it operates. Even so, it is
noteworthy that CUES 2014 uses definitions found in COLREGs. The term ―at sea‖ (as
used in COLREGs) indicates the high seas and ―all waters connected therewith
navigable by seagoing vessels.‖61 Even though COLREGs entered into force before the
LOSC, it is clear that all navigable waters connected to the high seas (as expressed in
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COLREGs) include the EEZ.62 Therefore, it is possible that CUES 2014 only applies on
the high seas and in EEZs.63 CUES 2003 contains one article which provides standard
safety procedures for ships engaged in surveillance. The article states that:
Ships engaged in surveillance should remain clear of platforms under surveillance so as
to avoid the risk of collision. They should also employ the practice of good seamanship
so as to avoid carrying out any manoeuvres that could endanger the object of
surveillance or cause it to deviate from intended course and/or speed.64

This article is similar to those contained in a number of incidents at sea
agreements, such as those between the United States and the former Soviet Union65,
Russia and the Republic of Korea66, and between Malaysia and Indonesia67. At the 2013
WPNS Workshop held in Bangkok, China did not agree with this article and proposed
an amended version in the following form:
Ships engaged in surveillance and those of surveillance should mutually employ the
practice of good seamanship so as to avoid carrying out any manoeuvres that could
endanger the navigation safety and the risk of collision.68

Due to disagreement between the parties, the article regarding surveillance
activities was deleted from CUES 2014. As many incidents at sea (and particularly
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those in the South China Sea), involve surveillance activities of naval vessels and
aircraft, the omission of this article has created a significant loophole in CUES 2014.
The adoption of CUES 2014 was described by Admiral Wu Shengli, the head of
the Chinese navy, as a milestone document that is ―highly significant to navies in the
region

in

promoting

communication

and

reducing

misjudgment

and

misunderstanding.‖69 The U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert,
also emphasised the significance of CUES 2014, stating that: ―We've agreed to increase
the standards that we will set at sea. We've agreed to establish proficiency in
communications. We've agreed to establish common behaviour at sea. We've agreed to
prevent misunderstanding and miscalculations.‖70 However, CUES 2014 appears to
suffer from a number of limitations in preventing tense encounters, particularly in the
South China Sea. As Christian Le Mière has opined, ―it is, in truth, very weak.‖ 71 These
limitations will now be explored in greater detail.
8.2.2.2 The limitations of CUES 2014
Firstly, CUES 2014 is a document which WPNS navies choose to adopt on a
voluntary and non-binding basis. Accordingly, there is no arbitration mechanism in the
agreement for disputes arising from incidents between naval ships or naval aircraft.72
Indeed, a U.S. Navy Pacific Fleet official has postulated that CUES 2014 is unlikely to
curb the risk of vessels colliding at sea.73 He added that: ―[I]f your intent is to cause
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trouble, you're going to cause trouble no matter what.‖74 Moreover, CUES 2014 focuses
mainly on safety procedures of naval ships rather than naval aircraft. As noted in
Chapter Seven, on 19 August 2014, four months after CUES 2014 was approved, a
Chinese fighter jet, the Shenyang J-11B, intercepted a U.S. Navy P-8 marine patrol and
surveillance aircraft in international airspace in a dangerous manoeuvre75 However,
CUES 2014 was not invoked by either party in relation to this incident.
Secondly, CUES 2014 only applies to naval vessels and naval aircraft. However,
as discussed in Chapter Seven, the majority of incidents in the South China Sea have
involved non-naval maritime law enforcement vessels. In addition, China has the largest
coast guard fleet in the world, and has been using its fishing vessels as government
proxies and maritime militia to strengthen its maritime claims. As CUES 2014 does not
cover civilian vessels, foreign naval vessels cannot expect civilian ships to abide by the
agreement. Indeed, with the increasing role of maritime law enforcement agencies in the
region, a potential clash between naval and maritime law enforcement vessels and
aircraft is highly likely. Therefore, the need for some mechanism to regulate the
activities of law enforcement vessels other than naval ships in the region is paramount.
Some key stakeholders in the region are taking note of this issue. At the 12th Maritime
Security and Coastal Surveillance Summit held in Malaysia in December 2015, the
Chief of the Royal Malaysian Navy, Admiral Kamarulzaman Ahmad Badaruddin,
called for an expansion of CUES 2014 to cover ―other maritime agencies, especially the
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coast guards.‖76 Singapore‘s Foreign Affairs Minister, Vivian Balakrishnan, has also
suggested expanding CUES 2104 to cover both naval and coast guards vessels and
aircraft.77 Another important consideration is that CUES 2014 only applies when naval
ships and aircraft of different States meet ―casually or unexpectedly.‖ In practice,
however, most incidents at sea arise when naval vessels or aircraft of one State
deliberately act in a way that poses a potential threat to the safety of naval vessels or
aircraft of another State.78 Thus, the reality is that in order to protect sovereignty and
maritime claims over disputed areas, vessels and aircraft of concerned States usually
shoulder or harass one another deliberately, not unexpectedly. CUES 2014, however,
does not ban certain acts of military intimidation. For example, the U.S.-Soviet
INCSEA 1972 Agreement prohibits ships of the Parties from ―simulat[ing] attacks by
aiming guns, missile launchers, torpedo tubes, and other weapons in the direction of a
passing ship of the other Party.‖79 CUES 2014 only suggests that acts including the
―simulation of attacks by aiming guns, missiles, fire control radars, torpedo tubes or
other weapons in the direction of vessels or aircraft encountered...might generally [be]
avoided (emphasis added).‖80 This means that ship commanders need to determine how
they will implement CUES 2014 in certain circumstances. Furthermore, while INCSEA
1972 requires parties to notify one another ―not less than 3 to 5 days in advance‖ in
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respect of actions which ―represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight‖81,
CUES 2014 only encourages parties to provide ―warnings‖ of dangerous activities,
eschewing any timeframe for when these warnings should be issued.82
Thirdly, the geographic scope of CUES 2014 is unclear. After the Code was
approved, U.S. naval officials were hopeful that all WPNS members would observe the
code in all places.83 However, Senior Captain Ren Xiaofeng, head of the Chinese navy's
Maritime Security and Safety Policy Research Division, made it clear that ―[w]e're just
talking about the rules. Whether or where or when these rules will apply – [CUES 2014]
it leaves that open, leaves it to bilateral [talks].‖84 Many commentators believe that
CUES 2014 only applies in the EEZ and on the high seas, but not in the territorial
waters.85 According to Xu Hongmeng, Vice Admiral of the Chinese Navy, CUES 2014
would have no impact on the conduct of State parties in the disputed waters of the East
China Sea and the South China Sea.86 Vice Admiral Xu added: ―You can‘t say that
[CUES 2014 is] related to the issues in the South and East China Sea – this is about the
navies of many countries… this will not influence those issues.‖87 When Japanese
Defence Minister Itsunori Onodera stated at the WPNS press conference that CUES
2014 would ban dangerous actions such as radar-locking on ships and aircraft of other
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countries at sea,88 Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun expressed the
view that ―sides concerned should not misinterpret deliberately the CUES, which is a
technical regulation under the multi-lateral framework, and make [a] selective reading
of it to make a fuss.‖89 This means that different interpretations of CUES 2014 could
be a challenging issue.
Fourthly, CUES 2014 does not contain any provisions for the safe conduct of
submarine operations. With the proliferation of submarines in the region and the
unresolved maritime disputes in the South China Sea, the risk of submarine accidents
and incidents will surely increase.90 According to Sam Bateman, ―the detection of a
submarine in disputed waters, unless carefully managed, could readily lead to a serious
deterioration in relations between the parties involved, increased tensions in the region,
and even conflict.‖91 However, due to the covert nature of submarines, it is difficult to
have an agreement in place governing standard operational procedures for such vessels.
And despite interest from Russia in having an international agreement on the safety of
submarine navigation, the United States has expressed reluctance to be bound by such
an agreement.92
Fifthly, CUES 2014 does not provide any guidelines for contracting parties
regarding annual training and exercises. For many regional navies, and particularly
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those of Southeast Asian States, language barriers and financial limitations are the main
factors hampering the effectiveness of training and the general implementation of CUES
2014. The WPNS should therefore consider reaching an agreement to provide language
training for naval officers from small regional navies, as well as providing financial
support to assist smaller navies conduct CUES training at sea.
Lastly, there is no timeframe for the implementation of CUES 2014. At the 2014
WPNS in Qingdao, (and after CUES 2014 was approved), Rear Admiral Anne Cullerre,
Commander of French Maritime Forces in the Pacific, stated: ―I do hope that all of us
will use the CUES in a very short time frame, but I also realize that some navies might
need more time to get accustomed to these procedures than others.‖93 As this comment
highlights, a precise timeframe for the implementation of CUES 2014 remains elusive.
Indeed, since the adoption of CUES 2014, there have been only a few combined
military exercises involving South China Sea littoral States. In June 2014, the Chinese
navy conducted its first combined exercise with the Indonesian navy focussing on the
practice of CUES 2014 procedures94. In April 2015, Vietnamese and U.S. navies
engaged in a coordinated military exercise in the coastal waters of Vietnam, practising
CUES 2014 procedures as well as search and rescue related activities.95 In May 2015,
the Philippine Navy held a combined exercise with the Japanese navy in the South
China Sea to run through CUES 2014 practices and procedures. 96 China also has
conducted a number of CUES exercises with the United States, Australia and
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Singapore. However, combined exercises for CUES practice between East and South
China Sea littoral States are still limited.
In summary, CUES 2014 is an important step towards improving confidence
between navies. However, as a non-legally binding document with unclear geographical
scope, CUES 2014 appears rather weak. As CUES 2014 only applies to naval vessels
and aircraft that meet ―casually or unexpectedly‖ at sea, it cannot prevent deliberate
brinksmanship.97 Moreover, it is unclear when, where and to what extent States will
implement CUES 2014. As many incidents between sovereign immune vessels and
aircraft in the South China Sea do not involve naval ships or aircraft, CUES 2014 will
have little impact on preventing such problems.
8.2.3

Bilateral agreements for confidence building measures

8.2.3.1 Incidents at sea agreements
Apart from regional initiatives, there has been a number of bilateral maritime
confidence building measures between extra-regional States addressing the passage of
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea. The most notable is the Agreement
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the
High Seas (INCSEA 1972), which entered into force 25 May, 1972. 98 INCSEA 1972
aims to ―assure the safety of navigation of the ships of their respective armed forces on
the high seas and flight of their military aircraft over the high seas, and guided by the
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principles and rules of international law.‖99 In May 1973, at the first annual review of
INCSEA 1972, the two sides added a Protocol to include non-military ships.100 Article 2
of the Protocol makes it clear that:
Ships and aircraft of the Parties shall not make simulated attacks by aiming guns,
missile launchers, torpedo tubes and other weapons at non-military ships of the other
Party, nor launch nor drop any objects near non-military ships of the other Party in such
a manner as to be hazardous to these ships or to constitute a hazard to Navigation.101

INCSEA 1972 was considered successful in reducing the number of incidents
between the two parties. For example, the number of serious incidents at sea between
the United States and the Soviet Union reduced from about 100 per year in the late
1960s to approximately 40 per year in the early 1980s.102 With more than 150 U.S. and
Soviet Union warships presenting in the Mediterranean during 1973 when war broke
out in the Middle East, the two sides appeared to comply with INCSEA 1972.103
Furthermore, as the Russian Federation was prepared to take over the rights and
obligations of the Soviet Union in relation to this agreement, it remains in place
today.104 Unlike CUES 2014, INCSEA 1972 not only established communication
regulations between vessels and aircraft of State parties in close proximity to one
another at sea, but also requires vessels and aircraft of all sides to avoid executing
manoeuvres which embarrass or endanger the ships under surveillance, and to avoid
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aiming weapons in the direction of a passing ship or aircraft of the other party. 105 There
have been a number of incidents at sea agreements modelled on INCSEA 1972. These
include the agreements between Russia and the Republic of Korea (1994)106; Japan and
Russia (1993); the UK and Soviet Union (1986); as well as between the Soviet Union
and Germany, Canada, France, and Italy respectively (1988 and 1989)107.
Within the South China Sea region, the navies of Indonesia and Malaysia
reached an agreement known as the MALINDO Prevention of Sea Incidents
Cooperative Guidelines in January 2001. These Guidelines provide standard safety and
communication procedures which apply to naval ships and aircraft of the two States
during encounters at sea.108 This bilateral agreement emphasizes that:
While no compromise should be made on matters concerning a nation‘s integrity and
sovereignty, incidents at sea could still be prevented by regulating and conditioning the
behaviour and actions of Commanding Officers of warships and military aircraft,
especially those assigned to frontline operations.109

The agreement came into force on the date of signing by both parties and applies
to all maritime regimes relevant to the LOSC, including disputed maritime territories.110
This means that the agreement will apply when naval vessels and aircraft of Indonesian
and Malaysian navies encounter each other in the South China Sea. However, the
agreement does not prevent third parties from taking provocative action in disputed
areas, particularly the South China Sea. Moreover, the agreement applies purely to
105

Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed 25
May 1972 (entered into force 25 May 1972).
106
See Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Russian
Federation Concerning the Prevention of Incidents at Sea Beyond the Territorial Sea, signed 2 June 1994
(entered into force 2 July 1994).
107
See Justin Jones, 'Background paper: A naval perspective of maritime confidence building measures'
(ASPI Special Report, September 2013), 25.
108
MALINDO Prevention of Sea Incident Cooperative Guidelines (Jakarta 18 January 2001).
109
Ibid art 1.
110
Ibid art 4.

298

naval units of the two navies; it does not apply to civilian law enforcement vessels or
aircraft.
8.2.3.2 China-United States bilateral agreements
In 1998 China and the United States agreed to establish a Military Maritime
Consultative Agreement (MMCA) which aims to avoid misunderstandings and
miscalculations between the naval and air forces of the two parties when they operate
near one another. However, the Agreement does not set out any standard safety
procedures, such as how the naval ships and aircraft of the two States should behave
when they encounter each other at sea.111 According to David Griffiths, the MMCA
―was much more diplomatic in nature and tone than the classic INCSEA model,
minimizing the role of operational experts and containing no provision for real-time
tactical communication.‖112 The numerous incidents which have occurred between U.S.
and Chinese vessels and aircraft, the most notable being the EP-3 Hainan incident in
2001,113 clearly indicates that the MMCA has been ineffective. Some authors have even
expressed the view that the biggest achievement of the MMCA ―has been that the two
countries are actually holding meetings.‖114 With the increasing number of incidents at
sea between China and the United States, however, there have been calls for an
INCSEA agreement between the two States. However, according to Sam Bateman,
China and the United States may not be interested in having such an agreement in
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place.115 Admiral Gary Roughead, then U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, indicated in
2011 that an INCSEA agreement with China is unnecessary as it would result in a
separate and exclusive agreement which could imply a strained relationship between the
two navies.116 Former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randy Schriver has also
pointed out that China is not interested in a ―rules-based, operator-to-operator approach
to safety on the high seas.‖117 Another dissenting voice on the issue is Shirley Kan, who
has asserted that tensions between the United States and China ―have been based on
different national interests rather than any misperception or misunderstanding.‖118
Nonetheless, in November 2014, China and the United States signed two
important agreements – a Memorandum of Understanding on Rules of Behaviour for
Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters (Rules of Behaviour MoU), 119 and a
Memorandum of Understanding on Notification of Major Military Activities
Confidence-Building Measures Mechanism (Notification MoU).120 The Rules of
Behaviour MoU provides standard safety procedures for military vessels and aircraft
when they encounter each other at sea or in the air. The Annex to the Rules of
Behaviour MoU providing for the safety of ship-to-ship encounters was completed and
signed in November 2014, while the Annex providing for air-to-air encounters was
signed in September 2015. The Rules of Behaviour MoU essentially relies on existing
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multilateral agreements, particularly COLREGs and CUES 2014. Meanwhile, the
Notification MoU aims to encourage the parties to exchange information about their
respective country‘s security policies, strategies and related legal information, and to
allow for reciprocal observation of military exercises and activities.121 These two major
confidence building agreements are expected to lessen the frequency of naval incidents
between China and the United States near China‘s coast, including in the South China
Sea. However, as the MoUs are not legally binding, it is difficult to know to what extent
each side will implement them (if at all). As James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo have
observed, China does not tend to comply with legally binding requirements, and thus it
is doubtful whether China would adhere to these (non-binding) MoUs.122 China‘s
rejection of the arbitral tribunal award in the South China Sea arbitration is one example
of the State rejecting a legally binding decision. The Rules of Behaviour MoU makes it
clear that ―this memorandum is made without prejudice to either Side‘s policy
perspective on military activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone.‖ 123 Given that
almost all incidents at sea involving China and the United States have occurred due to
different perspectives on foreign military activities in the EEZ, it is doubtful whether
the Rules of Behaviour MoU will help prevent such incidents. Moreover, unlike other
bilateral confidence building agreements, the two MoUs affirm that notifications
between parties is voluntary, and that neither side should disclose to third parties the
content of such notifications without the written consent of the other side. Some
scholars have expressed the view that ―these two features make it especially difficult for
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interested observers to know if the agreements are, in fact, being implemented.‖124
Indeed, the MoUs specify that the U.S. Department of Defense and China‘s Ministry of
National Defence are the only two agencies authorised to implement the MoUs. Thus, in
light of the confidential nature of the MOUs, ―it seems that other agencies within each
government may not receive detailed assessments of progress unless the other side
authorizes interagency information sharing.‖125
8.2.3.3 Bilateral agreements between littoral States
Other bilateral confidence building agreements between South China Sea littoral
States appear to be very limited. In October 2010, Vietnam and the Philippines signed a
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defence Cooperation, and in October 2011
the two navies adopted a MoU on Enhancement of Mutual Cooperation and Information
Sharing.126 In March 2012, the two navies signed an agreement on Standard Operating
Procedures on Personnel Interaction in the Vicinity of Southeast Cay Island and
Northeast Cay Island (in the Spratly Archipelago), with both sides agreeing to conduct
coordinated maritime patrols in these overlapping waters.127 Vietnam and the
Philippines also agreed to establish a ―hotline‖ between their coast guards for
information sharing on maritime incidents. In practice, however, there have been no
combined maritime patrols or exercises between the navies or coast guards of the two
States. According to Carlyle Thayer, defence cooperation between Vietnam and the
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Philippines ―is progressing but at a rudimentary level.‖128 Although Vietnam and
Malaysia signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Defense Cooperation in
August 2008,129 cooperation between the two navies appears to be very limited. China
and Vietnam signed a bilateral Agreement on Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement
of Maritime Issues in 2011, with the Agreement leading to the establishment of a
―hotline‖ in 2013 to deal with fisheries incidents in the South China Sea.130 However,
no guidelines have been developed for the safe conduct of their vessels and aircraft
when they encounter each other at sea. Indeed, the sheer number of incidents between
China and Vietnam in the South China Sea in recent years have proved that such
mechanisms are not very successful.
In summary, there have been a number of bilateral maritime confidence building
agreements involving the South China Sea littoral States. However, they appear to be
weak and play very limited roles in preventing incidents at sea. Moreover, as maritime
disputes in the South China Sea involve many countries, bilateral agreements are
incapable of preventing third parties from taking provocative action.
8.2.4

Track II level efforts
A number of Track II level workshops have been organised to address prevailing

issues in the South China Sea. These include: (i) the Workshop Process on Managing
Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (SCS Workshop Process) initiated by
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Indonesia in 1989; (ii) the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific
(CSCAP), established in 1993; (iii) EEZ Group 21.131
The SCS Workshop Process was initiated by Indonesia‘s Ambassador Hasjim
Djalal and Professor Ian Townsend-Gault of the University of British Columbia with
financial support from the Canadian International Development Agency.132 The SCS
Workshop Process is an informal workshop process, with all participants taking part in
their personal capacities (i.e., without representing governmental positions). It aims to
achieve three objectives: managing potential conflicts by seeking out areas of
cooperation; developing confidence building measures and processes; and exchanging
views through dialogue on certain issues.133 To date, there have been 25 Workshops and
a number of Technical Working Groups (TWG) and Group of Experts (GE)
meetings.134 In 2001, Canada decided to stop funding the workshop process because of
a ―lack of concrete results.‖135 However, as participants originally agreed to take part in
their personal capacities, thereby bypassing government bureaucracy, the SCS
Workshop Process has continued. Even so, there have been different assessments on the
success and failures of the SCS Workshop Process. In 1998, Townsend-Gault stated that
131
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―bringing together participants from the entire region was something of an
accomplishment.‖136 In this regard, it is important to note that the SCS Workshop
Process is the only regional forum focussing on the management of potential conflicts in
the South China Sea in which both Taiwan and China regularly participate. At the 16th
SCS Workshop held in Bali in 2006, Indonesian Ambassador Djalal commented that if
potential conflicts in the South China Sea have not become a reality, or have not
developed into conflict, the SCS Workshop Process will have been successful, and the
moment the potential conflicts become a reality, it may be considered a failure.137
However, other authors have expressed the view that the workshop processes have
―failed to get the claimant countries to work together meaningfully‖ 138, with participants
having had ―little influence on their respective governments for the most part.‖139
Indeed, there is some force in that assessment, because although discussions continue
even today, no outcome has been reached.
CSCAP is a non-governmental process for dialogue on security issues in the
Asia Pacific. The purpose of the CSCAP is to provide ―a structured process for regional
confidence building and security cooperation among countries and territories in the Asia
Pacific region.‖140 CSCAP currently has 21 full members representing all major States
in the Asia Pacific region. CSCAP activities are guided by a Steering Committee which
is co-chaired by a member from an ASEAN Member Committee and a member from a
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non-ASEAN Member Committee. There have been a number of Study Groups
established by the Steering Committee for the purpose of producing memoranda that
outline ―practical policy-oriented responses for consideration at Track One (official)
level.‖141 To date, 27 CSCAP Memoranda addressing a variety of issues have been
published and circulated to regional decision and policy makers. Regarding navigation
and communication at sea, these Memoranda include Guidelines for Regional Maritime
Cooperation; a Memorandum on Cooperation for Law and Order at Sea; Guidelines for
Maritime Cooperation in Enclosed and Semi-enclosed Seas and Similar Sea Areas of
the Asia Pacific; and a Memorandum on Maritime CBMs, Trust and Managing
Incidents at Sea.142 It is important to note, however, that CSCAP does not provide
detailed guidelines or proposals for the safety of navigation and communication at sea,
or for present purposes, the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft.
Unlike the SCS Workshop Process and the CSCAP, however, EEZ Group 21
does focus on the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft, particularly in the
EEZs of coastal States. EEZ Group 21 was a group of senior officials, legal experts and
maritime specialists primarily from Asia-Pacific States who participated in a series of
meeting held from 2002-2005, sponsored by Japanese Ocean Policy Research
Foundation. The aim of Group 21 was to produce ―a set of non-binding, voluntary
principles, which could provide the basis for a common understanding and approach to
issues arising from the implementation of the EEZ regime.‖143 In September 2005,
Group 21 reached an agreement named Guidelines for Navigation and Overflight in the
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Exclusive Economic Zone (Guidelines).144 These Guidelines are based primarily on the
LOSC, the practice of States, as well as emerging ―soft‖ law, 145 and are designed to
―ensure the safety and security of navigation in the EEZ‖ and to ―promote
understanding of the rights and duties of States conducting military and intelligence
gathering activities in the EEZ of another State, and thus contribute to peace, good
order, and security at sea.‖146
Significantly, the Guidelines provide definitions for certain activities in the EEZ
which are absent from the LOSC, among them ―hydrographic surveys‖, ―maritime
scientific research‖, ―maritime surveillance‖, and ―military activities‖. In addition to
these definitions, the Guidelines contain substantive provisions covering the above
activities. However, the Guidelines have failed to garner support from concerned States,
and regional organisations have refused to discuss them on the basis that they are ―too
ambitious in their scope by covering more activities and in greater detail than [is]
acceptable to some stakeholders in regional maritime security.‖147 For example, article
XI of the Guidelines (which addresses military activities in the EEZ), contains 8 subparagraphs covering military activities in such detail that that the freedoms of
navigation and overflight in the EEZ are somewhat restricted.148 Article IX of the
Guidelines (regarding hydrographic surveys), states that ―[h]ydrographic surveying
should only be conducted in the EEZ of another State with the consent of the Coastal
State.‖149 As the LOSC does not contain any provisions regarding hydrographic surveys
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in foreign EEZs, this particular article has not been accepted by some States, including
the United States. Indeed, in this regard Mark Valencia has asserted that the United
States has rejected ―any and all such guidelines as unacceptable.‖150 According to Raul
Pedrozo, ―such guidelines are clearly coastal State-oriented and are aimed at restricting
high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight set forth in UNCLOS and other
international instruments.‖151 Pedrozo has proffered the view that the Guidelines ―are
simply an effort to renegotiate the EEZ provisions of UNCLOS that were widely
accepted by the majority of the delegations at UNCLOS III.‖152
In 2012 and 2013, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation organised two
meetings in Hakone and Tokyo to review the Guidelines and make them more widely
accepted.153 One of the outcomes of these meetings was a change in the name of the
Guidelines to the Principles for Building Confidence and Security in the Exclusive
Economic Zone of the Asia-Pacific (Principles). The main focus points of the Principles
are ―the central issues of misunderstanding and ambiguity with regard to rights and
duties in the EEZ.‖154 The Principles still reflect the chief objectives of the Guidelines;
however, they are less detailed in order to ―avoid restricting activities in the EEZ more
than necessary.‖155
Another outcome of the two meetings was the deletion of articles II and III from
the Guidelines. The rights and duties of coastal and other States are now found in
articles IV and V of the Principles, and cover maritime surveillance and military
activities. Article VII of the Guidelines, which dealt with the suppression of piracy and
150
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other unlawful activities, has also been deleted ―with the recognition that international
antipiracy activities have now become quite common.‖156 Two new provisions – article
III on ―Due Regard in the EEZ‖ and article VIII on ―Provisional Arrangements‖ have
been added to the Principles. However, the Principles do not define the term ―due
regard‖, and therefore article III of the Principles essentially repeats what is already
mentioned in the LOSC. Article VIII of the Principles attempts to clarify LOSC article
74 with regard to provisional arrangements where boundaries between adjacent EEZs
have not been agreed upon. This article states that: ―Such arrangements include standard
operating procedures, information-sharing, and prior notification of military activities in
areas of overlapping claims…‖157 However, assuming concerned coastal States agree
with this provision, how are the activities of third parties in these overlapping EEZs to
be treated? As the LOSC does not require foreign States to give prior notice to coastal
States for the carrying out of military activities in the EEZ, article VIII of the Principles
seems to be inconsistent with the LOSC. Article IX of the Guidelines regarding
hydrographic surveying was also deleted, with the issue of hydrographic surveys being
subsumed under the broader category of ―Maritime Scientific Research‖ in article VII of
the Principles. Article VII (4) of the Principles states that ―[h]ydrographic surveying in
the EEZ requires consent of the coastal State when the data collected affects the
exclusive rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State.‖158 However, this article is quite
difficult to implement, as there are no objective means to assess whether and to what
extent the data collected affects the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State.
Table 8.1 shows the differences between the Guidelines and the Principles.
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Table 8.1 Contents of the Guidelines and the Principles
Guidelines
Principles
I. Definitions

I. Introduction

II. Rights and Duties of the Coastal State

II. Definitions

III. Rights and Duties of Other States

III. Due Regard in the EEZ

IV. Maritime Surveillance

IV. Maritime Surveillance

V. Military Activities

V. Military Activities

VI. Non-interference

with

Electronic VI. Non-interference with Electronic

Systems

Systems

VII. Suppression of Piracy and Other VII. Maritime Scientific Research
Unlawful Activities
VIII. Maritime Scientific Research

VIII. Provisional Arrangements

IX. Hydrographic Surveying

IX. Transparency of Legislation

X. Transparency of Legislation

Source: Kazumine Akimoto, Introduction to the Principles for Building
Confidence and Security in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Asia-Pacific

In summary, the Guidelines and Principles are laudable Track II level efforts in
building confidence and security in the EEZ. However, as they contain a number of
provisions that are not accepted by maritime States (including the United States), it is
unlikely that the Guidelines or the Principles will be discussed at any official regional
forum.
8.2.5

The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program
In response to excessive maritime claims by numerous States, in 1979 the U.S.

government (under the Carter Administration) established a formal program known as
the U.S. Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program to challenge excessive claims by ―a
310

peaceful exercise of the rights and freedoms of navigation and overflight recognized
under international law.‖159 The FON program is a presidential-national level program
jointly administered by the Department of Defense and the Department of State, and
based on the legal regime of the LOSC.160 Put simply, the Department of State responds
to excessive maritime claims through diplomatic protests or consultations with the
States concerned, while the Department of Defense responds through operational
assertions carried out by the Navy. According to J. Ashley Roach and Robert W. Smith,
―the necessity for diplomatic communications and operational assertions to maintain the
balance of interests reflected in the LOS Convention as law is often not well
understood.‖161 More than 30 years after the entry into force of the LOSC, the United
States remains outside of the Convention. However, the FON program has been
continued as a means to ―exercise and assert [U.S.] navigation and overflight rights and
freedoms on a worldwide basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of
interests reflected in the [Law of the Sea] convention.‖162 Since the FON Program
began, more than 110 diplomatic protests have been filed and over 300 operational
assertions have been conducted.163 According to Roach and Smith, the FON Program
has been successful in reducing excessive maritime claims and persuading States to
bring their domestic legislation into close conformity with the LOSC. 164 Moreover, the
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FON Program has had somewhat of a deterrent effect, with a number of States
eschewing excessive maritime claims for fear of being challenged by the United
States165 One example of the FON Program preserving navigational rights and freedoms
can be seen in the 1988 Black Sea ―bumping‖ incident between U.S. and former Soviet
warships. Indeed, this FON operation led to an agreement between the two maritime
powers over the interpretation of LOSC provisions on the innocent passage of warships
in the territorial sea.166 There have also been a number of operational assertions under
the FON Program to challenge excessive maritime claims made by South China Sea
littoral States, including China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and
Vietnam.167 During the period of 1 October 2013 to 30 September 2014, the FON
Program carried out 19 State challenges in order to preserve the rights, freedoms, and
uses of the sea and airspace guaranteed to all States under the LOSC.168 Indeed, for
several years the United States has challenged China‘s excessive maritime boundary
claims, as well as the State‘s imposed restrictions on foreign military activities in its
EEZ and claims to security jurisdiction outside of its territorial sea.169 Recently the FON
Program has challenged China‘s restriction on foreign aircraft flying through an Air
Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) where there is no intent to enter China‘s national
airspace, as well as to China‘s domestic law criminalising survey activities by foreign
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entities in its EEZ.170 There have also been a number of incidents between U.S. and
Chinese vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea.171 In response to China‘s massive
―land reclamations‖ in the Spratlys, the United States sent its Freedom-class littoral
combat ship, the USS Fort Worth, to patrol the maritime area near China‘s artificial
islands in the Spratlys on 11 May 2015. During the patrol, the USS Fort Worth came
across multiple Chinese warships, but as Commander Matt Kawas of the Fort Worth
confirmed, the interactions between the warships of the two States was professional and
in accordance with CUES 2014.172 Indeed, this interaction represents a positive sign for
the implementation of CUES 2014. Even so, CUES 2014 will be tested if the United
States continues to patrol this maritime area. And in light of several recent incidents in
the area, it would appear that the U.S. Navy has no plans to cease its close monitoring
of the region. On 20 May 2015, when a U.S. P8-A Poseidon surveillance aircraft
conducted overflights over China‘s artificial islands in the Spratlys, it was warned by
the Chinese navy that it was approaching ―a military alert zone‖ and that it should leave
the area ―to avoid misjudgement.‖173 However, the U.S. pilot replied that the aircraft
was conducting lawful military activities outside national airspace.174 In October 2015,
a U.S. guided-missile destroyer, the USS Lassen, conducted a freedom of navigation
patrol within 12 nautical miles of an artificial island built by China on the Subi Reef in
the Spratlys175. In January 2016, the USS Curtis Wilbur, exercised innocent passage
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within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan
without giving prior notice to any of these claimant States.176 And in May 2016 the USS
William P. Lawrence, exercised innocent passage within 12 nautical miles of Fiery
Cross Reef in the Spratly Islands, which the arbitral tribunal classifies as a ―rock‖ under
the LOSC.177 At the 2015 Shangri-La Dialogue, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton
Carter asserted that artificial islands do not confer sovereign rights.178 Carter also
stressed that ―there should be no mistake: The United States will fly, sail and operate
wherever international law allows, as we do all around the world.‖ 179 Likewise,
Australia has asserted that it will continue to conduct patrols over the disputed islands in
the South China Sea. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, then Australian
Defence Minister Kevin Andrews stated that ―we‘ve been doing it for decades, we‘re
doing it currently...and we‘ll continue to do it into the future.‖180 On 23 June 2015, in an
exercise with the Philippine military, a Japanese P3-C Orion surveillance plane circled
over disputed waters near the Spratlys for the first time.181 In an interview with the Wall
Street Journal, Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, Chief of Joint Staff of Japan‘s SelfDefence Forces, proposed that ―we don‘t have any plans to conduct surveillance in the
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South China Sea currently but depending on the situation, I think there is a chance we
could consider doing so.‖182 After the ruling of the arbitral tribunal, it is possible that
Japan will soon join the United States to patrol the South China Sea.
China has certainly adopted an aggressive stance in claiming sovereignty and
sovereign rights in the South China Sea. In addition, China has refused to take part in
international arbitration proceedings to settle disputes arising from the application of
LOSC provisions, proudly proclaiming that ―China views the law as a malleable tool to
be trumpeted when it supports Chinese claims and ignored when it stands in their
way.‖183 As China does not abide by the LOSC, other South China Sea littoral States
(and the international community as a whole), may be justified in supporting initiatives
similar to the FON Program to ensure the LOSC is respected and that the freedoms of
navigation and overflight are safeguarded.
8.3

Conclusion
A number of regional initiatives have been devised to fill the gaps in the

international law regime on the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea.
These initiatives include regional agreements; bilateral agreements between States
concerned; Track II level regional workshops; and unilateral State efforts. However, it
appears that such efforts have not been very successful in preventing contentious
incidents in the South China Sea. The geopolitical complexity of the South China Sea,
coupled with the existing conflicts between regional States over LOSC provisions, have
made this maritime area vulnerable to conflict. Indeed, incidents involving the passage
of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft show no signs of abating. With increasing
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tensions between States over sovereignty disputes and the freedom of navigation in the
South China Sea, and particularly China‘s aggressive pattern of behaviour, the need for
regional cooperation in terms of conflict management and conflict avoidance is
arguably more pressing than ever before.
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9 CHALLENGES AND THE WAY FORWARD
9.1

Introduction
Ensuring the safety and freedom of navigation at sea has been a critical State issue

for centuries. Indeed, this issue constitutes a fundamental element of the international
law of the sea and the law of the air. However, as international agreements are
invariably the product of compromise, there are often gaps and ambiguities in their
provisions. These gaps and ambiguities can be intentional or unintentional, and arise
due to a lack of agreement between State Parties.1 As a result, States tend to adopt
conflicting interpretations of international law provisions – interpretations which accord
with their own vested interests. The passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at
sea is a prime example of an issue on which States have adopted divergent opinions.
Multiple incidents have occurred in the South China Sea region due to differing
interpretations of international law provisions by coastal States and maritime user
States. In order to fill the gaps and ambiguities in international maritime and aviation
law, and to promote the safety and freedom of navigation and overflight, a number of
regional initiatives have been devised. However, as demonstrated in Chapter Eight, such
efforts have had limited success. This chapter will illustrate the remaining challenges
regarding the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea, in the South
China Sea. The discussion will also provide a number of legal and policy
recommendations for addressing these challenges, while highlighting the implications
for the future security, safety and freedom of navigation and overflight in the region.

1

See Dennis Mandsager, 'The U.S. Freedom of Navigation Program: Policy, Procedure, and Future' in
Michael N. Schmitt (ed), The Law of Military Operations (Naval War College Press, 1998) , 124.
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9.2

Uncertain issues in international law
The first uncertain issue in the international law of the sea concerns the

provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) –
specifically the innocent passage of warships in the territorial sea of coastal States. As
discussed in Chapter Four, the issue of whether warships enjoy the right of innocent
passage, or whether coastal States require prior notification or authorisation in order for
such a right to be exercised, was an area of disagreement between coastal States and
maritime user States.2 As a product of compromise, the LOSC does not contain any
provisions directly addressing the innocent passage of warships. The LOSC affirms that
―matters not regulated by this Convention continue to be governed by the rules and
principles of general international law.‖3 However, as States have adopted different
views on the question of the innocent passage of warships, their practices are far from
uniform.4 This divergence of state practice, as well as the lack of judicial decisions
regarding the innocent passage of warships, makes the formation of a universal
customary rule on the topic very unlikely. Although more than 30 years have passed
since the entry into force of the LOSC, at least 40 States still assert some form of
requirement, either prior authorisation or notification, in their national laws and
regulations for the passage of foreign warships through their territorial seas. 5 In the
South China Sea region, China requires prior authorisation, Taiwan, Vietnam and the
Philippines all require prior notification for the passage of foreign warships through

2

See Chapter Four for detailed discussion; see also Thomas Windsor, 'Innocent passage of warships in
East Asian territorial seas' (2011) 3(3) Australian Journal of Maritime and Oceans Affairs 73, 73.
3
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982 (entered into
force 16 November 1994), [hereafter LOSC], Preamble.
4
Zou Keyuan, 'Innocent Passage for Warships: The Chinese Doctrine and Practice' (1998) 29 Ocean
Development & International Law 195, 198.
5
Shao Jin, 'The question of innocent passage of warships after UNCLOS III' (1989) (January) Marine
Policy 56, 66; see Keyuan, above n 4, 206; see also Stuart Kaye, Freedom of Navigation in Indo-Pacific
Region, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No 22 (Sea Power Centre, 2008), 8.
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their territorial seas, while the current domestic regulations of Indonesia, Malaysia and
Brunei are silent on the issue altogether.6
The second uncertain issue concerns foreign military activities in the EEZ.
Indeed, the LOSC does not prescribe what types of military activities are permissible or
prohibited in the EEZ of a foreign State. Coastal states have not been granted any right
to regulate foreign military activities in their EEZ, while no express right regarding
military activities has been granted to maritime user states. Commenting on this during
UNCLOS III, the President of the Conference, Tommy T.B. Koh, stated that ―nowhere
is it clearly stated whether a third state may or may not conduct military activities in the
exclusive economic zone of a coastal state. But, it was the general understanding that
the text we negotiated and agreed upon would permit such activities to be conducted.‖ 7
Unfortunately this issue remains uncertain until today, and is arguably one of the most
controversial issues to be debated in the international law of the sea. Some South China
Sea coastal States, particularly China and Malaysia, have restrictive views on foreign
military activities in their EEZs, while other maritime user States consider such
activities to be part of the freedoms of navigation and overflight granted by the LOSC.
The third uncertain issue centres on the regime of islands under the LOSC.
Article 121 of the LOSC defines an island as ―a naturally formed area of land,
surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.‖8 Under this article, an island
may be entitled to a territorial sea, a contiguous zone, an exclusive economic zone and a
continental shelf.9 However, ―[rocks] which cannot sustain human habitation or

6

See Chapter four for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
Quoted in Jon M. Van Dyke, 'Military ships and planes operating in the exclusive economic zone of
another country' (2004) 28 Marine Policy 29, 31; see also Jing Geng, 'The Legality of Foreign Military
Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone under UNCLOS' (2012) 28(74) Merkourios 22, 26.
8
LOSC, art 121 (1).
9
LOSC, art 121 (2).
7
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economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf.‖10 In its final award issued on 12 July 2016, the arbitral tribunal in the
Philippines-China arbitration ruled that ―none of the high-tide features in the Spratly
Islands are capable of sustaining human habitation or an economic life of their own
within the meaning of those terms in Article 121(3) of the [LOSC].‖11 Clive Schofield
has commented that by clarifying the status of various offshore features in the South
China Sea for the purpose of article 121, the tribunal‘s decision ―is hugely significant
for the Law of the Sea‘s development and international law generally.‖12 However, it is
important to note that the arbitral tribunal‘s award is only legally binding on the parties
to the dispute.13 This raises the question: what is the position of other major powers? As
just two examples, the United States claims an EEZ from Kingman Reef in Micronesia,
and Japan claims an EEZ from Okinotorishima. However, according to M. Taylor
Fravel, ―[u]nder the precedent established by the tribunal, these features may not be
entitled to the EEZ that states claim from them.‖14 If the tribunal‘s award is respected by
States, then even though the tribunal‘s decision will not directly change the navigational
regimes of the LOSC, it would have indirect effects on navigational rights in the region
by reducing the EEZs for which States have different views on navigational rights.
The fourth uncertain issue is the safe navigation of sovereign immune vessels at
sea. The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) are

10

LOSC, art 121(3).
South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v People's Republic of China) (Case No. 2013-19)
(Award) (Permanent Court of Arbitration, 12 July 2016) [646].
12
Clive Schofield, Explainer: what are the legal implications of the South China Sea ruling? (13 July
2016) Conversation <http://theconversation.com/explainer-what-are-the-legal-implications-of-the-southchina-sea-ruling-62421>.
13
LOSC, Annex VII, art 11; see also Sam Bateman et al, 'Assessing the South China Sea Award' (2016)
108(August) Strategic Insights 1, 2.
14
M Taylor Fravel, The Strategic Implications of the South China Sea Tribunal‟s Award (13 July 2016)
National Interest <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-south-china-sea-tribunals-ruling-maybackfire-16951>.
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widely regarded as the maritime ―rules of the road‖ and ―apply to all vessels upon the
high seas and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels.‖15
Accordingly, sovereign immune vessels (with the exception of submerged submarines)
are subject to COLREGs.16 There are a number of provisions in COLREGs that
expressly apply to warships, including aircraft carriers, minesweepers and
replenishment ships.17 However, rule 1 of the regulations makes it clear that a party to
COLREGs shall attempt to achieve ―the closest possible compliance‖ if it has
―determined that a vessel of special construction or purpose cannot comply fully with
the provisions of any of these Rules.‖18 Due to the ―special construction or purpose‖ of
sovereign immune vessels, especially warships, these vessels are not required to comply
with all the rules of COLREGs. It is for this reason that a number of incidents at sea
agreements have been struck which apply exclusively to naval vessels and which
reinforce the spirit of COLREGs.19 For instance, the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union states that the Parties ―shall take
measures to instruct the commanding officers of their respective ships to observe
strictly the letter and spirit of [COLREGs].‖20 The Code for Unplanned Encounters at
Sea (CUES 2014) also provides that Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) navies
―are expected‖ to comply with COLREGs.21 However, as previously mentioned in

15

International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, adopted 20 October 1972 (entered into
force 15 July 1977) [hereafter COLREGs] rule 1.
16
As the COLREGs definition of ‗vessel‘ includes every description of water craft, including nondisplacement craft and seaplanes, used or cable of being used as a means of transportation on water,
submarines fall outside the definition.
17
COLREGs, rule 3.
18
COLREGs, rule 1.
19
See Chapter seven for a discussion of several Incidents at Sea agreements.
20
Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and the Government of The
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas, signed 25
May 1972 (entered into force 25 May 1972), art II.
21
Western Pacific Naval Symposium,Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea, adopted 22 April 2014,
point 2.0.
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Chapter Eight, non-naval law enforcement vessels and aircraft are not encompassed by
CUES. Another convention which focuses on safe navigation at sea is the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). SOLAS is ―generally regarded as the
most important of all international treaties concerning the safety of merchant ships.‖22
Nevertheless, SOLAS does not apply to warships, naval auxiliaries or other ships
owned or operated by a Contracting Government and used only on government noncommercial service.
The fifth uncertain issue in international law relates to the interaction between
military aircraft in international airspace. The Convention on International Civil
Aviation (Chicago Convention) and the LOSC both require States to ensure their state
aircraft operate with ―due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.‖ 23 The
Chicago Convention also requires that ―[an] aircraft shall not be operated in such
proximity to other aircraft as to create a collision hazard.‖24 Unfortunately, the Chicago
Convention does not contain any provisions regarding the operation of State aircraft,
including military and law enforcement aircraft, beyond the land areas and territorial
waters of coastal States.
Lastly, there are no international rules governing the safe manoeuvre of
submarines at sea. The LOSC requires submarines to navigate on the surface and to
show their flags when they transit through the territorial sea of a coastal State.25
However, according to Sam Bateman, ―due to the very nature of submarine operations,
this provision is honoured more in its breach rather than in its observation except in

22

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974 International Maritime
Organization <http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/InternationalConvention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx>.
23
Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed 7 December 1944 (entered into force 4 April 1947)
[hereafter Chicago Convention], art 3; LOSC, arts 39, 54 & 87.
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Chicago Convention, art 3.
25
LOSC, art 20.
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circumstances when navigational conditions, particularly water depth, require that the
submarine should travel on the surface.‖26 Submarines are treated as surface vessels
when they transit above the water, and hence they are expected to comply with the
―rules of the road‖ like other surface vessels. However, when submarines transit
submerged there are no rules that apply to them. Indeed, it is impossible for submerged
submarines of different States to communicate with each other as radio waves do not
travel well underwater. Moreover, as submarines have very limited command, control
and communication capabilities when submerged, if the commanding officers of the
respective submarines fail to handle a tense situation in a professional way (and without
the benefit of personnel ashore giving directions), the consequences could be very
serious. With an increasing number of submarines in the South China Sea, the safety of
submarine operations in the region is a challenging issue. This has led Singapore‘s
Navy Chief, Rear Admiral Lai Chung Han, to assert that: ―[W]ith an increasing number
of submarines operating in that congested and confined water space, it‘s perhaps no
exaggeration to say that it is an accident waiting to happen.‖27
9.3

Key drivers behind state practice
As the international law of the sea contains gaps and ambiguities, state practice

in the South China Sea has been divergent. This section will outline a number of key
drivers behind the practice of South China Sea littoral States in relation to the passage
of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft.
The first key driver is preserving the sovereign rights and security interests of
littoral States. China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei all have
26

Sam Bateman, 'Perils of the Deep: The Dangers of Submarine Proliferation in the Seas of East Asia'
(2011) 7(1) Asian Security 61, 72.
27
Quoted in Sharon Chen, Busy South China Sea an Accident in the Making, Singapore Says (20 May
2015) Bloomberg <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-20/busy-south-china-sea-anaccident-in-the-making-singapore-says>.
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overlapping sovereignty claims in the South China Sea. However, as none of these
claimant States are willing to compromise their claims, they have all tried to strengthen
and consolidate their sovereignty and sovereign rights through various strategies. By
virtue of its economic and military power, China has adopted a more assertive posture
in its disputes with other Southeast Asian claimants. Indeed, China has used navy ships,
maritime law enforcement vessels, fishing vessels, as well as oil-exploration rigs to
safeguard its maritime claims in the South China Sea, ignoring international law rules
and norms. Due to the operation of U.S. vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea,
China applies a restrictive view on the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft
in the region, thereby allaying some of its security concerns. As a rising maritime
power, China has become more confident in its dealings with the United States in the
South China Sea. However, in order to avoid a major conflict, China has thus far used
its civilian law enforcement forces and fishing vessels to confront U.S. military vessels
operating in the area. Other Southeast Asian claimants, particularly Vietnam and the
Philippines, have modified their domestic laws and regulations so that they conform to
the LOSC, thereby gaining the support of the international community and maritime
user States. Nevertheless, due to security concerns, the laws and regulations of these
Southeast Asian States still contain some form of restriction on the passage of foreign
military vessels and aircraft in their maritime zones, particularly in the territorial sea.
The second key driver is maintaining access to valuable resources in the South
China Sea. China‘s placement of an oil rig in Vietnam‘s claimed EEZ is one example of
a clash over resources. Furthermore, as the disputed areas of the South China Sea are
believed to be rich in fish stocks as well as oil and gas deposits, certain States have
strengthened their maritime law enforcement capabilities to better protect their resource
claims. In the near future, there will undoubtedly be a heavy concentration of sovereign
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immune vessels and aircraft deployed to the region. While China has become more
assertive and aggressive in the South China Sea, other States have shown no signs of
conceding anytime soon. As a result, intentional and unintentional incidents will
continue to take place.
The third key driver is safeguarding the strategic interests of other concerned
States in the South China Sea. As the security of sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
in the South China Sea is pivotal to many States, any disruption to seaborne trade would
pose significant threats to regional economies. As a result, maintaining the safety and
freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea is a key strategic interest
for many States, particularly those dependent on the United States for their security.
Indeed, by virtue of the navigation rights granted by the LOSC, the United States has
been conducting freedom of navigation (FON) operational assertions in the South China
Sea. By bolstering its territorial sovereignty and maritime claims in the South China
Sea, China has attempted to push the United States from its mainland while projecting
its power over the region. Thus, China and the United States have maintained
contradictory views over the passage of military vessels and aircraft in their respective
maritime zones. As a rising maritime power, China has become more assertive in
enforcing its position. The United States, however, will continue to assert the freedom
of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea in accordance with prevailing
international law, as well as to maintain its power and influence in the region.
9.4

Regional initiatives have been ineffective
As discussed in Chapter Eight, there have been a number of regional initiatives

at both the governmental level (Track-I) and non-governmental level (Track-II) to
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address problems relating to the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at
sea. However, for reasons canvassed below, these efforts have had very limited success.
There have been no regional or bilateral agreements at Track I level that address
the passage of foreign warships in the territorial sea of coastal States, or the issue of
foreign military activities in the EEZ. In addition, all regional initiatives and bilateral
agreements discussed in Chapter Eight are non-legally binding mechanisms. As a result,
the States concerned may not always be willing to act in conformity with these
agreements. Furthermore, Sam Bateman has highlighted that regional agreements
including CUES 2014 and the Rules of Behaviour for Safety of Air and Maritime
Encounters (Rules of Behaviour MOU) operate at a tactical level rather than at an
operational or strategic level.28 Therefore, according to Bateman, it is essential to have a
regional agreement in place that focuses on operational and strategic issues such as
―safety zones around disputed features, restrictions on particular types of operations in
particular areas such as submarine ―no go‖ areas, hot lines, operational transparency,
and prior notice of operations.‖29
Moreover, within disputed waters of the South China Sea, littoral States operate
different types of (non-naval) law enforcement vessels and aircraft, including coast
guard vessels, fisheries patrol vessels, as well as maritime law surveillance vessels.
However, no safety guidelines have been devised for the interaction between these
vessels and aircraft, or between naval vessels and military or state aircraft at sea. As a
result, many contentious incidents involving these types of vessels and aircraft have
occurred in the South China Sea region as described in Chapter Seven. Incidents
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involving coast guards and other civil maritime law enforcement services generally
carry a lower risk of catastrophic clashes compared to warships. However, as Richard
Bitzinger argues, ―if clashes increase or the stakes are raised, they could escalate into
more

violent

action

involving

navies.‖30

Unfortunately,

no

guidelines

or

recommendations for the safe manoeuvre of these types of vessels and aircraft have
been discussed thus far.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could potentially play an
important role in maintaining stable maritime security and freedom of navigation in the
region. However, it appears that differences between ASEAN States on South China
Sea issues persist. As discussed in previous chapters, all ten ASEAN States have
different strategic interests in the South China Sea. As a result, it is difficult for ASEAN
to speak with one voice on maritime disputes in the region. In November 2015, the
ASEAN Defence Ministers‘ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) was held in Malaysia with the
participation of ten ASEAN defence ministers and eight of their counterparts from the
United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, China, Russia and
India. However, for the first time in ASEAN‘s history, a meeting of this type failed to
issue a joint declaration on South China Sea issues as scheduled. According to
Malaysian Defence Minister Hishammuddin Hussein, ―the decision was made by
ASEAN because there is no consensus, so no joint declaration [was] signed.‖31 Another
problem within ASEAN is that decision-making is based on consultation and
consensus.32 If one pro-Beijing member does not agree on a particular issue, ASEAN

30

Richard A. Bitzinger, 'IMDEX ASIA 2015 Coast Guards in the South China Sea: Proxy Fighters?'
(2015) 121(20 May) RSIS Commentaries 1, 2.
31
Eunice Au, Signing of declaration at defence forum cancelled over South China Sea (4 November
2015) Straits Times <http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/signing-of-declaration-at-defence-forumcancelled-over-south-china-sea-report>.
32
Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, adopted on 20 November 2007, art 20.

327

cannot issue a declaration contrary to China‘s interests. The disunity within ASEAN
over South China Sea issues surfaced again in June 2016, when ASEAN foreign
ministers retracted a joint statement voicing ―serious concern‖ over ongoing
developments in the South China Sea which undermine peace, security and stability in
the region. In this instance, the joint statement was retracted only a few hours after it
was released. For Southeast Asia specialist, Ian Storey, ―[i]t really looks not only like
ASEAN is in disarray but also that it lacks any backbone.‖33 It is clear that maintaining
security and the freedoms of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea is very
important to the region; however, eliciting a collective, unified voice from ASEAN on
this issue has been fraught with difficulty.
Another issue affecting the success of regional initiatives is the Taiwan factor.
Taiwan is one of the claimants in the South China Sea disputes. However, due to
pressure from China, Taiwan cannot participate in any official regional security forum.
Taiwan and China share identical maritime claims in the South China Sea, particularly
the nine-dash line claims, with neither State clarifying whether they lay claim to all
islands or waters within the nine-dash line. Other claimant States wish to exclude
Taiwan from South China Sea negotiations because of their ―one-China‖ policy, but
also due to concerns that China and Taiwan could cooperate to strengthen their identical
maritime claims in the region.34 Taiwan currently occupies Itu Aba Island, the largest
land feature in the Spratlys, and also boasts one of the largest fishing fleets in the
region.35 Moreover, Taiwanese coast guard vessels regularly conduct maritime patrols
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in this area.36 For this reason, any Code of Conduct or related agreement related to
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea which does not have Taiwan‘s
participation would not be fully effective. As the arbitral tribunal has discounted the
nine-dash line, ASEAN could encourage Taiwan to clarify its maritime claims in the
South China Sea in accordance with international law. Provided Taiwan‘s response
accords with prevailing international law, ASEAN could then try to accept Taiwan as a
party to the regional security forum, thus helping to improve the effectiveness of
regional initiatives. As ASEAN member States have openly acknowledged the ―one
China‖ policy, it is unlikely that they will invite Taiwan to participate in any official
regional forum. However, inviting Taiwan to participate at Track II level initiatives
could help overcome this obstacle.
At Track II level, as noted in Chapter Eight, EEZ Group 21 has issued
Guidelines and Principles documents. However, neither document has been adopted at
any official regional forum. The reason behind the lack of uptake of either the
Guidelines or the Principles is that both interpret the provisions of the LOSC in a
regional but not global context. While most States around the world respect the
freedoms of navigation and overflight in the EEZ as codified in the LOSC, some States
in the Asia-Pacific, and particularly those in the South China Sea region, apply
restrictive views to the issue of foreign military activities in the EEZ. Therefore, any
attempt to reinterpret the provisions of the LOSC narrowly and with a particular
regional focus is unlikely to be successful. Moreover, States went through many years
of compromise, consensus-building and negotiation before the Convention was agreed.
As a result, the LOSC contains provisions which are intentionally vague and
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ambiguous. Attempts to clarify these intentional ambiguities at Track-II level initiatives
and with a regional focus are unlikely to be successful.
9.5

Maritime disputes are unlikely to be resolved
There are a number of reasons why the resolution of maritime disputes in the

South China Sea is highly unlikely. Firstly, it is important to note that disputes may be
resolved peacefully – either through negotiation between the States concerned or by
referring the matter to an international court or tribunal. China, however, has eschewed
submitting its territorial and maritime delimitation disputes to an independent and
impartial body.37 Accordingly, the resolution of China‘s sovereignty disputes by an
international court or tribunal is highly unlikely. Lee Kuan Yew, the late former Prime
Minister of Singapore, has opined that ―it is naive to believe that a strong China will
accept the conventional definition of what parts of the sea around it are under its
jurisdiction.‖38 Indeed, as China‘s maritime power grows, ―it seems less willing to be
beholden to legal norms enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.‖39
Secondly, most of the territorial sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea are
multilateral disputes involving more than two States, but China invariably insists on
resolving disputes through bilateral negotiations. This strategy gives China the upper
hand when dealing with smaller States. However, there is no logical basis for resolving
multilateral disputes through bilateral negotiations. Perhaps China continues this
37
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delaying strategy in order to strengthen its territorial sovereignty and associated
maritime claims in the long term, rather than striving for peaceful, short-term dispute
resolution procedures.
Thirdly, sovereignty claims over offshore features in the South China Sea are
already included in the domestic laws of several littoral States. For example, the Law on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of China states that the territorial land of
China ―includes the mainland and its offshore islands, Taiwan and the various affiliated
islands including Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha Islands,
Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to the People's Republic of
China.‖40 The Law of the Sea of Vietnam states that ―[t]his Law provides for the
baseline, the internal waters, the territorial sea…the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos
and other archipelagos under the sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Viet
Nam.‖41 Similarly, the 2009 Baseline Law of the Philippines affirms that the Philippines
exercises sovereignty over the Kalayaan Island Group (part of the Spratly Islands) and
Bajo de Masinloc (also known as Scarborough Shoal).42 That these States have made
such explicit reference to offshore features in their domestic legislation suggests they
are unlikely to compromise their sovereignty claims in any bilateral or multilateral
negotiation.
Lastly, resolving sovereignty disputes over these offshore features requires not
only compromise but also a strong political will from the parties involved. However,
with the rise of nationalist sentiment among claimant States, particularly China,
Vietnam and the Philippines, it will be difficult for the respective governments to accept
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any proposal that results in strong domestic criticism or protest. Wu Jianmin, a former
Chinese diplomatic spokesman, has highlighted the difficulties for a Chinese leader to
publicly speak of compromise with China‘s neighbours in the South China Sea,
propounding that ―[y]ou would be a ‗traitor.‘‖43 Recent demonstrations in both China
and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal, and in Vietnam over the Haiyang Shiyou
981 oil rig incident, are good illustrations of the strong sense of nationalism in these
particular States.44
9.6

Existing political and strategic mistrust between States concerned
Various maritime incidents in the South China Sea, together with China‘s

extensive artificial island-building program and its pattern of aggressive behaviour in
the region, have resulted in political and strategic mistrust between China and other
littoral States. The involvement of external players in the South China Sea, particularly
the United States, has also added to the strategic distrust between the United States and
China. While smaller littoral States of the South China Sea welcome the United States
playing a constructive role in the region, they still appear to be cautious in their policies
towards the United States. Indeed, the historical and cultural baggage that these States
bring to the negotiating table, as well as their different political ideologies and strategic
national interests, are all factors that have affected their mutual trust in the United
States. The irony, however, is that high levels of trust among the major players in the
South China Sea, particularly the United States, China, the Philippines and Vietnam, are
critical to the stability and security of the region.
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9.6.1

Vietnam-China relations
After more than a decade of hostility which began with the 1979 border conflict,

Vietnam and China officially normalised their relationship in 1991. Since this time, the
bilateral relationship has evolved substantially under the motto of ―friendly
neighbourliness, comprehensive cooperation, long-term stability and looking toward the
future‖. In 2008, the relationship between the two States solidified into a comprehensive
strategic partnership, paving the way for future cooperative milestones. 45 In December
2000, China and Vietnam reached an agreement on maritime boundary delimitation in
the Gulf of Tonkin. This agreement was the first maritime boundary agreement in the
region to involve China. In October 2011, China and Vietnam signed an Agreement on
Basic Principles Guiding the Settlement of Maritime-Related Issues, with the two States
committing to dispute resolution procedures based on legal processes and principles
defined by international law, as well as ―through friendly talks and negotiations.‖46
However, numerous maritime incidents in the South China Sea between Chinese and
Vietnamese vessels have revealed political and strategic mistrust between the two
States. In a media interview during his visit to the Philippines in May 2014, Vietnamese
Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung stated that ―[w]hat China is doing [with the Haiyang
Shiyou 981 oil rig] is totally different to what China is speaking‖47, adding that
―Vietnam always wants peace and friendship on the basis of independence, selfreliance, sovereignty, [and] territorial integrity of land and sea; however, Vietnam will
45
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never exchange this sacred sovereignty for some kind of unrealizable or dependent
peace and friendship.‖48 Speaking with Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to
Vietnam in November 2015, Vietnam‘s President Truong Tan Sang expressed his
concern that ―the trust in the relations between the two parties, two States, among our
people, officials, and party members has declined in recent years due to disputes and
disagreements over maritime issues as well as the failure to fully implement a number
of cooperative agreements between the two States.‖49 According to the Spring 2015
Global Attitudes survey, only 19 per cent of Vietnamese respondents had a positive
view on China, while 83 per cent expressed concern about Vietnam‘s territorial disputes
with the economic and military superpower.50 The 1974 Paracels battle, the 1979 border
war, and the 1988 Spratlys maritime conflict have been widely reported by Vietnamese
media outlets as battles stemming from China‘s illegal invasions. Indeed, the perception
of China as a threat emerged during the 2014 Haiyang Shiyou 981 oil rig incident. Since
this clash the two States have tried to restore their relationship; however, it has been
difficult for the two countries to regain the trust they first forged in 1991. Even though
China and Vietnam share the same nominal political ideology, Vietnam‘s foreign policy
vis-a-vis China centres on protecting its sovereignty and national interests in the South
China Sea. However, with China‘s formidable artificial island-building program in the
Spratly Islands, its growing assertiveness in the South China Sea, as well as social,
political and strategic distrust, mending the strained relationship between the two States
will be a difficult task.
48
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9.6.2

Philippines-China relations
The relationship between China and the Philippines has also undergone dramatic

change due to maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Indeed, since China occupied
Mischief Reef in 1995, the relationship between the two States has deteriorated
significantly. However, when Philippine President Arroyo came into power in 2011, the
relationship between the two States improved remarkably. To mark the 30th anniversary
of diplomatic relations between China and the Philippines in 2005, Chinese President
Hu Jintao paid a state visit to the Philippines, with the two States affirming that ―ChinaPhilippines relations have reached the golden age of partnership.‖ 51 Notably, in 2005
three oil companies from China, Vietnam and the Philippines signed a Tripartite
Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertakings in the Agreement Area in the South
China Sea, with the hope of ―contribut[ing] to the transformation of the South China
Sea into an area of peace, stability, cooperation, and development in accordance with
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 2002 ASEANChina Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.‖ 52 However, the
agreement was later suspended due to a widely publicised accusation by the Philippines
that the agreement violated its national laws.53 The relationship between China and the
Philippines has certainly worsened since 2012 due to the maritime standoff over
Scarborough Shoal. In 2013, the Philippines filed an arbitration case against China‘s
unlawful claims in the South China Sea despite formal objections from Beijing. In
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response, China asserted that ―what the Philippine side did seriously damaged bilateral
relations with China.‖54 Although China has sought to resolve maritime disputes with
the Philippines through bilateral negotiations, Philippine President Aquino has made it
clear that ―we cannot agree to bilateral talks to solve the problem, because we think the
problem is multilateral.‖55 The political mistrust between the two States has increased to
such an extent that President Aquino openly expressed his misgivings over Manila‘s
diplomatic relations with China, exclaiming that ―[a]t the end of the day, it goes from
hot to cold, sometimes they‘re very conciliatory, sometimes they make very provocative
statements‖.56 President Aquino further conceded that ―we don‘t understand some of the
messages [we get from China] sometimes. We‘re not sure.‖57 Since 2012, the
relationship between China and the Philippines has suffered significant setbacks. As
Richard Heydarian has succinctly stated: ―China and the Philippines have the most toxic
bilateral relationship in Asia.‖58 According to a 2015 survey by the Social Weather
Stations, 60 per cent of adults in the Philippines have ―little trust‖ in China, and 51 per
cent of Filipinos are concerned about maritime disputes with China in the South China
Sea.59
In May 2016, newly elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte indicated he
wanted to cultivate friendly relations with China, and would open up direct talks with
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Beijing over the South China Sea territorial disputes.60 This suggests a degree of hope
that the two sides may be able to restore their relationship in the coming years.
However, as the arbitral tribunal ruled in favour of the Philippines, it is unlikely that
Manila will concede any of its maritime claims to China in order to re-establish closer
ties.
9.6.3

United States-China relations
The lack of strategic trust between China and the United States has also

deepened due to various factors. The U.S. rebalancing policy towards the Asia-Pacific
to strengthen military, economic and diplomatic relationships with other Asian nations
has led to China becoming increasingly suspicious of U.S. involvement in the region.
Despite the United States going to great lengths to explain that the rebalancing policy is
about broadening U.S. engagement with Asia-Pacific States, and not a containment
exercise against China, many Chinese scholars have expressed the view that the U.S.
rebalancing policy targets China.61 Fan Gaoyue, a Senior Colonel in the Chinese Army
and Research Fellow at the Chinese Academy of Military Science, has expressed
concerns over the United States expanding its air and navy bases and increasing its
military presence in coastal regions of East Asia to monitor Chinese air and navy forces.
Fan has also propounded that the ―Air-Sea Battle‖ concept exaggerates the ―China
threat‖ in order to satisfy the U.S. domestic demand to contain China.62 Indeed, for Fan,
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―promoting such a concept will have a negative influence on building strategic mutual
trust between China and the US, and it will result in an escalation of tensions in the
Asia-Pacific region.‖63 Some Chinese authors have also proffered the view that the U.S.
rebalancing policy is designed to force China to accept the order and norms set by the
United States.64 Regarding the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), at a meeting with
President Obama in November 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping affirmed that ―I don't
see any of the regional free trade agreements as targeting China. China is committed to
open regionalism and we believe the various regional cooperation initiatives should
positively interact with each other. That is currently the case.‖ 65 However, many
Chinese observers have argued that the TPP is an instrument that the United States is
using to strengthen its economic control in the region and to contain China.66 For
example, Yin Chengde, a Research Fellow at the China Foundation for International
Studies, has explained that ―[by] involving its Asian allies Japan and Vietnam, both of
which have territorial disputes with China, in the TPP, the United States obviously
hopes to form a united front against China.‖67
In relation to the South China Sea, while the United States has asserted that it
―will not accept restrictions on freedom of navigation and overflight, or other lawful
uses of the sea‖68, China has rejected U.S. concerns over the issue. Speaking at the
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ASEAN Regional Forum in August 2015, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi ventured
as far as to say that ―China always maintains that countries enjoy freedom of navigation
and overflight in the South China Sea in accordance with the international law. Up to
now, there has not been a single case in which freedom of navigation in the South China
Sea is impeded.‖69 While the United States supports the resolution of South China Sea
disputes multilaterally, China prefers direct bilateral negotiation between the States
concerned. The United States has repeatedly stated its support for a Code of Conduct,
but China invariably seeks to exclude the United States from regional conversations.
According to Shannon Tiezzi, China ―will not move forward on a code of conduct until
the U.S. butts out.‖70 Speaking at the Shangri La Dialogue 2016 in Singapore, Ashton
Carter, U.S. Secretary of Defense, expressed the view that ―in the South China Sea,
China has taken some expansive and unprecedented actions that have generated
concerns about China‘s strategic intentions‖, adding that ―if these actions continue,
China could end up erecting a Great Wall of self-isolation.‖71 In response to Carter‘s
comments, Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the People's
Liberation Army, stated that ―[a]ctually I am worried that some people and countries are
still looking at China with the Cold War mentality and prejudice. They may build a wall
in their minds and end up isolating themselves.‖72 Carter and Sun have expressed
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diametrically opposing views, their comments clearly revealing the depth of the
strategic mistrust between the two powers.
9.6.4

United States relations with The Philippines and Vietnam
While the South China Sea disputes have pushed Vietnam and the Philippines

closer to the United States, political and strategic trust between the United States and
these two small South China Sea claimants is not always high.
Over the past decade there has been an improvement in the relationship between
Vietnam and the United States. However, due to historical issues and different political
ideologies, the two States still have a lot of work to do to fully normalise their
relationship. While human rights and democratic governance are the two major areas of
concern for the United States in its foreign policy towards Vietnam, maintaining the
power of the Vietnamese regime, preventing U.S.-led ―peaceful evolution‖, and creating
breathing space between U.S.-China strategic and diplomatic manoeuvres are key
concerns for Vietnam‘s foreign policy towards the United States. Moreover, Vietnam is
unlikely to forget the 1974 Paracels battle with China – a battle which, in Vietnamese
consciousness, saw the United States give the green light to China to invade Vietnam.
In this regard, Nguyen Manh Ha, Director of the Institute of Party History of Vietnam‘s
Communist Party, has declared that:
Without the handshake between Mao Zedong and Nixon, China would have not dared
to occupy the Paracel Islands, which was controlled by the southern government.
America was behind the southern region but why they did not support the southern
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government? It is because the US-China interests at that time were much bigger than the
―southern government card.‖73

Vietnam thus understands that national interests, rather than alliances, dictate
State relations. Vietnam also understands that the South China Sea issue is not the
central strategic factor in China-U.S. relations. Even though the relationship between
Vietnam and the United States has improved dramatically in recent years, it is unlikely
that Vietnam will seek a security alliance with the United States.
Although the Philippines and the United States are treaty allies, the level of trust
between these two States is not always high. Indeed, the strategic importance of the
alliance declined after 1991, when the Philippine Government voted to put an end to
U.S. military bases in the Philippines. The withdrawal of U.S. forces created a power
vacuum in the region, giving China the perfect opportunity to seize Mischief Reef in
1995. During the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and the Philippines,
the United States did show support for the Philippines by pressing China for a peaceful
resolution. However, in the end, the Philippines lost control of the shoal to Chinese
forces. With the growing assertiveness of China, the relationship between the United
States and the Philippines has improved in recent years. The 2014 Philippines-U.S.
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement is an example of strategic trust being rebuilt
between the two States. However, as Aileen Baviera has commented, ―while most
Filipinos welcome cooperation with the United States, many remain distrustful of
unequal agreement that long characterized relations with the former colonizer.‖74
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9.7

Implications for the future security, safety and freedom of navigation and
overflight
While most littoral States of the South China Sea have tried to enact domestic

legislation which is consistent with the LOSC, China, on the other hand, has claimed
almost all the waters of the South China Sea in contravention of international law. In
addition, China has advanced the most restrictive view on the freedoms of navigation
and overflight in various maritime zones, and assumed an aggressive posture in
defending its excessive territorial sovereignty and maritime claims in the region.
According to Peter Dutton, as a rising maritime power China appears to employ powerbased approaches in pursuing its maritime interests rather than law-based options.75
Dutton has also noted that ―[a]t no time in the last six decades can it be said that China‘s
preferred approach to achieving its peripheral maritime aims has been through
international law.‖76
Maintaining the security, safety and freedom of navigation and overflight in the
South China Sea is in the interest of not only littoral States but also extra-regional
players. Therefore, the States concerned need to cooperate with each other to diffuse
tensions and reduce the potential for violent clashes in this strategically important
region. With the aim of seeing the ―China Dream‖ become a reality, China has
increased its defence spending and is fiercely protecting its territorial sovereignty and
maritime claims in the South China Sea. In his speech to soldiers in the city of Huizhou
in 2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasised the military aspects of the ―Chinese
Dream‖, declaring that ―[t]his dream can be said to be the dream of a strong nation; and
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for the military, it is the dream of a strong military.‖77 In May 2015, the Chinese
government released its Defence White Paper (DWP) titled ―China‘s Military Strategy.‖
The paper is significant in that it highlights the role of China‘s military strategy in
securing the South China Sea domain. The DWP clearly states that ―[t]he traditional
mentality that land outweighs sea must be abandoned and great importance has to be
attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and
interests.‖78 The paper also notes that the Chinese navy ―will gradually shift its focus
from ‗offshore waters defense‘ to the combination of ‗offshore waters defense‘ with
‗open seas protection.‘‖79 Regarding territorial sovereignty and maritime disputes in the
South China Sea, the DWP asserts that some of China‘s neighbours ―take provocative
actions and reinforce their military presence on China‘s reefs and islands that they have
illegally occupied‖80, and that ―[s]ome external countries are also busy meddling in the
South China Sea affairs.‖81 It is clearly evident from these comments that China will not
compromise its territorial sovereignty and maritime claims in the South China Sea. Nor
will it submit to any legal process or entertain the involvement of external players in
managing South China Sea affairs.
As China has landed a number of aircraft on disputed features in the Spratly
Islands, it would appear that basing Chinese military aircraft on these artificial islands
will inevitably follow.82 Philippine Foreign Ministry spokesman Charles Jose has
surmised that ―[t]hat's the fear, that China will be able to take control of the South China
77

Edward Wong, China‟s Communist Party Chief Acts to Bolster Military (14 December 2012) New
York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/world/asia/chinas-xi-jinping-acts-to-bolstermilitary.html?_r=0>.
78
See Full Text: China's Military Strategy (26 May 2015) Xinhuanet
<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2015-05/26/c_134271001_4.htm>.
79
Ibid.
80
Ibid.
81
Ibid.
82
China lands more civilian planes on Fiery Cross reef (7 January 2016) BBC NEWS
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35249092>.

343

Sea and it will affect the freedom of navigation and freedom of overflight.‖ 83 According
to Richard Fisher, it is to be expected that China will deploy surface-to-air missiles to
islands in the Spratlys.84 If this occurs, then increasing its military presence in both the
Paracels and the Spratlys could help China effectively establish an air defence
identification zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea. In November 2013, China declared
an ADIZ in the East China Sea, sparking concerns from regional States, including the
United States, Japan and Australia.85 An ADIZ is a designated ―area of airspace over
land or water, extending upward from the surface, within which the ready identification,
the location, and the control of aircraft are required in the interest of national
security.‖86 The ADIZ concept is not clearly addressed in international law, but many
States in the region including the United States, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have
established ADIZs. China‘s ADIZ in the East China Sea covers airspace over disputed
territories, notably the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and overlaps with the ADIZs of Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan. Moreover, unlike the ADIZs of other States, China requests
all foreign aircraft, including civilian and military aircraft crossing its ADIZ, to identify
themselves and to follow Chinese instructions on flight paths even though such aircraft
are not entering Chinese airspace.87 If China establishes an ADIZ in the South China
Sea, then this will definitely have a negative effect on the passage of sovereign immune
aircraft. Moreover, if an ADIZ does transpire, then it is likely that there will be more
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Chinese military aircraft patrolling the airspace above the South China Sea.
Accordingly, intentional and unintentional aviation incidents will be difficult to avoid.
On the ocean surface, China will continue to adhere to its restrictive views on
the innocent passage of foreign warships in the territorial sea and foreign military
activities in the EEZ. With its increasing maritime power, it is expected that China will
be more assertive and aggressive in defending its position regarding these issues.
In addition to increasing the presence of its military and law enforcement
vessels, China has been operating the world‘s largest fleet of fishing vessels, with many
of these vessels being used as maritime militia to enforce China‘s maritime claims in
the South China Sea.88 Indeed, approximately 200,000 fishing vessels comprise China‘s
maritime militia, with such vessels supporting China‘s coercive maritime claims against
other claimant States in the South China Sea and East China Sea. 89 As a number of

Chinese fishing vessels have been trained to confront foreign vessels in disputed waters,
incidents involving these fishing vessels and other sovereign immune vessels operating
in the South China Sea will continue to take place.
In light of the above discussion, China‘s military ambitions, combined with its
increasing maritime forces and pattern of aggressive behaviour over the past few
decades, will make the task of maintaining the security, safety and freedom of
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea in the coming years very challenging.
9.8

The way forward
In order to avoid both intentional and unintentional maritime incidents in the

South China Sea, there are a number of recommendations that the relevant States should
consider.
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Firstly, pending the resolution of their territorial sovereignty and maritime
claims, the States concerned could maintain the current status quo in the South China
Sea, including in disputed offshore territories. This would require the relevant States to
not only halt island building, but also refrain from sending additional naval and law
enforcement assets to disputed maritime areas for the purpose of asserting sovereignty
claims. This option was mentioned in the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea (DOC), and has also been suggested by many diplomatic and political
leaders.90 However, China might not be interested in this option, as it views the current
status quo as unfavourable. Nevertheless, ASEAN member States could work with
China to implement the DOC while refraining from any action which would complicate
or escalate existing disputes. Extra-regional powers, particularly the United States,
Japan, India and Australia, could also play an important role in maintaining the existing
state of affairs in the South China Sea, thus hampering China‘s plans to consolidate its
presence and alter the status quo in the region in its favour. In order to support the role
of extra-regional powers (particularly the United States) in maintaining the freedoms of
navigation and overflight in the region, littoral States could issue a joint statement
expressing their views on the innocent passage of foreign warships in the territorial sea
and foreign military activities in the EEZ – views which are consistent with customary
international law and the LOSC. It is worth noting that despite Vietnam‘s domestic law
requiring prior notification for the passage of foreign warships in its territorial sea, the
passage of the USS Curtis Wilbur within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island claimed by
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Vietnam (among other States), without any prior notification being given prompted
Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesman Le Hai Binh to state that: ―Vietnam respects
the right of innocent passage through its territory in accordance with international law,
particularly Article 17 of the Law of the Sea Convention.‖91
Secondly, a Code of Conduct (Code) for the South China Sea seems difficult to
achieve due to the different interests of China and ASEAN States. China does not want
to have a legally binding document with ASEAN in the South China Sea, while a
number of ASEAN States including Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Myanmar may not
be in a hurry to push for a Code which would impact their relationship with China.
According to Carl Thayer, ―the geographical area of ASEAN‘s proposed CoC cannot be
defined until China either clarifies or withdraws its nine-dash line claim to the South
China Sea.‖92 Thayer has also added that ―because ASEAN and China have agreed to
proceed with consultations on the drafting of a CoC on the basis of consensus, China
can delay these proceedings indefinitely.‖93 As mentioned in Chapter eight, China and
the ASEAN aimed to reach a framework for a code of conduct for the South China Sea
by the middle of 2017. As ASEAN is unlikely to strike an agreement with China on
South China Sea issues, other littoral States could strive for an incidents at sea
agreement that sets out rules of behaviour for when their sovereign immune vessels and
aircraft encounter each other. Such an agreement could then be opened to other
interested States, including Indonesia, Singapore, the United States, Japan, India and
Australia. If such an agreement were to receive wide support from the regional
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community and extra-regional players, it would not only help avoid maritime incidents
but also potentially reduce the aggressive behaviour of Chinese maritime forces in the
region. Based on the arbitral tribunal‘s ruling, South China Sea claimants could strive
for a joint understanding or joint declaration to support the ruling regarding the ninedash line and the status of land features in the South China Sea. If all relevant States
showed support for the arbitral tribunal‘s decision that the nine-dash line claimed by
China has no legal basis, and that all land features in the South China Sea are incapable
of generating EEZs or continental shelves, this would help not only narrow down the
disputed maritime areas in this region, but also demonstrate respect for the LOSC.
Thirdly, as most of the recent maritime incidents in the South China Sea have
involved law enforcement vessels rather than naval ships and aircraft, regional States
could establish a law enforcement forum and develop maritime safety guidelines or
agreements between regional maritime law enforcement forces. The North Pacific Coast
Guard Forum (NPCF) established in 2000 is a good example of this practice. The NPCF
currently consists of six members, China, Canada, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the
United States. The focus areas of the NPCF include maritime security, maritime domain
awareness, illegal drug trafficking, illegal migration, fisheries enforcement, and
combined operations.94 Since the forum was established, a number of bilateral and
multilateral operations and exercises have been conducted.95 Also, the Heads of Asian
Coast Guard Agencies Meeting (HACGAM) has been held almost every year since
2004. Representatives from Asian States, including all South China Sea littoral States,
have participated in ―active discussions on their shared challenges concerning piracy
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and proposed a general framework of collaboration to effectively deal with this issue.‖96
It is recommended that HACGAM develop mechanisms for coast guard-type maritime
forces, including but not limited to, coast guards, fisheries enforcement agencies and
marine police, which could then cooperate at an operational level and also establish
guiding principles for the safe interaction of these types of maritime forces. If such
guiding principles are established and consistently implemented by a majority of States
in the region, they could certainly lead to the formation of customary international law
principles which would become binding on all States over time. In addition, the Taiwan
Coast Guard should be invited to participate in this regional law enforcement effort –
not as a State but as an agency in a similar way to the way Taiwan participates in the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) group and the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). This will help avoid sovereignty issues and improve
the effectiveness of any regional resolution regarding the passage of coast guard-type
maritime forces in the South China Sea. If these guiding principles are not established in
the near future, hotlines between coast guard-type maritime forces could be set up to
help prevent small-scale incidents from escalating into large-scale conflict.
Fourthly, pending the resolution of territorial sovereignty disputes and maritime
claims, regional States could cooperate to increase maritime situational awareness, thus
avoiding mistakes and miscalculations. Established in 2009, the Singapore-based
Information Fusion Centre (IFC) is a Singaporean initiative which seeks to strengthen
regional maritime security ―by building a common coherent maritime situation picture
and acting as a maritime information hub for the region.‖97 The IFC shares information
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with members of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) through the Regional
Maritime Information Exchange (ReMIX) System.98 However, this centre focuses
mainly on the exchange of information regarding maritime piracy and armed robberies.
Even if the centre was equipped to exchange other types of information, States would
still be reluctant to share sensitive data, such as information relating to manoeuvring
military vessels and aircraft. The idea of combined maritime surveillance patrols in the
South China Sea by South China Sea littoral States, or by littoral States and extraregional powers, could not only be used to improve maritime situational awareness but
also strengthen regional maritime cooperation and understanding. For example,
Vietnam and Malaysia could conduct combined maritime surveillance patrols within
their respective EEZs, including in the overlapping areas. The United States could
conduct maritime surveillance in conjunction with Vietnam and the Philippines within
the EEZs of Vietnam and the Philippines. This would help build confidence between the
parties and also place pressure on China in relation to its claimed nine-dash line.
Importantly, all information regarding the building of artificial islands or actions which
change the status quo could be publically broadcasted, thus allowing the relevant parties
to take appropriate and prompt action.
Fifthly, even though there have been no incidents in the South China Sea
between Chinese sovereign immune aircraft and those of smaller littoral States, the
increasing number of military and coast guard aircraft in the region could pose a
potential risk in the coming years. In 2015, China repeatedly warned Philippine and
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U.S. surveillance aircraft to leave the Spratly Island area.99 If China continues to send
its aircraft to accost or intercept surveillance aircraft of other States in the South China
Sea, then potential air incidents cannot be ignored in any future regulatory regime.
Currently, international law is silent on the interaction between sovereign immune
aircraft outside national airspace. For this reason, South China Sea littoral States should
devise a set of guiding principles for the passage of this type of aircraft. Indeed, such
principles would help avoid unexpected incidents in the South China Sea, particularly in
disputed maritime areas.
Sixthly, South China Sea littoral States have increased their submarine forces in
recent years. However, certain States, particularly Vietnam, Indonesia and Malaysia,
have little experience in handling submarines. According to Roger Thornhill, ―it takes
decades of submarine service to develop the tactics, techniques, procedures and
doctrine, backed by experience, to be effective.‖100 Therefore, the safety of submarine
operations in the South China Sea is a serious issue. As discussed above, the covert
nature of submarine operations means that a regional agreement governing the
manoeuvre of such vessels is a daunting task. NATO has a Submarine Movement
Advisory Authority to manage water space and de-conflict undersea transits and
operations among Allied nations and partners.101 However, this model cannot be
replicated in the South China Sea as no single State is willing to let other States know
where their submarines operate. As anti-submarine weapons can be very dangerous, this
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often results in States adopting an ―all or nothing‖ approach.102 It would be advisable to
have regional guidelines or principles in place which prevent lethal force being used
when dealing with unidentified submarines detected in the territorial sea and disputed
waters.103 Another option would be to increase regional cooperation in submarine safety
training and submarine rescue. This would not only help reduce the risk of submarine
accidents, but also foster trust and understanding between regional submarine forces.
The Submarine Escape and Rescue exercise conducted in 2010 by the navies of
Singapore, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the United States, and the Submarine
Rescue Arrangement signed by the Singapore Navy and the Australian Navy in 2013,
are good models for regional cooperation in submarine training and rescue.104
Seventhly, as territorial sovereignty and maritime delimitation disputes in the
South China Sea are unlikely to be resolved in the near future (or at all), concerned
States could look for options that avoid the issues of sovereignty and maritime
boundaries altogether. For example, for the safety of navigation and overflight in the
region, concerned States could negotiate standard procedures for the safe interaction of
sovereign immune vessels and aircraft at sea in general, without referring to maritime
zones. This change of mind-set could help avoid the obstacle of sovereignty disputes
among concerned States.
Lastly, maintaining safety, security and freedom of navigation and overflight in
the South China Sea is in the interest of not only littoral States but the region as a
102
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whole. Extra-regional powers can play a constructive role in preserving the freedom of
navigation and overflight in accordance with international law, thus ensuring the peace,
security and stability of the area. All regional States should cooperate with each other to
promote rule-based approaches to the South China Sea disputes. As Dutton has
proclaimed: ―Not history, not power, but international law must be the standard.‖105
Apart from statements urging claimants to adhere to international law and maintain the
status quo in the South China Sea, peaceful naval operations to assert the freedom of
navigation and overflight should be regularly conducted. Combined maritime patrols
and surveillance by extra-regional maritime powers in the South China Sea will also
help demonstrate their concerns over the security and freedom of navigation in this
strategically important region. The patrol of the USS Lassen within 12 nautical miles of
the artificial island built by China on Subi Reef on 27 October 2015, and the passage of
the USS Curtis Wilbur within 12 nautical miles of Triton Island in February 2016,
represent efforts by the United States to maintain the status quo in relation to the
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. However, the patrol by a single State is
not powerful enough in representing State practice, and even this would make the issue
become the matter between the United States and China. Therefore, combined patrol by
like-mined States should be encouraged. With the ruling of the arbitral tribunal in the
Philippines-China arbitration, China cannot continue to assert ambiguous maritime
claims in the South China Sea. Indeed, in the wake of this ruling, the United States,
Japan, India and Australia have a clear legal basis to conduct freedom of navigation
operations in the South China Sea, and thus support a rules-based order. Extra-regional
powers could also help smaller South China Sea States improve their knowledge and
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skills in handling maritime assets in accordance with international law, thus helping to
mitigate maritime incidents and accidents at sea. Moreover, the United States could
accede to the LOSC in order to improve its credibility and bolster its efforts in
advocating for rule-based orders, not only in the region but around the world. As U.S.
President Barack Obama has noted: ―[We] can‘t try to resolve problems in the South
China Sea when we have refused to make sure that the Law of the Sea Convention is
ratified by our United States Senate.‖106
9.9

Conclusion

The international law of the sea has played an important role in maintaining maritime
safety and security. However, due to uncertain issues in the international legal regime,
States continue to adopt differing interpretations of pertinent provisions to suit their
own vested interests. Given China‘s rise in economic and military power, as well as its
pattern of aggressive behaviour, it is unlikely that it will show any respect for
international legal provisions which it considers prejudicial to its own interests. By all
accounts, it seems likely that China will soon declare an ADIZ in the South China
Sea.107 If this transpires, managing maritime safety and the freedom of navigation and
overflight in the region will be a critical issue for years to come. Although there have
been a number of regional initiatives to address South China Sea issues, they have had
limited success. Furthermore, considerable challenges remain which necessitate swift
and decisive action. The recommendations discussed in this chapter can be combined
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with other policies and strategies which address sovereignty disputes and maritime
claims in order to keep the South China Sea peaceful and secure long into the future.
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10 CONCLUSION
10.1 Introduction
This thesis has shown that the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft
at sea is not explicitly addressed in international law. Moreover, the geographical and
geopolitical complexity of the South China Sea means that many more incidents
involving vessels and aircraft of this type are likely to occur in the coming years.
The research presented in the thesis has analysed navigational issues in the
South China Sea, focusing on the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft.
Particular attention has been given to the prevailing international law; geopolitical
issues; territorial sovereignty disputes and associated maritime claims; the practices of
littoral States; current regional initiatives; and the strengths and weaknesses of regional
institutions. In doing so, the thesis has highlighted the challenges that lay ahead; the
implications of these challenges for future maritime security, safety, and the freedom of
navigation and overflight in the South China Sea; as well as a number of
recommendations for more responsible navigational regimes in relation to sovereign
immune vessels and aircraft in the region.
This chapter summarises the key findings of the thesis. Furthermore, based on
these key findings, the chapter recommends a number of areas that require further
research.
10.2 Key findings and policy recommendations
The thesis has uncovered a number of problems that continue to impact the
passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft in the South China Sea. These
problems include unresolved maritime territorial disputes and sovereignty issues; gaps
and ambiguities in the international legal regime which lead to conflicting
interpretations of pertinent provisions by States; limitations in the practical application
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of regional initiatives at both the governmental level (Track I) and non-governmental
level (Track II); differences of opinion within the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) over how to best approach the South China Sea disputes; China‘s
growing assertiveness in relation to its excessive sovereignty and maritime claims in the
region; and the existing political and strategic distrust among littoral States and between
littoral States and extra-regional powers.
The thesis has also found that the resolution of sovereignty disputes in the South
China Sea is highly unlikely in the coming years. The main reason for this is that none
of the claimant States are willing to relinquish or compromise their sovereignty claims
over offshore features. Furthermore, certain claimants, such as China, have taken the
bold step of claiming all these islands, thus casting further doubt on the possibility of a
resolution. Moreover, China‘s ―nine-dash line‖ claim, which contravenes international
law, has created an obstacle for any joint resource development in the region. Indeed, as
States have not been able to agree on what areas are in dispute, they cannot agree on
areas for joint resource development.
The analysis in the preceding chapters has focused on a number of regional
initiatives (at both Track I and Track II levels) to promote confidence-building and
prevent maritime conflict. However, current efforts to manage such conflicts appear to
have had limited success. While most of the regional initiatives and bilateral agreements
approved at Track I level are non-legally binding, proposals at Track II level have failed
to gain traction with concerned States, as any attempt to interpret the provisions of the
LOSC narrowly and with a regional focus has proved unsuccessful. ASEAN could play
a central role in maintaining stable maritime security and freedom of navigation in the
region. However, all ten member States of ASEAN have different stakes in, and
concerns over, South China Sea issues. As a result, ASEAN has not been able to speak
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with one voice in relation to the South China Sea disputes. Moreover, as consultation
and consensus are the basic principles of decision-making within ASEAN, one proBeijing member can effectively block the organisation‘s decision-making process.
In addition to the shortcomings of regional mechanisms, the thesis has revealed
gaps and ambiguities in international law, particularly in the way the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), the Convention on International Civil
Aviation (Chicago Convention), and the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea (COLREGs) regulate the passage of sovereign immune vessels and
aircraft at sea. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that these gaps and ambiguities will be
resolved, as they are the inevitable product of a compromise-based international law
system.
A key emphasis of the thesis has been China‘s burgeoning economic and
military prowess. Indeed, China‘s advancement in these crucial areas has allowed it to
disregard international law, particularly the LOSC. For example, while China applies a
restrictive view on the freedom of navigation and overflight in its own EEZ, it continues
to disregard the sovereign rights of other South China Sea littoral States in their
respective EEZs. Granted, the LOSC contains provisions regarding foreign military
activities in the EEZ of coastal States which are, at best, ambiguous. And undoubtedly
China has exploited these ambiguities to its advantage. However, no ambiguity exists in
the LOSC in relation to the sovereign rights enjoyed by coastal States over both living
and non-living resources in their EEZs. China‘s legally untenable ‗nine-dash line‘
claim, and its extensive artificial island-building program on various disputed offshore
features in the South China Sea, have created concerns which transcend the safety and
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. With China‘s current pattern of
behaviour, maintaining the safety and freedom of navigation and overflight in the South
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China Sea, particularly for sovereign immune vessels and aircraft, will be a challenging
issue for years to come.
The thesis has found that other maritime user States, particularly the United
States, Japan, India and Australia, have interests in the South China Sea. Promoting the
freedom of navigation in accordance with international law, and maintaining stable
security in the South China Sea, are key priorities for these States. However, the South
China Sea is not the only factor in their relations vis-à-vis China.
The analysis has also highlighted that as long as strategic and political distrust
exists between China and other South China Sea claimants, any resolution of the South
China Sea disputes will remain illusory. The strategic distrust between China and the
United States also prevents external players from promoting the safety and freedom of
navigation and overflight in and above the South China Sea. As a result, regional
responses to maritime disputes in the South China Sea have taken on a distinct material
character, with concerned States modernising their maritime forces, including navies, as
well as coast guards and other types of civilian law enforcement agencies. The
heightened presence of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft will increase the
likelihood of adverse incidents.
The thesis has provided a number of policy recommendations to maintain the
freedoms of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, and to prevent potentially
adverse incidents in the region involving the passage of sovereign immune vessels and
aircraft. These recommendations include promoting regional efforts to maintain the
status quo; an incidents at sea agreement between South China Sea claimant States in a
way that encourages non-claimants and extra-regional powers to accede to it;
encouraging South China Sea claimants to revise their maritime claims in accordance
with developments in international law (such the recent award of the arbitral tribunal);
360

encouraging Taiwan, in its capacity as a South China Sea claimant, to play a more
constructive role in the region; advocating for regional guidelines or agreements
regarding the interaction between coast guard-type maritime forces in the South China
Sea; promoting a regional agreement governing the interaction between State aircraft in
international airspace; recommending prospective measures for the safe operation of
submarines; increasing maritime awareness; and insisting that extra-regional powers
play constructive roles in maintaining security and the freedom of navigation and
overflight in the area. These recommendations should be combined with other relevant
policies and strategies, and adapted or modified (as necessary) in accordance with the
political will of the States concerned. By doing so, it is hoped that the peace, stability
and security of the South China Sea will be maintained for the benefit of the region as a
whole.
More than 30 years have passed since the LOSC was negotiated, and with
changes in technology and the security environment, it is timely to consider what
revisions may be made to the document with the support of the global community. In
this regard, provisions of the LOSC related to maritime safety and the freedoms of
navigation and overflight should be revised for increased clarity. However, it is highly
dubious that such a proposal would help fill the gaps and ambiguities in areas relevant
to the passage of sovereign immune vessels and aircraft. This is because maritime user
States are unlikely to reach a consensus on any provision that restricts the freedom of
navigation and overflight at sea. Therefore, rather than clarifying the existing provisions
of the LOSC, a better approach would be to focus on how to encourage States to strictly
adhere to the current provisions of the LOSC in good faith.
As there are no existing international law rules governing the interaction
between sovereign immune aircraft outside national airspace, establishing a code of
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conduct or set of guidelines for unplanned encounters at sea for sovereign immune
aircraft is also critical. A number of incidents have occurred between Chinese, Japanese
and U.S. sovereign immune aircraft in the East and South China Seas, and between
sovereign immune aircraft of the United States and Russia in the Baltic Sea. These
incidents have revealed a loophole in the international legal regime regarding the
interaction between State aircraft in international airspace.
In recent years, there have been a number of regional and bilateral agreements
regarding the interaction between military vessels and aircraft at sea. The Code for
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) was approved in 2014 by the Western Pacific
Naval Symposium, and two Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) have been signed by
China and the United States on sea-air interactions. However, similar agreements
ensuring safe encounters between non-naval law enforcement vessels and aircraft are
yet to be devised. Given that coast guards and other maritime law enforcement agencies
are playing critical roles in protecting the sovereignty and sovereign rights of concerned
States, especially in the East and South China Seas, the potential for clashes between
these forces should not be ignored. As a result, encouraging regional civilian law
enforcement agencies to have an agreement in place for the safe behaviour of their
vessels and aircraft at sea is a critical consideration.
10.3 Recommended areas for further research
The thesis has exposed a number of areas that require further research for the
continued improvement of maritime safety and the freedom of navigation and overflight
at sea.
As States in the South China Sea have not been able to agree on what areas are
in dispute, any proposal for sharing resources or for the joint development of such
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resources in contested areas is unlikely to succeed. Moreover, apart from resources, the
South China Sea has strategic and security importance to littoral States; therefore,
sharing resources is not the highest priority for these particular States. An avenue for
further research could thus be ways of maintaining the current status quo in the region.
Indeed, this research could investigate indirect approaches to achieve this goal –
approaches which eschew any reference to disputed areas. This could take the form of
regional cooperative mechanisms for maintaining the safety of sea lines of
communication and protecting the region‘s marine environment and natural resources.
Despite the Cold War having ended 25 years ago, an increase in the number of
Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZs) due to sovereignty and security concerns is
likely to continue into the future. As there are currently no international law rules
governing the establishment of ADIZs, further research could be conducted on
international guidelines and geostrategic factors related to ADIZs (and with the
objective of maintaining the safety and freedom of overflight at sea).
In the East and South China Seas, Chinese fishing vessels have received
specialised training and been equipped with advanced electronics and even some
warfare capabilities. As a result, these fishing vessels have been transformed into
maritime militia to support China‘s maritime claims in times of peace, and to bolster the
State‘s military forces in times of armed conflict. This tactic not only poses potential
threats to the safety and freedom of navigation of vessels of other States in the region,
but also raises concerns over how to distinguish between civilian fishing vessels used
for peaceful purposes, and fishing vessels which are being used to support military
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forces in times of war.1 Therefore, research focusing on the legality of using ―irregular‖
fishing vessels to enforce maritime sovereignty claims in peacetime, and to support
military forces in times of armed conflict at sea, could help fill this loophole in
international law.
ASEAN should play a key role in maintaining regional security. However, due
to its consensus-based decision-making process, it is hard for ASEAN to stand firm on
regional security issues, particularly South China Sea problems. Further research on the
limitations of the ASEAN Charter would, therefore, be useful.
Lastly, as unresolved maritime disputes have the potential to lead to maritime
conflicts if not carefully managed, resolving disputes by peaceful means and with
reference to international law rules and norms should always be a priority. Against this
backdrop, the opportunity exists for research which critically assesses rule-based versus
power-based approaches in resolving sovereignty and maritime disputes. Such research
could help encourage concerned States to settle disputes through peaceful legal
processes rather than resorting to armed conflict.
In order to establish a broad spectrum of potential approaches to issues in the
South China Sea, the above-mentioned research areas should be fully investigated. It is
fervently hoped that the proposals canvassed in this thesis, when combined with the
results of the further research, will lead to the maintenance and promotion of maritime
safety, stability and security – not only in the South China Sea but in all ocean spaces.
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